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SECRET WARRANTY REGULATION
I. NTRODUCTION

Everyone knows that manufacturers normally repair defects that turn up
while a warranty is in effect. But what about defects that surface after the
warranty expires? When something you've bought-perhaps a car-breaks
down after the warranty has run, do you ask the manufacturer to repair it for
free? If not, you may be paying for repairs unnecessarily. Some
manufacturers, especially automobile manufacturers, provide repairs without
charge when the identical defect turns up in many units of the products they
make, even though the repairs are not covered by a warranty. The
manufacturer might do so to retain the good will of the customer, in the hope
that the customer will continue to buy the manufacturer's products. Many
manufacturers who offer these "good will adjustments" strive to keep them
confidential, so that few will request them. 1 Hence consumer advocates call
Secret
good will adjustments by another name: "secret warranties."'
warranty programs, which have existed for at least twenty years, 3 are

1. Manufacturers also call good will adjustments by other names:

policy

adjustments, special adjustment programs and post-warranty adjustment programs.
2. One example comes from the testimony of Clarence M. Ditlow, Executive
Director, Center for Auto Safety ("CAS"), during Joint HearingsBefore the N.Y.
Assembly Committee on ConsumerAffairs and Protectionand Senate Committee on
ConsumerProtection (Dec. 4, 1989) [hereinafter, N.Y. Hearings]:
GM's secret warranty on power steering failure on 1980-88
front-wheel-drive cars alone affects up to 16 million vehicles. Center for
Auto Safety estimates a minimum of 15% of these cars will have failures
that will require replacement of the rack and pinion assembly at a cost of
about $500. Although Center for Auto Safety pressured GM to
acknowledge the secret warranty, GM refused to notify owners and its latest
press release failed to name the models affected. As a result, Center for

Auto Safety is inundated with complaints from consumers about power
steering failure who have never heard of the secret warranty. By the time
many consumers learn of this secret warranty, the 5 year/50,000 limit has
often expired. Even though these consumers first experience symptoms of
the defect before the limit, they didn't take it in for repair because it was
relatively minor. By concealing the defect, GM managed to get consumers
over the limit.
Throughout this Article, references will be made to allegations of secret
warranties reported elsewhere. Sometimes manufacturers deny that they are in fact

conducting such programs. See, e.g., infra note 26. The author cannot verify claims
that particular secretwarranties programs have existed or not; consequently references

to allegations of particular secret warranty programs here should not be construed to
mean that the allegations are true.
3. JONATHAN A. SHELDON, UNFAm AND DEcEPnvE ACTS AND PRACTICES 226

(3d ed. 1992). Secret warranties are referred to, though not by that name, in William
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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enormous in scope: nearly every car on the road is said to be subject to one
of the more than 500 secret warranties supposedly operating at any given
time,! while one expert estimates that the ten largest known secret warranty
programs have covered 30 million automobiles and $3 billion in repairs.5
Troubled by the fact that some consumers obtain free repairs while others
who are equally needy do not, a number of consumer groups have sought to
make the repairs available to all consumers. These consumer organizations
have attempted to publicize secret warranties,' and have met with some
success: publication of one list of secret warranties generated more than
20,000 consumer inquiries and helped numerous car owners obtain relief.'
But consumer groups have been frustrated by the difficulty of learning
about secret warranties. While federal legislation requires automobile
manufacturers to file with the Department of Transportation copies of repair
bulletins sent to dealers,8 manufacturers allegedly have avoided filing notices
of secret warranties by addressing reports of secret warranties not to dealers,
but to customer service departments. 9 Corporate whistleblowers have leaked

C. Whitford, Law and the Consumer Transaction: A Case Study of the Automobile
Warranty, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 1006, 1037-38.

4. See CLARENCE DrrLow & RAY GOLD, LrrTLE SECRETS OF THE AuTo
INDUSTRY 1 (1994); see also Center for Auto Safety, CarMakers Secret Warranties
Attacked, 8 LEMON Tvms, No. 4, at 4 (1987), reprintedin CENTER FOR AUTO
SAFETY, SECRET AUTO WARRANTi-s item 5 (1992) (300 warranties). For a 73-page

list of secret warranties, see MORTON J. SCHULTZ, GET YOUR CAR FIXED FREE 10-83
(1994).
5. See NYHearings, supranote 2 (testimony of Clarence M. Ditlow, Executive
Director, Center for Auto Safety) (1987 estimate); CENTER FOR AUTo SAFETY,
REPORT ON SECRET WARRANTIES TO THE FTC 5 (1987), reprintedin CENTER FOR
AUTO SAFETY, SECRET AUTO WARRANTIS item 7 (1992). The estimate apparently
does not take into account consequential and other damages incurred by consumers,
such as towing expenses, expenses caused by the need to arrange alternative

transportation, and payments made for repairs to mechanics who erroneously diagnose
the problem because they do not know of the secretwarranty. See NYHearings,supra
note 2 (testimony of Virginia Apuzzo, Deputy Executive Director, New York State
Consumer Protection Board).
6. The Center for Auto Safety and Consumers Union have been most active in
publicizing secret warranties.

Other consumer organizations opposed to secret

warranties reportedly include the Consumer Federation of America and Motor Voters.
See Laura Polachek & Mark Steinbach, Secret Warranty Programs, in NAAG
CoNsUMER PROTECTION REPORT, Aug. 1991, at 1.
7. See id. at 6.
8. See 15 U.S.C. § 1418(a)(1) (1988).
9. See Is Your Car's Warranty a Secret?, CONSUMER REP., Apr. 1989, at 214
(reporter reviewed a year's worth of technical bulletins filed with the Secretary of

Transportation-about 3200-without finding report of good will adjustments).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/2
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allegations of some secret warranty programs, 0 and consumer advocates have

discovered others by carefully comparing government records with reports
from consumers," but it is likely that other good will adjustment programs
have remained confidential.
Consumer groups have lobbied for protective legislation. That effort has
borne fruit in California, Connecticut, Virginia, and Wisconsin, all of which
have enacted statutes governing secret warranties. In the early 1980's the
Federal Trade Commission commenced two proceedings in an effort to take
the secrecy out of secret warranties, but the Commission seems to have lost
interest in secret warranty regulation. As a result, in most of the country
today, secret warranty programs are largely unfettered by governmental
controls.
The purpose of this Article is to discuss whether secret warranties should
be regulated, and if so, how. Part II of the Article reviews what is known
about the working of secret warranty programs. Part III discusses the
economics of secret warranties, consumer psychology, and the policies which
militate in favor of and against regulation of secret warranties. Part IV
explores the laws applicable to secret warranties. Finally, part V attempts to
determine what type of regulation might be most effective.

10. See id. ("Awhistleblower made public 41 secret warranties ... ."). See also
lntemal RepairDocuments,
Diana T. Kurylko, CenterforAuto Safety SharesNissan 's
AUTOMOTIVE NEWs, July 9, 1990, at 8 ("The Center for Auto Safety has released
documents it obtained from whistleblowers that alleged Nissan Motor Corp. spent

$15.5 million in a six-month period on free repairs for consumers who protested about
parts no longer covered bywarranties."); Laura Sagolla, CarTrouble, COMMON CAUSE
MAG., Jan-Feb. 1991, at 7-8.

11. CAS has discovered some secretwarranty programs by comparing automobile
manufacturer service bulletins, which identify defects in cars, with reports of consumer
complaints in which the manufacturer had agreed to pay for the repairs. See NY

Hearings,supranote 2 (testimony of Virginia Apuzzo, Deputy Executive Director,
New York State Consumer Protection Board). That system works only if the Center
for Auto Safety has access to the service bulletins-and some are available to the

public only after long delays. See id. (testimony of Robert Abrams, New York State
Attorney General) (1988 survey of 24 auto manufacturers found that only three offered
service bulletins to public; fourth has since started doing so). It is obviously also
limited to automobiles and to cases in which the manufacturer identifies the defect in
its bulletins, and ConsumerReportshas reported that not all adjustment programs are
reported in the bulletins. See supra note 9.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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II. How SECRET WARRANTIES WORK
Any attempt to describe how secret warranties function suffers from a

significant disability:

Many manufacturers who provide them attempt to

conceal their very existence, let alone how they work, and so accounts of their
operation may be incomplete. Nevertheless, some information has become
public. Most of what is known about secret warranties has to do with

automobiles. 2 That may be because secret warranties are more common in
automobile sales, given the expense and complexity of motor vehicles, or it
may be because the Center for Auto Safety has been particularly vigilant in
monitoring good will adjustment programs. In any event, since more
information is available about automobile secret warranties, the focus of this
Article is on cars.
Because many consumers have their cars serviced by dealers, and because
dealers provide information to manufacturers about repairs, auto manufacturers
are able to identify widespread problems with the cars they sell. 3
Manufacturers may respond in a variety of ways to discovery of a common
problem showing up in cars after expiration of the warranty. At one extreme,
they may choose to do nothing. At the other extreme, they may initiate a
recall campaign, and indeed, if the problem relates to safety or certain

12. Automobiles are not the only product subject to secret warranties. See, e.g.,
Warren Brown, Are Consumers Left Out By 'Secret Warranties'? In Most States,
ManufacturersAren'tRequiredto Notify Public When ProtectionIs Extended, WASH.
POST, Sept. 22, 1991, at HI (telephone company reported to have secret warranty
program for cordless telephones); Follow-up, CONSUMER REP., Sept. 1993, at 558
(manufacturer said to notify its servicers but not customers that it will replace at
reduced rate compressors in refrigerators that failed after warranty expired but before
compressors normally fail). In addition, many manufacturers provide refunds to
dissatisfiedconsumerswho communicate their dissatisfactionto the manufacturer, even
though the product's labelling does not indicate that the manufacturer has such a
policy. See C. L. Kendall & Frederick A. Russ, Warranty and ComplaintPolicies:
An OpportunityforMarketingManagement, 39 J. MKTG. 36, 39 (Apr. 1975) (when
complaint letters were written to companies many of whose products did not carry
written warranty, one study found that 70% responded satisfactorily with offers of
refund or merchandise and another found 68% responded in same way; no significant
difference found between those who put warranties on products and those who did
not).
13. See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.

According to one trade

organization, these problems need not involve part failures: "Such mundane items as
wind noise or rattles may be the subject of a [good will adjustment] program."
HearingsBefore Conn. GeneralLaw Committee (Jan. 30, 1990) [hereinafter, Conn.
Hearings](statement of Automobile Importers of America, Inc.).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/2
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emissions, federal law requires a recall. 4

An intermediate choice is to

provide a secret warranty program. 15
From the manufacturer's perspective, secret warranties offer advantages
over both doing nothing and a recall, at least in some circumstances. While
doing nothing is the cheapest course in the short term, in the longer run
refusing to act may cost the manufacturer sales. Many consumers expect a car
to run without significant repairs long after the warranty has expired, and if
those expectations are frustrated, the consumer may "exit;" that is, stop buying
the manufacturer's products. 6 By contrast, if the manufacturer agrees to
repair a consumer's car after the warranty has run, the consumer is likely to
perceive the manufacturer as generously providing free repairs," making the
consumer more likely to buy from the manufacturer again and to praise the
car to others. 8 Indeed, manufacturers claim that they sometimes decide to

14. See infra notes 138-42 and accompanying text. A manufacturer which
chooses to notify its customers that it will provide free repairs upon request, even
when it is not required to do so, may choose to call its program something other than
a recall. For example, one manufacturer characterized such a program as a "special
customer-care program." See Toyota to Fix Brake-PedalFault on 380,000 Camry
Models, AUTOMOTIV NEWS, May 9, 1988, at 8.
15. Other choices exist as well. For example, a manufacturer could send its
dealers a service bulletin in which it describes the problem and its solution. While
consumers would still pay for the repairs, the amount of time needed to diagnose the
problem and devise a solution should be reduced if the mechanic is aware of the
bulletin, and that should lower the cost of repairs. Alternatively, the manufacturer
could notify divisional technical personnel instead of dealers. In deciding whether to
commence a secret warranty program, manufacturers may take into account such
considerations as the expected lifetime of the particular part or systemwhich has failed
and how long after the expiration of the warranty the failure occurs. See Whitford,
supranote 3, at 1037.
16. See generallyALBERT HIRSCHMAN, Exrr, VoIcE, AND LOYALTY (1970).
17. See Is Your Car's Warrantya Secret?, supranote 9, at 214.
18. See Claes Fomell, CorporateConsumerAffairs Departments:Retrospectand
Prospect,in THE FRONTIER OF RESEARCH IN THE CONSUMMl

INTEREST 595, 612 (E.

Scott Maynes & American Council on Consumer Interests eds., 1988) ("Empirical
evidence also demonstrates that a satisfied,complaining consumer becomes more loyal
and will generate positive word-of-mouth about the firm to other consumers.");
Whitford, supranote 3, at 1016 (Car manufacturers "are keenly aware that a satisfied
new car purchaser will not only become a proponent of his make among his friends
but will also be more likely to purchase the same make for his next new car."). On
the importance of word-of-mouth, see John Amdt, Word of Mouth Advertising and
Informal Communication, in RISK TAKING AND INFORMATION

HANDLING IN

CONSUmE BEHAVIOR 188, 238 (Donald F. Cox ed., 1967) (Based on shaky empirical
data, the author concludes "word of mouth emerges as one of the most important,
possibly the most important source of information for the consumer.... Word of
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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pay for repairs to parts that are not defective, in the interests of maintaining
customer good will. 9
Though secret warranties are more expensive in the short run than doing
nothing, they are still cheaper than recalls, and are less likely to damage a
manufacturer's reputation for quality.2" A manufacturer which recalls a car
must notify both the government and its customers of that fact, at least in
certain circumstances.2 The notification process itself can be expensive, and
obviously more consumers are likely to bring their cars in for repairs under
a recall program than under a secret warranty program. Moreover, media
reports of a recall may cause some would-be car buyers to conclude that the
manufacturer does not make its cars very well and that they would do better
to purchase a different car.22

mouth is particularly important in situations of uncertainty and when much is at stake
for the consumer."). Auto manufacturers are in fact somewhat successful at building
brand loyalty. One survey conducted in 1976 found that the vehicle purchased most
recently by 60.9% of the car buyers responding was of a brand they had previously

bought. ARTHUm YOUNG & Co., WARRANTIES RuLEs CONSUMER BASELINE STUDY
29 (1979).
19. See Anthony Giorgianni, Automakers Don't Inform Owners of All Free
Repairs;Car OwnersDon 't Always Learn About FreeRepairs,HARTFORD CoURANT,

May 2, 1992, at E3 (Automakers say "many factors can play a role in the decision
whether to cover the cost of a repair, including how well the vehicle was maintained
and the number of complaints about the problem."). See also Whitford, supranote3,
at 1028 (Manufacturers sometimes provide free repairs for good will "even though it
is clear that there was no manufacturing defect.").
20. For example, estimates of the cost of one proposed recall range from $300
million to $1 billion. See Andrew E. Serwer, GM Gets Tough With Its Critics,
FORTUNE, May 31, 1993, at 90, 96. The costs of recalls are so great that some
companies have sought recall insurance. See Recalls: Legal and CorporateResponses
to FDA, CPSC, NIITSA, and ProductLiability Considerations,39 Bus. LAw. 757,
760-61 (1984) (Andrew S. Krulwich stated, "recall insurance varies from covering
solely the administrative costs of the recall to covering loss of profits and advertising
expenses for repairing a tarnished image.").
21. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1411, 1413 (1988).
22. Awealth of studies onthe effects of recalls has yielded sometimes-conflicting
results. Some have found that the effect depends on the severity of the recall. See,
e.g., Steven M. Crafton et al., Testing the Impact of Recalls on the Demandfor
Automobiles, 19 ECON. INQUIRY 694, 702 (1981) ("Severe recalls were found to
influence adversely sales of the models recalled. Recalls of lesser severity had no
significant impact on sales."); Paul Slovic et al., PerceptionofRisk FromAutomobile
Safety Defects, 19 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 262-63 (1987) (study finds
that safety recalls reduce likelihood of future purchase of car which is subject of recall,
but that likelihood of decision not to buy car in future depends on how dangerous the
defect is). Compare Robert J. Reilly & George E. Hoffer, Will Retarding the
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/2

8

1995]

Sovern: Sovern: Good Will Adjustment Games
SECRET WARRANTY REGULATION

Recalls can also have ramifications for product liability suits: when a
company recalls its cars, consumers who have been injured by the defect
which triggered the recall may realize for the first time that their injury was
caused by a defect, thus prompting them to bring a suit they might not
otherwise have brought.' Additionally, in some jurisdictions the recall letter
may be used to help consumers prove their cases.24 Though injury is less
likely to be a concern in the types of defects which are candidates for secret
warranties, since manufacturers are required to recall unsafe cars and may not
substitute secret warranties for such a recall, the impact of product liability
litigation cannot be discounted altogether.'

Information Flow on Automobile Recalls Affect Consumer Demand?, 21 ECON.
INQUMY 444, 447 (1983) ("severe recalls have an adverse impact on the growth rate
of the car lines recalled") with George E. Hoffer & A. James Wynne, Consumer
Responses to Auto Recalls, 9 J. CONSUMER AFFAIRS 212, 217 (1975) ("recalls were
not a significant determinant of market share for most makes in the subcompact
market"). At least one study found a significant impact. See Gregg Jarrell & Sam
Peltzman, The Impact of ProductRecalls on the Wealth of Sellers, 93 J. POL. EcoN.
512 (1985) (study finds that automobile recall causes price of seller's stock to decline
in value). Jarrell and Peltzman's methodology is criticized in George E. Hoffer et al.,
The Impact of ProductRecalls on the Wealth ofSellers: A Re-examination,96 J. POL.
EcoN. 663, 669 (1988) ("little significant evidence remains indicating that securities
markets penalize shareholders for an automotive recall by driving down share prices").
On the other hand, some consumers might respond to a recall order by concluding that
the manufacturer was quick to acknowledge and correct problems, and therefore that
they should buy its cars. Cf David L. Ramp, The Impact of Recall Campaigns on
Products Liability, 44 INs. CouNsEL J. 83, 84 (Jan. 1977) ("Manufacturers are
realizing that recall is not as harmful to the corporate image as once believed, and are
increasingly accepted by the public."); Teresa M. Schwartz & Robert S. Adler, Product
Recalls: A Remedy in Need of Repair, 34 CASE W. REs. L. Rlv. 401, 417 (1984)
("While manufacturers may overestimate the adverse impact of recall-related publicity,
this conceem nevertheless deters them from reporting defects andundertaking voluntary
recalls.") (footnote deleted).
23. See Stephen J. Werber, Automobile Recall Campaigns: Proposals For
Legislative and JudicialResponses, 56 J. URBAN L. 1083, 1087 (1979) ("A recall
campaign virtually automatically results in the filing of actions involving the subject
vehicle .... "); Recalls, supranote 20, at 772; Ramp, supra note 22, at 84.
24. See generallyRecalls, supra note 20, at 764-65; Cary Stewart Sklaren, The
Effect of CurrentNHTSA Regulations and EnforcementPolicy on ProductsLiability
in the Motor Vehicle Industry, 21 TORTS & INS. L.J. 464, 472 (1986); W. Terrell
Wimgfield, Jr., Comment, Recall Letters as Evidence of a Defect in an Automobile, 29

McER L. REV. 611 (1978).
25. Car manufacturers are required by federal law to recall cars which suffer a
safety defect, so secret warranties are not an option for dealing with safety defects.
See infranotes 138-43 and accompanying text. But if the issue of whether a recall is
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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Manufacturers have been known to go to considerable lengths to preserve

the advantages of secret warranties. For example, according to an article in
ConsumerReports, after a whistleblower had disclosed the existence of forty-

one secret warranties allegedly run by one manufacturer, a spokesperson for
that manufacturer maintained "We have no secret warranties." 6 Another

required is a close one, conceivably a manufacturer might consider a secret warranty
instead of a recall, in which case the matters discussed in the text might be a
consideration.
26. Is Your Car's Warrantya Secret?, supranote 9, at 214. The article reports
on a memo dated March 11, 1987 from a Toyota regional customer-relations manager
addressed to "all Toyota Customer Relations Managers and Service Managers" which
recommended free repairs as a "good will gesture" for engine warmup problems on
1985-87 Toyota Corrollas with automatic transmissions. The Toyota spokesperson did
acknowledge to Consumer Reports that "repairs are sometimes paid for on a
case-by-case basis in the interest of customer satisfaction." Id. According to one
newspaper report, a Toyota spokesperson has acknowledged that it is providing
reimbursement for out-of-warranty repair claims, butthe spokespersonalso denied that
the company had a secret warranty. "We do not have a secret warranty," he said.
"We make a case-by-case determinationunder our customer satisfactionpolicywhether
to reimburse for a repair that occurs beyond the normal warranty." John E.Peterson,
Toyota Will Bend on Warranty,If You Ask, THE DETROIT NEWS, Aug. 26, 1988, at
1A. Toyota has characterized the secret warranty memo as fraudulent. See, e.g.,
Warren Brown, Toyota Denies Existence of Secret Warranty Program,WASH. POST,
Sept. 3, 1988, at C2; Geoff Sundstrom, Secret-WarrantyLettera Fraud,Toyota Says,
AUTOMOTIVE NEws, Oct. 31, 1988, at 60; see also Letter from William MacLeod,
Director FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection to Clarence L. Ditlow ]JI 7-8 (May 24,
1989) [hereinafter MacLeod Letter] ("It appears that Toyota's guidelines provide for
ad hoc good will adjustments and not across the board 'secret warranties."'). Copies
of the alleged list of 41 defects which are the subject of Toyota secret warranties are
available from the Center for Auto Safety. See also Sagolla, supranote 10. (After
Toyota and Nissanwhistleblowers released documents showing secret warranties, the
two automakers denied that they provided secret warranties); SHELDON, supranote 3,
at 226 ("Manufacturers, moreover, will often deny the existence of these secret
warranties or describe them as merely 'good will' or 'customer relations' gestures.");
Group Says Nissan UsedSecret Warranties,AUTOMOTIVE NEWs, July 2, 1990, at 8
("Center for Auto Safety alleges Nissanuses secretwarranties based on internalNissan
documents. A Nissan spokesman denied the charges and said the company's
willingness to repair some defects without charge was misinterpreted as a secret
warranty."); JohnE. Peterson, 'GoodWill' CostsNissan, TB DETROIT NEWs, July 4,
1990, at 13A, 14A (Nissan officials charge that allegations that Nissanprovides secret
warranties come from disgruntled ex-employees. Nissanspokespersonreported to say
that the fin'ms "good will" in repairing some defects free of charge is misinterpreted
as a secret warranty. Center for Auto Safety alleged to have received documents from
former Nissan U.S. Director of Consumer Support and Nissan's U.S. Director of
Engineering, including memo from Nissan Service Chief to Nissan Financial
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/2
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representative went even further, remarking, "there is no such thing as a secret
warranty."'2 7 Some manufacturers insist that all they do is authorize dealers

to make free repairs on a case-by-case basis.2" On occasion, automobile
manufacturers have not notified all their dealers, or even any dealers, of their
secret warranties.2 9 Though some of the disagreement between sellers and
consumer groups may stem from a split over exactly what constitutes a secret
warranty," the dispute also seems to reflect a genuine difference over

Vice-President acknowledging that company's goodwill expenses "are directly related
to specific product problems." Documents also show payments by Nissanto its dealers
for "good will repairs" of over $15 million in six-month period); Kathy Jackson,
Watchdogs Say Ford Fixing Cars in Canada Under Secret Warranty; Company
ConsidersFuel Pump Repairs to be Good Will, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, June 10, 1991,
at 2 (Canadian Automobile Protective Association charges Ford has secret warranty
program to repair fuel pumps and has provided repairs in 35 percent of cases reviewed
by organization. Ford of Canada spokesman quoted as saying "we wouldn't risk the
good will of our customers by running secret warranties," but acknowledges that good
will assistance plan has been in effect for eight years and that repairs provided based
on how well a dealer presents the customer's argument. Ford dealers said to use good
will forms that they submit to the factory at their discretion.); Abe Plotkin, Connecticut
Shoots Down Secret Warranty With Law, AUTOMOTVE NEWS, Feb. 25, 1991, at 15

(Ford Motor Co. regional governmental relations manager quoted as saying Ford does
not "engage in secret warranties"); Irene G. Keeney, Some DealersPro-RatingSubaru
Repair, TIMES UNION, Dec. 31, 1989, at DI (dealer states that it is authorized to
provide repairs under secret warranty, but manufacturer denies existence of secret
warranty and maintains that dealer is providing repairs on its own account); DITLow
& GOLD, supranote 4, at 16 ("Auto makers often try to disguise secret warranties as
good will adjustments to avoid their disclosure.").
27. See Marc Silver, The Out-Of-WarrantyBlues, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP.,

Oct. 30, 1989, at 74 (quoting Toyota spokesperson, who was also quoted as saying

"sometimes a dealer will decide to do repairs because he values a customer... In
other cases, the regional office reviews the case and makes a decision. Adjustments
are made in the interest of customer satisfaction.").
28. See supranote 26.
29. See YVONNE W. ROSMAmN, SALEs OF GOoDs AND SERVIcES 116 n.120.17
(Supp. 1991); SHELDON, supranote 3, at 226 ("Generally the manufacturer issues a
bulletin to regional offices, and sometimes to dealers .... "). See also Letters: More
Money Saved, 53 CONSUMER REP. 193 (1988) (reader reports that dealer denied
knowledge of secret warranty reported in ConsumerReportsbut that reader was able
to obtain relief from Buick in Flint, Mich.).
30. For example, in one situation a manufacturer acknowledged that it had
notified dealers but not customers that it would replace defective tires under certain
circumstances, but denied that it was providing a secret warranty, apparently because,
in the manufacturer's view, notification of dealers was en6ugh to prevent the program
from constituting a secret warranty. See United Press International, GMReplacing
Tires On Some 1985 and 1986 Models (Dec. 12, 1986). See also James M. Tarbox,
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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whether manufacturers are providing at least some free repairs to all who seek
them, or only to selected consumers on a case-by-case basis.
As noted above, in the eyes of some consumer groups, a chief problem
with secret warranties is that they are not available to all consumers.
According to one report, only about ten percent of car owners eligible for
secret warranties succeed in obtaining them.31 How do manufacturers decide
who gets free repairs? Often the manufacturer lets the dealer decide.32 One
commentator, writing in 1968, observed that the most important consideration
seems to be whether providing free repairs will enhance the seller's good
will.' Whether a seller values a customer's good will can depend on the
seller's guess as to whether the consumer will buy new cars again and how
hard the consumer bargains on price.34 The seller may 35also take into account
whether the owner seems to maintain the Car properly.
Even if a seller wishes to retain the good will of a particular customer,
the seller may not repair the problem for free unless the seller believes that
failure to make the repair would cause the consumer to buy elsewhere in the
future. Thus, some manufacturers provide the free repairs only for the most
aggressive and persistent customers.36 As an extreme example, one

Ford Truck Paint Woes Protested Consumer Advocates Demand Investigalion, ST.
PAUL PIoNEER PRESS DISPATCH, June 23, 1992, at C3 (quoting Ford Motor Co.

representative as saying, "[a] secretwarranty is characterized by a time and/or mileage
limitation."); Jan A. Zverina, United Press International, GMto ProvideFree Engine
Replacement (Jan. 24, 1986) (GM claimed it was not providing secret warranty when
it had notified dealers but not customers because customers can obtain information by

contacting dealer or GM).
31. Peterson, supra note 26, at 13A (attributing statement to Center for Auto
Safety).
32. See Polachek & Steinbach, supranote 6, at 1, 2.
33. Whitford, supranote 3, at 1038.

34. See Whitford, supranote 3, at 1043-44 ("An owner who bargains hard on the
price is not as profitable a customer to the dealer, and he also is likely to consider
price the most important factor in deciding from which dealer to buy his next car.").

Professor Whitford suggests that buyers who pay more for a car or who buy regularly
from the same dealer are in fact paying for the extra warranty coverage provision

through good will adjustments. Id. at 1067. But it is not clear that owners who pay
more are in fact the recipients of good will adjustments.

35. See Polachek & Steinbach, supra note 6, at 1, 2-3; Ed Henry, "Goodwill"
Warrantiesfor High-Mileage Cars, KPLiNGER's PERs. FIN. MAG. (Nov. 1994)
(quoting auto manufacturer representative: "If you have a transmission failure and its
obvious the car has been abused, you'd probably be told no; but if you had a nice,
clean vehicle and the transmission failed, and it was 5,000 to 10,000 miles out of
warranty, it would most likely be covered within a goodwill adjustment.").
36. SnPLDON, supra note 3, at 226 ("Secret warranties benefit only those
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/2
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government official has reported a case in which a consumer succeeded in
obtaining a $2,000 settlement from a manufacturer within a week after the
consumer subpoenaed the manufacturer's secret customer relations
guidelines.37 Manufacturers probably reason that consumers who are not
unhappy enough to complain vociferously will not desert them for other
sellers. 8 In any event, some observers have suggested that it may be
necessary to create a nuisance to obtain the benefits of the warranty. 9
When manufacturers decide to institute good will adjustment programs,
they sometimes impose limiting conditions. Some of these conditions may be
designed to insure that the specific problem was in fact caused by a

consumers who complain loudly and persistently enough, and to the right party.");
JACK GILiS, THE CAR BOOK 92 (1992) (free repairs formerly "reserved for customers
who made a big fuss"); Is Your Car's Warrantya Secret?,supranote9, at 214 ("Only
car owners who complain long and loudly to the right person get reimbursed for
repairs."); Silver, supranote 27, at 74 ("Those who benefit [from secret warranties]
usually are those who complain the loudest. You certainly will not cut your repair bill
if you dutifully reach for a pen and write out a check rather than make your
displeasure known."); NY Hearings, supra note 2 (testimony of New York State
Automobile Association) (secret warranty programs "frequently are triggered only
when consumers complain vociferously"); Gordon Martin, Guide to Concours
D 'EleganceEvents in Northern California,SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Apr. 18, 1991,
at C13 ("On occasion, the customer has to complain loud and long before the 'secret
warranty' goes into effect."); John E.Peterson, Toyota Will Bend on Warranty,If You
Ask, THE DEmorr NEws, Aug. 26, 1988, at IA, 8A ("A customer 'generally has to
complain about paying' for a component on the 'high frequency of repair' list to be
reimbursed [Toyota spokesperson] Daly acknowledged. 'A dealer might point out to
him that a component shouldn't have failed and offer to seek reimbursement from
Toyota, but in most cases it would be up to the customer to request it."). Cf Ralph
Vartabedian, Your Wheels: ImportedCarsHave ProblemsToo, Los ANGaEs TIMs,
Jan. 16, 1992, at E6 (consumer who complained of problem covered under secret
warranty to dealer while warranty in effect was not provided with free repairs).
37. NYHearings,supranote2 (testimony of Virginia Apuzzo, Deputy Executive
Director, New York State Consumer Protection Board) (the consumer had learned of
the existence of the guidelines from a former employee).
38. Cf.Whitford, supranote 3, at 1045 ("An aggressive owner is more likely to
obtain a warranty repair.... Aggressive owners more often convey the impressionthat
a denial of a warranty repair will have a substantial harmful effect on their feelings of
good will towards the dealer and manufacturer.").
39. See RosMARIN, supra note 29, at 115; SHELDON, supra note 3, at 227; See
also Ralph Vartabedian, Your Wheels: FuelPumpFails to Deliverthe NeededPower,
Los ANGELES TIMES, Aug. 30, 1990, at E8 (consumer may be able to receive benefits
of secret warranty on car older than cut-off, if consumer complained before car was
too old, but consumer "undoubtedly will have to make a lot of noise complaining and
...almost certainly will have to haggle with a... factory representative").
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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manufacturing defect rather than customer neglect. The programs generally

run for a linited time."

Consumers who learn of the program after the

deadline for obtaining repairs are usually out of luck, even if they complained
to the dealer while the program was in effect."1 Not all cars are included in
42
the program; manufacturers sometimes establish cutoffs based on mileage.
Manufacturers typically assume only the actual cost of repair and will not
Sometimes
compensate consumers for consequential damages. 3
4
of
repairs.
cost
the
full
manufacturers do not pay

m.

SHOULD SECRET WARRANTiES BE REGULATED?

Those who seek the regulation of secret warranties usually argue for a
rule that would accomplish two goals: First, good will adjustments should be
offered to all purchasers of the cars which might suffer from the defect, and
second, notice of the adjustments should be provided to eligible purchasers.45
The justifications for these goals are typically rooted.in both economics and
a sense of fairness. The economics-based rationale stems from the fact that
those who do not know about the good will adjustments not only end up
paying for the repair itself, but may incur other expenses because of the
collateral damage which may be caused by an unrepaired defect. 6 In
addition, the inequality of treatment-some consumers are able to obtain free
repairs while others are not-strikes critics as unfair. Advocates for secret

40. See ROSMAPJN, supra note 29, at 114.
41. RoSMARIN, supra note 29, at 114; SELDON, supra note 3, at 226
("[C]onsumers who complain of the problem during the secretwarranty period, but are
not sufficiently aggressive or complainto a dealer uninformed of the policy, are denied
coverage when they later learn of it after the period/mileage cutoff.").
42. See Polachek & Steinbach, supranote 6, at 1-2 ("Typically... repairs will

be made or reimbursed only when the vehicle owner reports the problem within a
designated time period, such as the first 5 years or 50,000 miles. Some secret
warranties, however, have extended for the life of the car."); ROSMARIN, supranote

29, at 114; SHLDON, supra note 3, at 226.
43. ROSMARIN, supranote 29, at 114; SHELDON, supra note 3, at 226.
44. See, e.g., Silver, supranote 27, at 74 (manufacturer offered to assume half
the repair bill for particular problem).
45. See, e.g., Conn. Hearings,supra note 13 (testimony of Clarine Riddle,

Attorney General of the State of Connecticut) ('Notification to the consumer
personally is crucial to the concept before you today. I urge the Committee to
consider requiring the manufacturers to mail the notice... directly to the consumer.").

46. See, e.g., DriLow & GOLD, supranote 4, at 17-19. Automobile owners use
independent mechanics, rather than dealers, about 80% of the time. See Julie E.
Halpert, Who Will Fix Tomorrow 's Cars?,N.Y. TIms, Nov. 7, 1993, at F4.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/2
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warranty regulation seldom go beyond these points. This section explores
these and other arguments concerning the regulation of secret warranties.
A. An Economic Analysis of Secret WarrantyRegulation
This section discusses the economics of rules which would prohibit
manufacturers from offering good will adjustments unless they made the
repairs without charge for all affected consumers and notified those consumers
of the availability of the free repairs. The section argues, first, that under such
a regimen of regulation manufacturers would continue to offer good will
adjustments, though they might offer fewer than they do at present. Second,
the Article contends in this section that as all automobile purchasers pay a
portion of the costs of the secret warranties that benefit only a few, most
consumers would be better off if manufacturers provided good will
adjustments to all buyers or none, even if fewer good will adjustments were
provided.
The section also argues that the market cannot resolve this matter
optimally, in part because the obscurity of secret warranties prevents
consumers from taking them into account when making purchasing decisions.
Hence, this section concludes that government intervention is necessary to
correct the market failure.
1. Will Regulation of Secret Warranties Cause Manufacturers
to Stop Offering Secret Warranties?
Industry representatives,'

commentators,4" government officials,"

47. See, e.g., NYHearings, supranote 2 (testimony of Automobile Importers of
America, Inc.) ("government regulation of adjustment programs, if it raises the overall
cost or legal risk of offering assistance, will act as a strong disincentive to any
action"); id. (testimony of Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.) ("increased costs of
compliance with [government] regulation would divert manufacturer resources from
direct customer satisfaction efforts and discourage manufacturers from offering new
programs"); Conn. Hearings, supra note 13 (statement of Stephen F. Gabriel,
Executive Vice President, ConnecticutAutomotive Trades Association) ("Our ultimate
concern is that any proposed legislation affecting warranty adjustment programs not
be so inflexible as to deter manufacturers from taking responsive measures which
might otherwise have been implemented.").
48. See, e.g., Keith E. Crain, "Secret Warranties" Are Better Than None,
AuToMoTVE NEWS, July 16, 1990, at 12 (arguing that if automakers are required to
offer good will adjustments to all consumers, automakers will stop making
adjustments; "the net result would be far worse for the consumer than if we permit
exceptional remedies from time to time").
49. See, e.g., Sagolla, supranote 10, at 7 (FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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and even a consumer advocate 5 ° have argued that if secret warranties are
regulated, sellers might offer fewer good will adjustments, if indeed they offer
any at all. They contend that manufacturers might conclude that the benefits
of providing secret warranties-increased sales attributable to customer good
will-would be outweighed by the costs of providing them-the expense of
complying with whatever regulation is imposed, plus the costs currently
associated with secret warranties.
The history of consumer protection suggests that argument should not be
taken at face value. Proposals designed to aid consumers often elicit
predictions of similar setbacks for consumers, and the predictions have
sometimes proved fanciful. Thus, some forecast that sellers would stop
warranting goods if Congress passed the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act,51
and obviously sellers still furnish warranties.52

employee Lydia Pames was reported to state that "[i]f car makers are required to
disclose secret warranties, they will be less likely to offer them, thus hurting
consumers." Bureau of Consumer Protection Director William MacLeod was quoted
as saying "requiring ... disclosures [of secret warranties] would also raise the cost of
each adjustment program, as reimbursements go to more beneficiaries. We would
expect manufacturers to offer fewer programs unless consumers are willing to pay for
the increased costs."); 33 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONN. GN. ASSEMBLY, HOUSE, part
4, at 1316-17 (1990) (remarks of Rep. Farr) ("What this bill does is it says to a
manufacturer, if you have a small defect and the cost of giving notice is high, just
don't repair it. If you have a manufactured automobile and it's got a defective light
in the glove compartment and it's going to cost $5 or $10 to fix that and you decided
itwas obviously a mistake in manufacturing and you told your dealers to go ahead and
fix it, it's only $10, but now we pass a bill and it's going to cost you $25 or $15 to
give this notice. Any dealer is going to-any manufacturer is simply not going to give
the notice.").
50. See World News, AUTo WEEK, Apr. 24, 1989, at 9 (Consumer advocate and
author Sal Fariello reported to say that requiring car makers to provide free repairs for
all owners under secret warranties "will only force all manufacturers to
indiscriminately shut the door to all consumers who request special out-of-warranty
assistance.").
51. See Emerging Issues Under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-FederalTrade
CommissionImprovementAct, 45 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 72, 74 (1976) (remarks of
Joan Z. Bernstein, formerly Acting Director, FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection).
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1988). See
also Robert J. Banta, Negotiabilityin ConsumerSales-The Needfor FurtherStudy,
53 NEB. L. REV. 195, 196-97 (1974) ("Many banking and financial institutions argue
that if they were subject to consumer defenses, consumer credit might vanish or
become so expensive as to be prohibitive.").
52. Similarly, estimates of the costs of air bags by auto manufacturers have
proved to be wildly inflated. See, e.g., Daniel D. Cutler, The ContinuingStrugglefor

Automotive Safety, 15 SETON

HALL LEGIs.

J. 453,463 n.65 (1991) (car manufacturers

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/2
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Indeed, some empirical evidence suggests that manufacturers would not
stop providing free repairs if the repairs were regulated. For example, after
Connecticut passed a statute regulating good will adjustments, Ford continued
Ford
to make adjustments and simply complied with the statute. 3
reportedly continued to abide by the terms of a 1980 consent decree it entered
into with the FTC, requiring notice of good will adjustments to Ford
customers, years after the decree expired by its terms. 4
If good will adjustments are regulated, manufacturers should continue to
provide the adjustments if they conclude that it is in their best interests to do
SO." What manufacturers perceive as being in their best interests should, in

estimated airbags would cost consumers $1,100).
53. Giorgianni, supranote 19, at E3 (since the Connecticut law became effective
in 1990, Ford has provided Connecticut officials with copies of owner notifications for
four adjustments). Ford also continued to institute goodwill adjustmentprograms after
it entered into a consent order with the FTC obliging it to notify its customers when
it created such programs. See Letter from Clarence M. Ditlow III, Dan Howell and
Daniel Oliver, FTC Chair (Sept. 9, 1987) reprintedin CENTER FOR AuTo SAFETY,
SEcRET AuTo WARRANTIES item 6 (1992) (six programs in eight months). On the
other hand, CAS has charged that Ford has conducted a secret warranty program
without notifying consumers. Ford denied that it was providing secret warranties and
stated that it was getting in touch with affected consumers. See Doron P. Levin, When
It Pays to Complain: Detroit's 'SecretWarranties,'N.Y. TIMEs, June 23, 1992, at
Dl.
54. See Levin, supranote 53, at D7; Polachek & Steinbach, supranote 6, at 6;
see also Conn. Hearings, supra note 13 (testimony of Alice Cantwell, Regional
Manager of Governmental Relations for Ford Motor Co.) (Ford continues to notify
consumers of good will adjustments even after expiration of FTC consent decree
"because we believe in doing so is in the best interest of the consumer and ultimately
in Ford's best interest to serve and keep customers happy"). Similarly, General Motors
claimed recently that it provided notice by mail to owners in more than 90% of its
"field actions for non-safety and customer satisfaction problems .... ." Id. (Letter
from R. J. Buqno, General Motors General Director of Service Operations, (Jan. 30,
1990.)). The consent decree is reported at In re FordMotor Co., 96 F.T.C. 362
(1980).
55. Cf Conn. Hearings,supranote 13 (Letter from R.J. Bugno, General Motors
General Director of Service Operations (Jan. 30, 1990)) ("It is simply not in General
Motors' short or long term interest to withhold information about [good will
adjustment] programs from our customers. Any 'savings' that might result from a
company's effort to withhold from its customers information about its own remedial
programs are very likely to be more than offset by the diminished customer loyalty
that results from dissatisfaction associated with the problem."); Linda Welling, A
Theory of VoluntaryRecalls and ProductLiability, 57 S.ECON. J. 1092, 1093 (1991)
("[T]he firm has some discretion in determining whether the benefits of a recall,
measured by the reaction of current and future consumers to an admission that some
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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turn, depend on a calculus of several variables, which takes into account the
cost of compliance, including the cost of providing notice and repairs, and the
cost of not providing the adjustments.
What is the cost to manufacturers of not providing adjustments? If the
manufacturers respond to regulation by refusing to make any free repairs on
widespread problems, they will certainly incur the irritation of the consumers
who complain to them (call them "complainers"). In addition, the
manufacturers will also generate ill will among some number of consumers
who do not complain to them ("non-complainers"). Studies show that many
consumers who discover that a product is defective do not complain to sellers
or manufacturers;56 some of these, in the parlance of social scientists, "exit"
and purchase products made by others in the future. 7

part of its product line is substandard, outweigh the costs .... Depending upon the
conditions of demand, a firm which maintains a reputation for recalling defective
products is able to obtain expected profits in excess of those available when consumers
bear all of the risk attached to uncertainty over product liability.").
56. See Arthur Best & Alan R. Andreasen, ConsumerResponseto Unsatisfactory
Purchases: A Survey of Perceiving Defects, Voicing Complaints, and Obtaining
Redress, 11 LAv & Soc'Y REV. 701, 712, 716 (1977) (Of those who perceived
problems with cars they purchased, 41.8% took no action while 46.8% complained to
the seller, nonprice problems about cars were voiced 57.1% of the time.); Kenneth
McNeil et al., Market DiscriminationAgainst the Poor and the Impact of Consumer
DisclosureLaws: The Used Car Industry, 13 LAw & Soc' REV. 695, 715 (1979)
(study which examined the behavior of those who bought used cars from a dealer
found that when a defect manifested in the car in the first three months of purchase,
nearly 40% of the consumers did not report the problem to the dealer); Rex H.
Warland et al., DissatisfiedConsumers: Who Gets Upset and Who Takes Action, 9 J.
CONSUMER A_ .148, 152 (1975) (Of 458 dissatisfied consumers of various goods and
services, 49% either did nothing or took only such steps as complaining to family or
friends or resolving not to purchase product in the future, rather than complaining to
seller.); Improving the New ProductsEquation,Tim NIELsEN RESARCHmR, No. 1, at
2, 12-13 (1974) ("A national study of consumer reactions to product defects revealed
that... 69% [of the consumers] took no direct action whatsoever.") (emphasis in
original). But see H. Laurence Ross & Neil 0. Littlefield, Complaint as a
Problem-SolvingMechanism, 12 LAV & Soc'Y REV. 199, 205 (1978) (middle class
consumers of single appliance dealer, who might have been more responsive to
complaints than other sellers, generally complained to seller when they experienced
problems). Another study found that 25% of the car buyers who experience difficulty
in obtaining warranty repairs do not pursue the matter further; in other words, 25% of
those who do complain stop at the first rebuff. See Whitford, supra note 3, at 1021
n.44.
57. See Best & Andreasen, supra note 56, at 711 (survey found that 5.7% of
disappointed car buyers exit without complaining to seller); Warland et al., supranote
56, at 152 (In survey of consumer to determine how they respond to product
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/2
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Consumer research also shows that some consumers are less willing to
complain about problems which are not manifest"8 That is to say, some
consumers seem more comfortable complaining to sellers about problems that
are easy to demonstrate, such as a product that was never furnished, than
about problems that are harder to prove and whose very existence is more
susceptible to the exercise of judgment, such as whether the product is
sufficiently durable.59 It may be that these consumers feel uneasy about
complaining when they face a possibility of a rebuff. Intuition suggests such
consumers will hesitate to complain when they know that the good is no
longer covered by a warranty, though they may nevertheless feel that the
product has not performed adequately.' Thus, refusal to repair will probably
cost the seller some unknown number of repeat sales to those who do not

complain.
One advantage of secret warranty programs, from a manufacturer's point
of view, is that they permit manufacturers to target many of the customers
who are most angry about a defect, and thus offer the greatest return, in good
will, per repair. Manufacturers who provide free repairs for all their
customers retain the good will of non-complainers, but to do so they probably
pay for repairs for some customers who have not noticed the defect,6 1 or who
do not hold it against the manufacturer, and whose faith in the company has
not been shaken. Such manufacturers end up paying for repairs which do not

disappointments, 6% did not complain about problem but stopped shopping at the store
or changed stores, and 5% resolved not to purchase the offending product or service
in future but did not complain.). For a theoretical discussion of how consumers choose
between exit and voicing their concerns, see generallyHirscbman,supranote 16; see
also H. Keith Hunt, ConsumerSatisfactionDissatisfactionandComplainingBehavior,
47 3. SOCiAL Issuurs 107 (1991).
58. See Best & Andreasen, supranote 56, at 719.
59. See Best and Andreasen, supranote 56, at 719, 724.
60. Some consumers may complain because they do not realize that theirwarranty

has expired. One survey found that 31% of the respondents, when asked how long
their auto warranty was, answered incorrectly, and that another 4% did not know.

Whitford, supra note 3, at 1055. On the other hand, the survey respondents do not
appear to have been given a warranty to check their answers; in real life, some

consumers who thought their repairs were covered by a warranty might review the
warranty before bringing the car in for work. In addition, some of those who thought
their warranty had a different term than it had in actuality may have thought it had a
shorter term than it did. See also ARTHUR YouNG & Co., supra note 18, at 79-81
(88.4% of car buyers responding to survey said their cars carried warranties claimed

to know duration of warranty, but answers to questions about length of warranty
suggested that some did not in fact know the duration of their warranties.).
61. Some problems simply escape detection, see Best & Andreason, supranote
56, at 703, or do not surface in every car.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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necessarily enhance their good will, and so, from the manufacturer's point of
view, the money may not have been well-spent. At a minimum, the cost of
retaining the good will of the unidentified non-complainers who would
otherwise exit is much higher than the cost of retaining the good will of the
complainers. On the other hand, if manufacturers are barred by statute from
spending money on some customers without also repairing the cars of others,
the calculus is very different. In order to retain the good will of any
customers who are angry about the defect, including the complainers, the
manufacturers must repair the cars of all.
For example, assume that a particular model, of which 1000 cars were
sold, contains a defect that appears after the warranty expires, and that 300 of
the purchasers complain to the manufacturer and seek a good will adjustment.
Also, assume that the manufacturer believes that all the complainers will exit
if the defect is not repaired and that an additional 100, of the 700
non-complainers who bought the car, will exit because of the flaw, though the
manufacturer cannot identify them. Finally, assume that the manufacturer

believes no one who is angry about the flaw and who receives a free repair
will exit. As things stand now, absent regulation, if the manufacturer initiates
a secret warranty program limited to complainers, it will retain the good will
of the 300 complainers, and lose the repeat business of 100 of the remaining
700. The cost of reclaiming those 100 disappointed non-complainers is the
cost of notifying all of the 700 non-complainers and agreeing to repair all of
their cars. In fact, probably not all the 700 would seek free repairs even if
they were notified that they could obtain them, but assume for the sake of
argument that all 700 would. Thus, for every non-complaining customer the
manufacturer keeps, it pays for seven repairs. A manufacturer, faced with the
choice of losing the 100 or keeping them at the expense of repairing 700 cars,
might choose to lose the 100.
However, regulation that prohibits fixing some without fixing all changes
the economics. Because the manufacturer could not repair the cars of the
complaining 300 without also fixing the cars of the other 700, the value to the
manufacturer of fixing the cars of the 600 who do not care is retaining 400
consumers. A manufacturer who would not repair 700 cars to retain the good
will of 100 people might repair 1,000 cars to retain the good will of 400.62
Whether the manufacturer would pay to fix the 1,000 to retain the 400 still
depends on a multitude of variables, including the cost of the repairs and the

62. Cf. Polachek & Steinbach, supra note 6, at 8 (arguing that manufacturers
would continue to offer good will adjustments even after regulation because of
"increasingly competitive auto marketplace to retain customer satisfaction.
Manufacturers can ill afford to stand by while large numbers of buyers of particular
models experience widespread, commonproblems resulting from flaws inmanufacture
or design.").
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/2
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cost of complying with any notice rules.63 However, as this hypothetical

illustrates, the economics of good will adjustments is not so clear-cut as some
have suggested.
In addition, the economics depend very much on what the manufacturer
believes consumers will do. For example, not all consumers who learn of the
availability of free repairs will necessarily seek them.'
Many consumers

63. See infra notes 286-307 and accompanying text for a discussion of notice
rules.
64. CompareNY Hearings,supra note 2 (testimony of Travis B. Plunkett, New
York Public Interest Research Group, Inc.) (Ford provided notices to owners of
problems and "whole world" did not claim free repairs. "These programs cover a
defined number of cars manufactured within specific production dates. Owners are not
compensated unless their cars have the appropriate serial numbers. Often, Ford will
notify buyers that a particular defect, such as poor quality leather, could potentially
cause damage to occur, such as cracked leather upholstery. Repairs are not made
unless the damage actually exists.") with Silver, supranote27, at75 (quoting Chrysler
spokesperson as saying "Experience teaches you that when you say to the world,
'We'll fix it,' the whole world will come in for the repairs whether they have the
problem or not. That's human nature.") and NY Hearings,supra note 2 (testimony
of Automobile Importers of America, Inc.) (Mandatory notice to all cars in class of
good will adjustment program "would result in more vehicle owners seeking the
remedy than actually have the problem, causing a much higher cost of repairing the
vehicles and eventually a much higher cost ofnew vehicles."). The problem is similar
to moral hazard, under which people who are insured seek payments for damages
which would not have occurred but for the existence of the insurance. See generally
John M. Marshall, Moral Hazard,66 AM. EcoN. REv. 880 (1976) (defining moral
hazard as "any misallocation of resources which results when risks are insured with
normal insurance contracts and only with such contracts"); Mark V. Pauly, The
Economics of Moral Hazard, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 531 (1968); Mark V. Pauly,
Overinsuranceand Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles ofMoral Hazardand
Adverse Selection, 88 Q.J. ECON. 44 (1974); Isaac Ehrlich & Gary S. Becker, Market
Insurance,Self-Insurance,andSelfProtection,80 J. POL. ECON. 623 (1972). See also
Robert E. Wilkes & James B. Wilcox, ConsumerPerceptionsof Product Warranties
and TheirlmplicationsforRetail Strategy, 4 J. Bus. RESEARCH 35, 39 (1976) (63.8%
of consumers in study agreed that "sometimes consumers make claims for service or
repair for a product even though they are not honestly entitled to do so by the
guarantee"). But moral hazard is unlikely to present much difficulty with secret
warranties. The defects whichprompt secretwarranties are significant enoughto cause
owners to complain vociferously to manufacturers. That being so, trained mechanics
should be able to identify most defects covered by secret warranties from a description
of the symptoms, and so relatively little time should be required to determine whether
a particular problem, real or imagined, is in fact covered under a particular secret
warranty. To use the example above, a determination of whether leather upholstery
has cracked does not take very long, even for an untrained mechanic. Owners who
have not suffered from cracked upholstery are not likely to take the time to bring their
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995

21

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 2 [1995], Art. 2
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60

who have been notified of recalls in the past have elected not to bring their
cars in to be corrected. 5 Recalls may not provide the best evidence of how

consumers will respond to notice of good will adjustments, however. Recalls
often involve defects which may not be of concern to a particular motorist, for
example, and so the motorist may not bother to seek the repair. Thus, car
owners who do not have children may not take the time to respond to a notice

cars in for repairs of upholstery under a program in which only cracks are repaired.
In effect, the burden of taking the car to the dealer functions as the equivalent of a
co-payment, a classic method of reducing moral hazard. See Alan Schwartz & Louis
L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Marketsfor Contract Terms: The Examples of
Warranties and Security Interests 69 VA. L. REv. 1387, 1446-47 (1983) ("Moral
hazard seems unlikely to exist in warranty markets. . . . Even broad consumer
warranties enjoy a form of coinsurance. Consumer durables are bought for use, and
buyers seldom keep spares. Moreover, firms require many warranted repairs to be
made off the consumer's premises. Consequently, product breakdown imposes
substantial costs on consumers in lost use even when firms fulfill their warranty
obligations."). Sellers can also reduce losses from moral hazard by instructing owners,
in any notice of good will adjustments, not to bring their cars in for adjustments unless
the particular symptoms attributable to the defect which is the subject of the
adjustment have manifested.
65. See, e.g., Glen D. Nager, Note, Auto Recalls and the Pursuitof Safety: A
Commonsense Approach, 33 STAN. L. REv 301, 305 n.23 (1981) ("Administration
statistics indicated that return rates for recalls from 1966 to 1974 averaged 75% when
the manufacturer paid for repairs."); Bob Tamarkin, Recalls-TheCostsSoar,FoRBES,
July 10, 1978, at 79 ("Owner response to a recall notice varies sharply: a brake recall
may draw an 80% response, a seat belt repair only 30%."); Schwartz & Adler, supra
note 22, at 406 (owner response rates to recalls average around 50%). When queried,
owners provide various explanations for their failure to respond to a recall. Among
the reasons given: lack of notice, inadequate notice (such as letters which did not
explain the safety risks clearly enough to impress the reader), time or inconvenience

involved in responding to the recall, and a perception that the risk of danger is low.
See id. at 421-24; see also Why You Don't Respond to Recalls, CONSUMER REP. Jan.
1981, at 46 (when ConsumerReports asked its readers why they did not respond to
recalls, the replies fell into four rough categories: too much trouble, lack of incentive
(in particular, that the danger seemed remote or irrelevant), doubts about whether the
dealer will repair the defect properly without causing additional problems, and some
consumers reported that they were able to solve the problem themselves); George E.
Hoffer et al., When RecallsMatter: FactorsAffecting OwnerResponse to Automotive
Recalls, 28 J. CoNSMER. AFFAImRS 96, 103-04 (1994) (study finds that owners more
likely to respond to recalls of newer cars, domestic cars, and when defect is more
severe; study also founid that the number of cars recalled and the issuance of a press
release announcing the recall when car owners were already notified by direct mail did
not have a significant impact on owner response to the recalls).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/2
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of a defect that is dangerous only to children;66 similarly, some drivers may
not care enough about the environment to have even free repairs performed
on their car when the sole purpose of the repairs is to reduce emissions. On
the other hand, unlike some recalls, secret warranties are triggered by
consumer complaints, and are significant enough problems to cause some
consumers aggressively to seek correction of the problem. Consequently, it
may be that consumers who learn they can obtain free repairs under a good
will adjustment program will want those repairs in greater numbers than has

been the case with safety and emission recalls.
In addition, the manufacturer's belief as to the circumstances in which
consumers will exit is critical. For example, if the manufacturer anticipates
that consumers will exit whether or not the manufacturer provides free repairs,
the manufacturer has little to gain in good will from making the
adjustment. 7 Similarly, if the manufacturer believes that consumers will buy
the manufacturer's product again regardless of whether the manufacturer
provides free repairs, good will adjustments do not benefit the manufacturer.
However, if either of these situations existed, the manufacturer would not in
any event offer a secret warranty, even inthe absence of regulation.
2. Other Costs of Secret Warranty Regulation
If secret warranties were regulated, what other costs would be imposed
on society? Though manufacturers can be expected to care primarily about
the costs they bear when they offer good will adjustments, in fact they do not
incur all the costs of good will adjustments. Consumers obviously bear the
cost of bringing their cars to a dealer for repair.6" But since many
consumers would normally seek the repair anyway-after all, part of the
reason the manufacturer offers the good will adjustment is because consumers
have noticed the defect and want it repaired-this cost may be a wash.

66. For example, in 1992, Ford recalled 654,000 Ford Taurus and Mercury Sable
station wagons because it discovered that a child could lock itself in an area of the
tailgate and suffocate. SeeRecalls, CONSUMER REP., Aug. 1992, at 542. Owners who
rarely, if ever, have children in their cars could rationally conclude that bringing their
cars in to have the problem corrected would be a waste of time.
67. Conceivably, the manufacturer might offer free repairs even to loud
complainers it expects to exit in the hope that these consumers will be placated and not
generate adverse publicity. But some such consumers voice their critical comments
anyway, as manufacturers know, and so this may not be a successful strategy.
68. Cf Nager, supranote65, at 306 ("Recalls require owners to bring their cars

to the dealer to obtain service. Demands on the owners' time must be counted as a
social cost of recall since in the absence of recall the time would be available for other
productive or leisure activity.").
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Another potential cost imposed by any regulation of good will

adjustments requiring notice stems from the "boy who cried wolf syndrome:"
If consumers receive too many notices of free repairs, they may regard them
as unimportant and not respond to safety recalls, which can be of critical
significance.69 Given, however, that any individual automobile is the subject
of few, if any, good will adjustments at present, and that regulation is likely
to diminish the number of good will adjustments offered, rather than increase
it, this concern seems far-fetched.
Finally, any regulatory scheme normally requires enforcement, and

enforcement may add to the cost of regulating good will adjustments. But
experts seem to agree that the enforcement of secret warranty regulation would
not be difficult," implying that the cost will not be great, and existing filings
required by law should make enforcement even cheaper.7" In short, the costs
of secretwarrantyregulation--otherthan those imposed on manufacturers-do
not seem significant, and so probably need not be taken into account in
determining whether secret warranties should be regulated. 2

69. See NY Hearings, supra note 2 (testimony of Automobile Importers of
America, Inc.) ("Repeated notices . . . would ... undercut the response to recall
notices which might well cover more serious problems."); Cf. Nager, supranote 65,
at 306 n.23 (If recall and notice announcements are to be taken seriously by the
consumer, they must not be overused. Repeated notices or recalls might have a
chilling effect on the rate atwhich consumers return defective cars, causing an increase
in the harm from accidents to the extent that recalls for serious hazards are ignored.).
70. See Conn. Hearings,supra note 13 (testimony of Clarine Riddle, Attorney
General of the State of Connecticut) (predicting that enforcement of Connecticut law
would not be difficult); id. (testimony of Timothy West, Director of the Fraud Division
of the Department of Consumer Protection) (enforcement would not be difficult
because manufacturers could be required to report information to state about repeated
problems and repairs).
71. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
72. Other potential costs of disclosure, which do not appear to be worthy of
serious consideration in connection with secret warranties, have been mentioned in
various sources. Moral hazard is discussed supra in note 64. Some opponents of
secret warranty regulation have argued that notices of good will adjustments might
impair consumer confidence in automobiles. See NY Hearings, supra note 2
(testimony of Automobile Importers of America, Inc.) ("Repeated notices.., would
undercut the overall level of consumer confidence . .. ."); Polachek & Steinbach,
supranote6, at 4 ("Manufacturers also contend that if theywere forced to disclose all
widespread flaws in their cars, customer confidence in their product would be
undermined. For example, assume that a component has a failure rate of ten percent.
An auto maker who wanted to compensate customers who experienced the problem
would have to notify all owners of the affected model. But in that case, ninety percent
of the owners would have their confidence in the product undermined without

reason."). Consumer confidence seems far more likely to be harmed by defects in cars
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/2
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3. Would Consumers Be Worse Off if Manufacturers Stopped
Providing Good Will Adjustments?
While the existing statutes have not eliminated good will adjustments, and
while it may sometimes be in a manufacturer's best interests to offer good will
adjustments even under a regimen of regulation, it is in fact impossible to
determine, based on publicly-available information, whether some
manufacturers have decided against instituting good will adjustment programs
because of existing regulation of those programs. While no manufacturer has
proclaimed that it eschewed a good will adjustment program because of
regulation, such a claim is unlikely, given that it would necessarily require
acknowledging an uncorrected defect; manufacturers are understandably
reluctant to advertise the defects in their automobiles. Moreover, it is possible
that more expensive regulation, such as extension of Connecticut-like
legislation to the entire country or even many more states, would increase the
cost of good will adjustments to the point where manufacturers would provide
them less frequently.
Accordingly, while good will adjustments probably would survive
regulation, it is nevertheless the case that government regulation might reduce
the number of good will adjustments. Some commentators, including at least
one consumer advocate, have argued that secret warranty programs therefore
should not be regulated.73 Their theory is that even absent regulation, secret
warranties benefit those consumers who are fortunate enough (or aggressive
enough) to obtain the free repairs; half a loaf, or even a few slices of bread,
is better than none.

which the manufacturer refuses to fix than by notices of defects which the
manufacturer agrees to fix without charge. Former Federal Trade Commission Chair
Miller has argued that regulation of secret warranties will reduce experimentation
because manufacturers will not want to take a chance on being ordered to pay for
substantial repairs. See 42 TRADE REG. & ANTIrUST RPTR. (BNA) 234 (Jan. 28,
1982). That, too, misses the mark. Manufacturers could simply decline to undertake
an expensive good will adjustment program. In addition, any disincentive to
experimentation undoubtedly comes from the fear of producing a defective product,
not the fear of being ordered to correct the defect if the manufacturer corrects the
defect for some of its customers.
Commentators onthe provision of information to consumers generally have noted
that some consumers might misinterpret the information provided. SeeHoward Beales
et al., The Efficient Regulation of ConsumerInformation,24 J.L. & ECON. 491, 534
(1981). It should be possible, however, to draft notices of good will adjustments in
such a way as to minimize the likelihood of consumer confusion. Thus, though the
observation is important in other contexts, it does not appear significant here.
73. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
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Implicit in that argument is an assumption that consumers as a group
benefit when some consumers, but not others, receive free repairs. That
assumption is questionable. In fact, a system in which either all purchasers
of a particular good or no purchasers have access to free repairs may be better
for consumers as a whole than a system in which only aggressive or lucky
consumers obtain free repairs.
When competition is perfect, sellers recover their costs plus a reasonable
profit. While the automobile industry might not be characterized by perfect
competition, and indeed sellers do not always recover their costs, it is
reasonable to assume that prices to consumers, on average, bear a significant
relationship to costs. If that is so, sellers should recover much or all of the
cost of providing future good will adjustments in their selling prices. 7 1 They
should estimate the cost of providing good will adjustments and take that
estimate into account in establishing the selling price. Because manufacturers

74. Cf David A. Rice, ProductsQualityLaws and The Economics ofFederalism
65 B.U. L. REv. 1, 5 n.7 (1985) ("Warranty and other claims costs are a cost of goods
sold and must be recovered through the sale of goods. The calculus necessarily
involves estimation regardless of the type of warranty accounting system that is
employed."); Mark Geistfeld, Note, Imperfect Information, the PricingMechanism,
andProductsLiability, 88 CoLUM. L. Rv. 1057, 1062-63 (1988) ("The price charged
for a product must cover not only its manufacturing and distribution costs, but also the
cost of those product-related risks for whichthe manufacturer is liable. This latter cost
is roughly equivalent to a product liability insurance premium paid by the consumer.
The amount of the premium for each product risk is determined by the expected cost
of the risk plus its administrative costs.") (footnote omitted). The exact proportion of
an increase in manufacturing costs that is passed on to consumers in the form of an
increase in price is determined by the shape of the supply and demand curves. See
generally Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and
Distributionin Buyer-SellerRelationships,43 STAN. L. REV.361 (1991); cf Center
for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d 1336, 1352 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("Because
automobile manufacturers seek to make money, and because their industry is a highly
competitive one, it is reasonable to assure that they will view cost savings as an
opportunity to compete for profitable business by lowering their prices, or will be
forced to follow the lead of those who do"); ROBERT W. CRANI)ALL ET AL.,
REGULATING THE AUTOMOB]LE 40-41 (1986) (Authors constructed a model to
calculate how much of the costs of automobile regulation is passed on to consumers.
They conclude "roughly two-thirds of regulatory costs appear to be passed on to
consumers with a one-year lag ....One cannot reject the hypothesis that eventually
the price of cars reflects the full estimated costs of regulation. "). In re International
Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1065 (1984) ("More information may generally be
helpful to consumers, but all such information can be produced only by incurring costs
that are ultimately born as higher prices by those same consumers.").
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/2
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have decades of experience with secret warranties, and can control whether

they are offered at all, manufacturers' estimates should be fairly accurate.75
Consequently, the average consumer, when purchasing an automobile,
bears some portion of the expense of providing secret warranties. As a result,
the vast majority of consumers end up paying for a benefit they do not
receive; namely, providing free repairs for the most aggressive consumers. 76
If most consumers pay for secret warranties without gaining anything from
them, they would be better off if automakers did not provide secret warranties
at all. Hence, most consumers would be better off under a system in which
manufacturers must provide good will adjustments to all or none, even if that
meant fewer good will adjustments were provided.
Of course, if good will adjustments were eliminated, the consumers who
now obtain free repairs would lose benefits whose cost is spread over a much
larger group. Alternatively, if all consumers were provided with good will
adjustments, all consumers would have to pay the full cost of the adjustments
they receive at the time they purchase their car. The people who now obtain
the benefits of secret warranties might be disappointed if that were to occur,
but as it is difficult articulate with a principled justification for their continued
receipt of77 benefits for which others pay, that does not seem a tragic
outcome.

Which would be better for consumers as a whole, if manufacturers
provided good will adjustments to all, or to none? Though it is unnecessary
to decide that question to determine whether secret warranties should be
regulated, the question is nevertheless of interest. Assuming that consumers
end up paying for the good will adjustments, or perhaps more accurately, the
manufacturer's prediction of what future good will adjustments will cost, that

75. Cf Geistfeld, supra note 74, at 1064 ("In general, the manufacturer is the
party best able to make accurate estimates of product risks, and each estimate directly
translates into a price that the consumer pays for the risk involved.") (footnote

omitted).
76. See Whitford, supranote3, at 1066-67 (writing about out-of-warranty repairs
decided on a case-by-case basis rather than through a secret warranty program:
"Although the dealers and manufacturers might argue that these policy adjustments are

in the nature of gifts, the expense of making policy adjustments must be met out of
the dealers' and manufacturers' income, and that income is principally derived from
the sale of new cars. Accordingly... all owners in some sense help pay for policy
adjustments that are generally available only to a few.").
77. Some might argue that the fact that those who complain the most also receive
the free repairs operates as a sort of self-selecting rationing, insuring that those who
care the most obtain free repairs, and thus, that those who care less must pay for them

or forego them. Some might see this as efficient. But it is not demonstrable that those
who are loudest care the most, only that they are loudest. Others might not have the
time and resources needed to travel back and forth to the dealer to complain.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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raises the question of whether good will adjustments are worth as much to
consumers as they cost."8
No empirical evidence is publicly available to answer that question. The
closest analogous product consumers can purchase is extended warranties, or,
as they are also known, service contracts. Some consumers purchase extended
warranties and others do not; 9 as the consumers who purchase the extended
warranties already should receive the benefits of good will adjustments, they
might not wish to pay for the additional protection. On the other hand, if
manufacturers assumed the cost of providing good will adjustments to all, that
might reduce the cost of providing service contracts."0 Ironically, one of the
staunchest supporters of regulation of secret warranties, Consumers Union,
routinely urges its readers not to purchase extended warranties."
But comparing consumer demand for service contracts to consumer
demand for secret warranties may be misleading; the two are not the same.
Under secret warranty programs, manufacturers typically pay for repairs to
correct a defect shared by many of the manufacturer's cars; often the problem
is one of design. Under extended warranty programs, however, the
manufacturer agrees to pay for all repairs, whether they are caused by
widespread problems or problems specific to the particular car, subject perhaps
to a deductible. The real issue is whether consumers want to pay in advance
78. Cf Ian Ayres & F. Clayton Miller, "I'll Sell it to You at Cost:" Legal
Methods to PromoteRetailMarkupDisclosure,84 Nw. U. L. REV. 1047, 1076 (1990)

(Requiring... disclosure when the costs of communicating are higher than the value
of the information to consumers would force retailers to provide a service whose value
is less than its costs.").
79. Consumers may decide against extended warranties for a variety of reasons.
Some evidence suggests that consumers are more likely to be dissatisfied with
automobile warranty repairs than with repairs of other products under warranties. See
Michael Pertschuk, ConsumerAutomobileProblems, 11 U.C.C.L.J. 145, 146-47 (1978)
(FTC study shows that "25 percent of those who had warranty problems with motor
vehicles were dissatisfiedwith the final result, compared to only 8 percent for all other
products." Various reasons were given: Consumer phone calls were not returned and
appointments were canceled without notice; parts were not available for extended
periods; and consumers were obliged to return to dealers repeatedly). Ultimately, the
problems with automobile warranty repairs culminated in state lemon laws, under
which consumers have a right to a new car or a refund after a specified number of
repairs. See generallyDEE PRIDGEN, CONSUMR PROTECTION AND THE LAW, ch. 15
(1991).
80. More completely, it might lower the cost of extended warranties and raise the
price of the car by a like amount.
81. See, e.g., To Deal or not to Deal, CONSUMM REP., Apr. 1993, at 207
C'Extended warranties .... are more costly. They are not worth their price .... ").
See also Center for Automobile Safety, Warrantiesand ConsumerRights, 8 LEMoN
TIES No. 3 & 4 at 41 (1987) (service contracts "a bad buy").
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/2
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for repairs of defects which surface in many units of the particular model, but
not necessarily all defects in the specific car, given that the decision of
whether to initiate a good will adjustment program is entirely in the discretion
of the manufacturer.
Consumers as a whole should value open disclosure of good will
adjustments if the good will adjustments lower the total of the expected costs
of purchasing, maintaining, and operating the automobile.' That is to say,
if manufacturers provide good will adjustments and raise their prices
accordingly, consumers should still value the good will adjustments if they
reduce the operating and maintenance costs down the road enough so that
consumers overall save money.
Will that be the case? Car dealers are notorious for charging more for
repairs than independent mechanics;' consequently, it is easy to imagine that
the cost to consumers of paying in advance for good will adjustments might
be greater than the cost of paying others to perform the same repairs at the
time they are needed. But the price dealers charge consumers for repairs
probably is not the best figure to use in calculating the costs of good will
adjustments. Manufacturers rarely pay dealers as much for repairs as
consumers do, 4 and the repairs provided under secret warranties are paid for
by manufacturers, not consumers, in the first instance.

82. Cf Charles W. Smithson & Christopher R. Thomas, Measuring the Cost to
ConsumersofProductDefects: The Value of "Lemon Insurance,"31 J. LAw & ECON.
485, 486 (1988) (using a similar approach to determine value of lemon laws for
automobiles). Smithson & Thomas point out that consumers value lemon laws more
for larger cars. Id. at 502. Perhaps consumervaluation of secret warranties also varies
according to the car.
83. See, e.g., MARK

EsKnLDsON, WHAT

AuTo

MEcHANICs DON'T WANT

You

(1993).
84. See Polachek & Steinbach, supra note 6, at 5 n.3 (Auto dealers generally
charge customers a higher labor rate for non-warranty work then [sic] they are allowed
TO KNOW 59

to charge the manufacturer for warranty work."); Whitford, supranote 3, at 1020

("[A] dealer usually receives less for warranty work than he would charge a paying
service customer for the same work. Indeed, many dealers believe that the flat rates
for some labor operations are so stringent that they inevitably absorb a loss on such

warranty work, and some dealers believe their hourly labor rate is so low that they
absorb a loss on almost all warranty work."); ESKELaSON, supra note 83, at 61;
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT ON AUTOMOBILE WARRANTIES 54-65 (1970).
Cf Kronon Motor Sales v. Ford Motor Co., 41 F.3d 338 (7th Cir. 1994) (Dealer

unsuccessfully sued manufacturer to recover difference between what manufacturer
pays dealer for warranty work and what dealer charges customers; difference alleged
to be nearly $700,000 over four years for dealer.). But see ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
10 § 1176 (West Supp. 1994) (manufacturer must reimburse dealer for warranty work
"at the retail rate customarily charged by that" dealer).
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In addition, there are reasons to believe that auto manufacturers, or
dealers working under their direction, as is the case with secret warranty
repairs, possess special characteristics which ought to make them more
efficient than independent mechanics in providing those repairs. Dealership
mechanics are typically better trained and more highly specialized than
independent mechanics." But even apart from that, dealership mechanics are
apt to have advantages over other mechanics in effecting secret warranty
repairs. As noted above, each car manufacturer receives and analyzes reports
of repairs from its dealers around the country. 6 These reports may enable
the manufacturer to identify a potential defect in a system which would not
be apparent to a mechanic who sees many fewer cars of a particular model.
Given that the manufacturer's concern is not just with one car, as might be
true of an independent mechanic, but with many cars (and perhaps with cars
yet to be produced), the manufacturer has a greater incentive to devote
resources to determining how the defect can be cured. As one General Motors
representative put it, GM's product monitoring system is "expected to identify
[problem] situations early and provide General Motors with a sufficient
amount of detailed feedback to fashion the appropriate corrective action in the
shortest .time possible."'
In the end, the manufacturer may be able to tell its dealers how to
identify and fix the problem.. That information should help dealers solve the
problem more quickly and cheaply than an independent mechanic, who must

85. See ESKELDSON, supra note 83, at 59 ("Dealership mechanics are usually
specialists in one repair area of one brand ofvehces ....Because they have access
to factory training and technical assistance that is not usually available to mechanics
working in independent shops, they are usually more knowledgeable concerning the
types of vehicles they work on.").
86. See Conn. Hearings, supra note 13 (statement of Stephen F. Gabriel,
Executive Vice President, Connecticut Automotive Trades Association) ("Information
relative to repairs performed under warranty is forwarded by each dealer to his
respective manufacturer. This statistical information forms the basis of the
manufacturers' analysis of vehicle performance, repair frequencies of various vehicle
parts and projected failure rates of such parts. Additionally, unusual patterns of parts
failure detected by a dealership service department will be routinely noted to the
manufacturer."); Id. (Letter from R.J. Bugno, General Director, Service Operations,
General Motors to General Law Committee, (Jan. 30, 1990)) ("General Motors
monitors the performance of its products in a wide variety of ways . . . .The
monitoring process continues after the public sale of vehicles begins, with the ongoing

assistance of nearly 10,000 General Motors dealers who provide service to the
purchasers and lessees of our vehicles.").
87. Conn Hearings,supra note 13 (Letter from R.J. Bugno, General Director,
Service Operations, General Motors to General Law Committee, (Jan. 30, 1990)).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/2
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first diagnose the problem and then devise her own solution.' Dealers who
perform the same repair on many cars should also benefit from practice; there
may even be economies of scale in effecting some repairs. In fact, it appears
that mechanics as a group are not very successful in fixing cars; one study of
5,000 cars inspected at a Department of Transportation diagnostic center in
Huntsville, Alabama, for example, found that twenty-four percent of all repairs

to the cars were unnecessary and one-third of the money spent on repairs was
devoted to unneeded work. 9 Another study found that more than a third of
the consumers who had had their cars repaired within the previous year found
the repairs unsatisfactory.9" While dealers' mechanics also make mistakes,9
common sense suggests that they are less likely to do so when making repairs
pursuant to a good will adjustment program, under which they have special
information, than are independent mechanics who are not so well informed.
4. Is Government Regulation Desirable?
The foregoing analysis suggests that consumers as a whole should desire
notice of good will adjustment programs, but does not by itself indicate why
government intervention is required. That is to say, the above discussion does
not explain why the market does not reach an optimal resolution of the matter.

88. Cf. Conn Hearings,supranote 13 (Letter from R.J. Bugno, General Director,
Service Operations, General Motors to General Law Committee, (Jan. 30, 1990))
(GM's "dealers are supported by a large network of field personnel... including
people experienced in engineering, quality and reliability and service-related functions,
all ofwhom make on-site contactwith dealers. In addition, anation-wide direct-access
telephone system is made available to dealership technicians. This system provides
dealer service technicians with helpful technical insights and diagnostic assistance.");
Ralph Vartabedian, Your Wheels, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 13, 1990, at E15 ("If a dealer is
'unfamiliar' with a problem, he can refer to the [service] bulletins [provided by
manufacturers] and find whether the engineers in Detroit or Tokyo have information
that will save him time and the motorist money."); Mary L. Lyndon, Secrecy and
Innovation In Tort Law and Regulation, 23 N.M. L. REv. 1, 14 ("There is general
agreement among economists that secrecy as such is costly. It encourages wasteful
duplication and lack of coordination.").
89. See Pertschuk, supranote 79, at 152. See also EsKELDSON, supra note 83,
at 6 ("Rapidly changing technology is making most mechanics' skills obsolete.
According to the California Bureau of Automotive Repair, which licenses mechanics
for the state's smog inspection program, 70% of the mechanics being tested are not
able to expertly diagnose and repair late-model vehicles.").
90. See Best & Andreasen, supranote 56, at 705-06. For extensive discussion
of problems with auto repairs, see generallyESKELDSON, supra note 83.
91. For discussion of problems with dealer repairs under warranty, see Whitford,
supra note 3, at 1032-35, 1040.
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One of the mainstays of economic analysis is that properly functioning
markets should allocate resources appropriately.' 2 In theory, if consumers
value good will adjustments more than it costs manufacturers to supply them,
manufacturers will in fact produce the adjustments. If consumers do not value
good will adjustments as much as adjustments cost, they should not have to
pay for them, and regulation that forces consumers to do so will lead to
inefficiencies. In the absence of a market failure, if the market does not
supply consumers with good will adjustments, then the analysis in the
preceding section may simply be wrong.
Has there been a market failure? Market forces could conceivably
resolve secret warranty issues in one of two ways: There could be a separate
market in a form of warranty or insurance that protects only against the type
of defects covered by secret warranty programs; or the market for new cars
could take into account the type of support manufacturers provide for
after-warranty defects, just as that market takes into account other auto
characteristics, such as price and gasoline mileage. In fact, it appears that
market forces are not resolving the matter optimally.
There is no separate market in "good will adjustment insurance." To be
sure, manufacturers sell extended warranties, but extended warranties cover
other types of defects as well, and thus are more expensive than would be
some sort of good will adjustment insurance, assuming such insurance were
available.
What would happen if manufacturers were to offer a form of good will
adjustment insurance? Any answer must be founded on sheer speculation, but
it beggars the imagination to suggest that many consumers would be
enthusiastic about secret warranty programs as they currently exist; it seems
far-fetched to suggest that consumers would be willing to pay for a program
under which, when many cars of a particular model developed a problem after
the warranty expired, those who complained to the right people loudly enough
would obtain free repairs, at the manufacturer's discretion.
It is less obvious how consumers would respond if the repairs were
offered to all who purchased the insurance, though the fact that the decision
on whether to institute a particular repair program at all is up to the
manufacturer would undoubtedly diminish interest. But, of course,
manufacturers would not offer good will adjustment insurance as a separate
product. From the manufacturer's point of view, that would defeat the
purpose of making good will adjustments. Those who purchased the insurance
would feel entitled to the adjustment; therefore providing the repairs would
not enhance the seller's reputation. Similarly, if the manufacturer chose not
to pay for the repair for those who did not buy the insurance, its good will

92. See generally Peter Asch, Automobile Safety: Is Government Regulation
Really Our Savior?, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 383, 387 (1986).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/2
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would suffer, even though the consumer did not purchase the insurance. In
short, not only is there now no market in good will adjustment insurance, but
such a market is not likely to come into existence.
Another way the market could resolve the problem is through the market
for new cars. When making purchasing decisions, buyers of new cars could
decide how much they valued good will adjustments vis-a-vis other features
and price, and could purchase cars manufactured by companies which
provided more adjustments, if that was their preference. But few consumers
can do that because few consumers are aware of secret warranties.' Because
most companies are not open about providing good will adjustments, very few
consumers are in a position to form a conclusion about which manufacturers
provide more after-warranty support. While consumers can form conclusions
about the durability of particular models, and in fact Consumer Reports
annually publishes the results of its surveys on durability, providing interested
consumers with access to durability information,94 durability does not
correlate directly with secret warranties. Some cars which fare quite well in
durability ratings are nevertheless the subject of secret warranties.95 The

situation is a variant of George A. Akerlof's famous lemons model: Akerlof
wrote that when buyers cannot distinguish between high-quality and lowquality goods, sellers have an incentive to market poor quality merchandise.96
Manufacturers who sell to those who do not know about goodwill adjustment
programs have an incentive not to supply those programs.
If consumers cannot take secret warranties into account in making
purchasing decisions, the market cannot be expected to reach an optimal
equilibrium.' A number of economists have argued that when consumers
possess imperfect information, sellers will have disproportionate market
power;9 empirical studies seem to confirm that insight.99 Accordingly, the

93. See, e.g., Conn. Hearings, supra note 13 (testimony of Timothy West,

Director of the Fraud Division of the Department of Consumer Protection) ("the
general public does not recognize that these secret warranties are in effect").

94. The information appears in the April issue of each year. For reasons why the
Consumer Reports data may not be entirely reliable, see ROBERT W. CRANDALL

ET

150 (1986).
95. For example, the April 1989 issue of ConsumerReports contained both an

AL., REGULATiNG THE AUTOMOBI.E

article listingvarious secretwarranties ("Cars With Secret Warranties") andFrequency

of Repair Records for numerous makes. Some of the cars listed as having been the
subject of secret warranties rated highly in the durability ratings.
96. George A- Akerlof, The Marketfor "Lemons:" Quality Uncertaintyand the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).
97. See Asch, supranote 92, at 387 ("The qualification that markets in question
must function properly is important. . . , gross consumer ignorance of particular risks
may justify government intervention.").
98. See Steve Salop, Information and Market Structure: Information and
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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traditional "let the market do it" argument does not justify resisting
governmental intervention.
Even if information about good will adjustments were readily available
before purchase, it is doubtful that the market would function properly. Many
consumers probably are not equipped to take good will adjustments into
account in making decisions to buy cars. A number of studies have
demonstrated that many consumers do little "shopping around" for purchases,
even for major purchases like cars."' One survey conducted in 1976 found

Monopolistic Competition, 66 AM. ECON. REv. 240 (1976) ("if information is costly,
each small firm obtains market power, and the equilibrium (if one exists) is
characterized by prices above competitive levels .. ."); William N. Eskridge, One
Hundred Years of Ineptitude: The Need for Mortgage Rules Consonant with the
Economic and PsychologicalDynamics of the Home Sale and Loan Transaction,70
VA. L. REv. 1083, 1112, n.96 (1984); Phillip Nelson, Information and Consumer
Behavior, 78 J. POL. EcoN. 311 (1970); Charles Stuart, Consumer Protection in
Markets With Informationally Weak Buyers, 12 BELL J. EOON. 562 (1981). But see
Leon Courville & Warren H. Hausman, Warranty Scope and Reliability Under
ImperfectInformation andAlternative MarketStructures, 52 J. Bus. 361, 373 (1979)
("inaccurate information does not imply poor market results" based on an economic
model that makes the questionable assumption that consumers maximize perceived
expected utility).
99. For example, a number of studies have found that increased comparison
shopping by consumers leads to lower market prices. See, e.g., D. Grant Devine &
Bruce W. Marion, The Influence of ConsumerPriceInformation on RetailPricingand
ConsumerBehavior,61 AM. J. AGRIC. EOON. 228 (1979); Vicki A. McCracken et al.,
The Impact of Comparative Food Price Information on Consumers and Grocery
Retailers: Some PreliminaryFindings of a Field Experiment, 16 J. CONSUMER
AFFAIRS 224 (1982); Kenneth McNeil et al., supra note 56, at 708-09; J. Edward
Russo et al., An Effective Display of Unit PriceInformation, J. MKTG., Apr. 1975, at
11. See also E. Thomas Sullivan & Brian A. Marks, The FTC'sDeceptiveAdvertising
Policy: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 64 OR. L. REv. 593, 620 (1986) ("The
courts, the Commission, and legal commentators have recognized that the lack of
product information leads to market imperfections, abuse and reduced consumer
welfare.").
100. See, e.g., Brian T. Ratchford, The Economics ofInformation: The Views of
aMarketingEconomist,in THE FRONTER OF RESEARCH IN THE CONSUMER INTEREST
265, 267 (E.Scott Maynes & American Council on Consumer Interests eds., 1988)
("consumers search little, even for expensive items such as cars"); JamesN. Morgan,
Consumer Choice is More Than Search, in THE FRoNT
oF RESEARCH IN THE
CONSUMER INTEREST 277, 278 (E.Scott Maynes & American Council on Consumer

Interests eds., 1988) (studies show that consumers exhibit "even in major purchases,
a startling lack of deliberation, of specification of qualities, of consideration of brands,
or of visiting of stores, and not even a substantial span of time from thinking of
buying to purchase.., the overwhelming finding in search of an explanation is the
casual purchase-without-choice, even for cars"); Howard Beales et al., Consumer
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/2
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that more than a third of car buyers considered only one or two brands before
buying a car while the average car purchaser considered only 3.5 brands and

made 3.1 dealer visits." 1 Other studies have found that consumers can

Search and Public Policy, 8 J.CONSUMER RES. 11, 11, 17 (1981) ("[C]onsumers
engage in very little overt search for information, even for expensive products such as
major appliances and furniture .... [S]ome buyers purchase a house after exploring
only a few alternatives."); D. HEMPEL, SEARCH BEHAVIOR AND INFORMATION
UTILIZATION IN THE HOME BUYING PROCESS IN MARKETING INVOLVEMENT IN
SOCIETY AND THE ECONOMY 241, 243 (P. McDonald ed., 1969) (1969 Fall Conf.
Procs. Am. Marketing Ass'n) (study of homebuyers in high-income Connecticut
communities found that about one-third actually visited fewer than six homes with the
intent of considering them for purchase; median number of houses visited with the
intent of considering for purchase was four); Michael L. Ray & Donald A. Dunn,
Local ConsumerInformation Systems for Services: The Marketfor Information and
Its Effect on the Market, in THE EFFECT OF INFORMATION ON CONSUMER AN
MARKET BEHAVIOR 92, 94 (A. Mitchell ed., 1978) (median number of houses seenby
a homebuyer is about two or three and many people buy the first house they see);
Norris, Processesand ObjectivesofHouse Purchasingin the New London Area, in 1
CONSUMER BEHAVIOR: THE DYNAMICS OF CONSUMER REACTION 25, 26-27 (L.
Clarke ed., 1954) (author of study of homebuyers in tight Connecticut market, after
finding that median number of houses entered was six and median number of houses
seriously considered was one, characterized househunting of many consumers as
"lethargic and casual"); Eskridge, supranote 98, at 1113-14 (many consumers do little
shopping for mortgages); DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND
VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION, MORTGAGE SETTLEMENT COSTS 2-3 (1972), reprinted
in REAL ESTATE SETTLEMENT COSTS, FHA MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES, HOUSING
ABANDoNMENT, AND SITE SELECTION POLICIES: HEARINGS ON H.R. 13337 BEFORE
THE SUBCOM. ON HOUSING OF THE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 92nd Cong.

1st Sess.735, 738-39 (1972) ("The buyer seldom decides who will provide settlement
services for him. If there is a choice, he usually depends upon advice of the broker,
escrow agent, seller, or settlement attorney."). But see JosephW. Newman & Bradley
D. Lockman, MeasuringPrepurchaseInformationSeeking, 2 J. CoNsUEvR RES. 216
(1975) (concluding that some studies of consumer search behavior underestimate the
amount of search by consumers).
101. See ARTHUR YOUNG & Co., supra note 18, at 31. According to the study
only 13.3% thought about six or more brands. Of the car purchasers who responded
to the survey, 80.6% visited a dealer between one and four times before buying.

Another study conducted in January and February of 1977 under the auspices of
NewsweekMagazine, was published in two volumes, BUYERS OF NEW DOMESTIC
CARS 1977, [hereinafter DOMESTIC CARs] and BUYERS OF NEW IMPORTED CARS 1977
[hereinafter IMPORTED CARS]. More than 7,000 purchasers of domestic autos and
nearly 6,000 owners of imported vehicles were surveyed. The study found that more
than 40% of consumers visited only one dealer that sold the make of car they
ultimately purchased, that the median number of such dealers visited was 2 and the
mean number was 2.4 for domestic purchases and 2.1 for imported cars. DOMESTIC
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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become overloaded with too much information 1" and that many respond to

CARS,

supra at Table 13; IMPORTED

CARS,

supra at Table 13. More than 40% of the

domestic car buyers did not consider another make. DommsTIC CARS, supraat Table
15, while nearly a third of the foreign car buyers did not, IMPORTED CARS, supra at
Table 15. Nearly half of the domestic purchasers did not even visit a dealer who sold
one make other than the one purchased; nearly 40% of the imported car buyers did not

visit a rival manufacturer's dealer either. DoMESTIc CARS, supra, at Table 16;
IMPORTED CARS, supra at Table 16.
Some evidence suggests that consumers would be better off if they engaged in
more search when purchasing cars. For example, one study concluded "on average,
automobile brands are far from equal in value even within size classes, and...
consumers stand to gain a great deal from acquiring information and making optimal
choices." See Brian T. Ratchford & Manoj K. Agarwal, The Value ofInformation on
Automobile Characteristics,1979 EDUCATOR'S CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 200, 203

(Neil Beckwith et al. eds., 1979). The study concluded that the expected incremental
gain even from obtaining information on a fifth car as opposed to only four, was
substantially in excess of the cost of obtaining that information.
102. Though some of the information overload studies have been criticized, the
bulk of the research indicates that consumer decision-making does degrade when
consumers are provided with too much information. See, e.g., Kevin L. Keller &
Richard Staelin, Effects of Quality and Quantity of Information of Decision
Effectiveness, 14 J. CONSUMIER RES. 200, 211 (1987); John C. Bergstrom & John R.
Stoll, An Analysis of Information Overload with Implications for Survey Design
Research, 12 LEIsURE SCIENCES 265 (1990); Naresh K. Malhotra, InformationLoad

and Consumer Decision Making, 8 J. CONSUME REs. 419 (1982). Early studies
included Jacob Jacoby et al., Brand Choice Behavior as a Function of Information
Load: Replicationand Extension, 1 J. CONSUMER RES. 33 (1974); and Jacob Jacoby
et al., BrandChoice Behavior as a Function ofInformation Load, 11 J. MARKETING
RES. 63 (1974). The Jacoby studies were criticized by a number of articles, some of
which argued that the data did not support the reported conclusions. See, e.g., Naresh
K. Malhotra, Reflectionson the InformationOverloadParadigmin ConsumerDecision
Making, 10 J. CONSUMER REs. 436 (1984) (suggesting that information overload
occurs but that the Jacoby studies did not prove it); J. Edward Russo, More
Information is Better: A Reevaluation of Jacoby, Speller & Kohn, 1 J. CONSUMER
RES. 68 (1974); John D. Summers, Less InformationBetter?, 11 J. MARETING RES.

467 (1974); William L. Wilkie, Analysis of Effects of Information Load, 11 J.
MARKITING RES. 462 (1974). Jacoby responded in Jacob Jacoby, Constructive
Criticism and ProgrammaticResearch: Reply to Russo, 2 J. CONSUMNmRES. 154
(1975); and Jacob Jacoby, InformationLoad and Decision Quality: Some Contested
Issues, 14 J. MARKETING RES. 569 (1977). Studies suggesting that additional
infonnation does not impair decision-making-though possibly the load tested was too
small-include Debra L. Scammon, "Information Load" and Consumers, 4 J.
CONSUMER RES. 148 (1977); Naresh K. Malhotra et al., The Information Overload
Controversy: An Alternative Viewpoint, 46 J. MARKETING 27 (1982); and Thomas E.
Muller, Buyer Response to Variations in ProductInformation Load, 69 J. AIPLIED
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/2
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information overload by not attending to all the information with which they
are presented; 3 in essence, consumers focus on some features but not
others. Still other studies have shown that when making decisions, consumer
tend to focus on exciting, "vivid" information rather than on less interesting,
drier information." Given the welter of information which is available to
buyers about cars, the emotional response much of it elicits, and the difficulty
in evaluating much of the available information, it is easy to imagine that
after-warranty
repairs which may never be needed would not get much
05
attention. 1

PsYCH. 300 (1984). These last studies have been criticized. See Jacob Jacoby,
Perspectiveson Information Overload, 10 J. CONSUMER REs. 432 (1984). Keller &
Staelin are in turn criticized in Robert J. Meyer & Eric J. Johnson, Information
Overloadand the NonrobustnessofLinearModels: A Comment on Kellerand Staelin,
15 J. CONSUMER RES. 498 (1989). Kevin L. Keller & Richard Staelin responded in
Assessing Biases in MeasuringDecision Effectiveness and Information Overload, 15
J. CONSUM REs. 504 (1989).
103. See David M. Grether et al., The IrrelevanceofInformation Overload: An
Analysis of Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 277 (1986); Jacoby,
Perspectiveson Information Overload,supra note 102; Allan Schwartz & Louis L.
Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of ImperfectInformation: A Legal and
EconomicAnalysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630,660-61 (1979) ("Evaluating terms is more
costly than evaluating prices or search characteristics such as color, size or fit; some
comparison shoppers in consequence may devote little time to examining terms.").
104. See RICHARD E. NISBETT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCES: STRATEGIES
AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMEw 45 (1980); Eskridge, supra note 98, at
1117; Jonathan Shedler & Melvin Manis, Can the Availability Heuristic Explain
Vividness Effects?, 51 J. PERsONALirY & Soc. PsYCHOL. 26 (1986); Marie G. Wilson
et al., Information Competition and ividness Effects in On-Line Judgments, 44
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 132 (1989).

105. The amount of printed information designed to assist car buyers provides
some hint of how much is available in making purchase decisions. For example, car
buyers can consult automobile books, like GiLlis, THE CAR BoOK, supra note 36
(updated annually; the 1992 edition runs 160 pages and has chapters on safety, fuel
economy, maintenance, warranties, insurance, tires, buying strategies, among other
things); consumer magazines, like ConsumerReports(one issue each year is devoted
to cars and most other issues rate at least a few cars); automobile specialty magazines,
like Car and Driver; buyer's price guides; car columns in local newspapers; and
advertising brochures prepared by car manufacturers. Visiting show rooms and taking
test drives can also be overwhelming for some.
It is impossible to know the extent to which consumers would absorb and use
information about secret warranties, if that information were made available at the time
of purchase. The closest analogy is warranty information, but as warranties are
considerably more important than after-warranty support information, the extent to
which consumers use information about warranties in making purchase decision is not
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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Some scholars have argued against intervention in markets even when
consumers lack perfect information. Professors Schwartz and Wilde have
argued that in many markets governmental regulation of warranties will be
unnecessary as long as a certain number of consumers shop for
warranties.' M According to their theory, because sellers cannot distinguish
between those who shop for warranties and those who do not, sellers who
wish to attract the business of those who shop for warranties will offer
favorable warranty terms to all shoppers. Thus, all shoppers obtain favorable
warranty terms, and those who do not actively shop for warranties are
protected by those who do. On that theory, it should not much matter if some
consumers lack the ability to focus on secret warranties when purchasing cars
as long as some do.
But that theory does not seem to speak to the market failure pertaining
to secret warranties."° Secret warranties do not present a situation where
interested consumers protect others who are not interested. First, many sellers
make some attempt to distinguish between those who care about good will
adjustments and those who do not; they simply do not offer good will

a reliable guide as to consumer interest in secret warranties. Some empirical data on
consumer use of motor vehicle warranty information in purchasing decisions is
available. One study found that fewer than seven percent of motor vehicle buyers
rated the terms of the warranty offered among the five most important factors in their
purchase decision. See DOMEsic CARS, and IMPORTED CARs, supra note 101, at
Table 33-1. But another study found that many car buyers claim awareness of the
detail of the warranties provided with the cars they purchased. See ART-i_ YOUNG
& Co., supranote 18, at 55 (78.2% of respondents who had bought cars asserted that

they knew details of the warranty). But as only 36.8% had actually read the warranty
before purchase, see id. at 58, the claims of awareness may be inflated. In addition,
it is not clear how representative the study's respondents were of the population as a
whole. Respondents were called upon to mail their answers back to those conducting
the survey, and thus the respondents were probably more interested in consumer
matters and better informed than the general population. See id. at 12. Thus, they

may also have been more careful about reading warranties. See also Wilkes &
Wilcox, supranote64, at 39 (91.5% of respondents in survey agreed that "consumers
are not likely to check a product's guarantee very well until after the product has been

bought and some problem arises"); William C. Whitford, StrietProductsLiability and
the Automobile Industry: Much Ado About Nothing, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 83, at 152-53
(concluding that consumers do not seem interested in absorbingwarranty information).
106. See Schwartz & Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets, supra note 64;
see also Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening on the Basis oflmperfectInformation,supra
note 103.
107. This is not to suggest that the authors intended their theory to apply to secret
warranties. Rather, they dealt with conventional warranties.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/2
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adjustments
to all buyers and thus the Schwartz-Wilde model does not
18
apply. 0
Second, it is unlikely that there are enough consumers who are interested
in secret warranties at the time of purchase to cause auto makers to compete
on that basis. As Professors Schwartz and Wilde note, "[e]valuating terms is
more costly than evaluating prices or search characteristics such as color, size
or fit; some comparison
shoppers in consequence may devote little time to
examining terms."1"9 Secret warranties seem even less likely than most
terms to draw the attention of comparison shoppers: If consumers are not
generally aware of secret warranties, it is unlikely that many are choosing
among different cars on the basis of good will adjustments. Even those
manufacturers, like Ford, which provide superior after-warrantysupport do not
seem to advertise the fact; that suggests that they believe that consumers do
not make buying judgments on the basis of good will adjustments until they
have been the beneficiary of such adjustments. Alternatively, manufacturers
may believe that disclosing the existence of after-warranty support may detract
from other marketing efforts, either by obscuring more persuasive appeals or

108. Professors Schwartz and Wilde comment that their model will not apply if
sellers can discriminate among consumers:
When fnms competed for the business of comparison shoppers,
nonsearchers necessarily were benefitted. But if firms discriminate among
customers on the basis of knowledge or sophistication, this pecuniary
externality would vanish: firms would exploit nonsearchers by charging
them higher prices or providing them with lower quality products and
services than would be offered to comparison shoppers.
Schwartz & Wilde, ImperfectInformation in Markets, supra note 64, at 662-63.
109. Schwartz & Wilde, Interveningon the Basis ofImperfectlnformation,supra
note 103, at 660-61. The authors also state:
A market can be considered monopolistic for any term used by all or almost
all firms if (1)the market is not price competitive; and (2)the term at issue
appears in arcane legal language and fine or otherwise inconspicuous print
....If the market is price competitive but the second criterion is met, a
monopolistic outcome for any term should be presumed to occur if a
substantial portion ...of the comparison shoppers are not term conscious.

Id. at 661 (footnotes omitted). Secret warranties, of course, are even less conspicuous
than anything buried in fine print. See also Richard Craswell, The Identification of
UnfairActs and Practicesby the FederalTrade Commission, 1981 WIs. L. REV. 107,
133 ("It would be a rare (and exceptionally industrious) consumer who could imagine
all the undesirable things a seller might do, and then compare competing offers to see
which undesirable acts each seller has promised not to commit. Unless enough
consumers are willing and able to make such comparisons, however, the market
provides very little incentive for sellers to improve their contracts to offer the optimal

bundle of post-purchase rights.").
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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by reminding consumers of something manufacturers would rather they forget;
namely, that cars break down after the warranty expires.
5. A Kaldor-Hicks Analysis

It thus appears that consumers would be better off if manufacturers
offered good will adjustments to all consumers or none, and that, as the
market cannot attain that result acting alone, government intervention is
desirable. But would such a result be efficient? Economists sometimes use
an approach known as Kaldor-Hicks to measure whether a particular outcome
is efficient."' Under Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, a transaction or regulation is
considered efficient if it produces an outcome in which the winner gains more
than the loser loses, so that the outcome produces a net increase in wealth.
For example, if A values a particular book at three dollars, and B at seven
dollars, and A sells the book to B for six dollars, that is an efficient outcome.
A is better off by three dollars, because A has received six dollars for a book
worth half that to A, while B's position has improved by one dollar, because
B paid only six dollars for something worth seven dollars to B. By parity of
reasoning, an outcome under which the law required A to surrender the book
to B at no charge would also be efficient, because A would have lost
something worth three dollars, and B would have gained something worth
seven, for a net gain in wealth of four dollars."' Under the Kaldor-Hicks
approach, it is not necessary for the winner actually to compensate the loser;
rather, as long as the winner could in theory have compensated the loser and
still have something left over, the solution is considered efficient.'
Kaldor-Hicks is obviously a long way from a perfect guide to formulating
legal rules, and it is subject to criticism on various grounds.'
Still, it is

110. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, EcoNoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 14 (4th ed.
1992) ('When an economist says that free trade or competition or the control of
pollution or some other policy or state of the world is efficient, nine times out of ten
he means Kaldor-Hicks efficient, as shall this book."). For a comparison of KaldorHicks efficiency with other measures of efficiency, seeJULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS,
MoRAts AND TBE LAW 84-132 (1988).
111. The example assumes that A does not resent the law. If A does, the result
may not be efficient. For example, if A were willing to pay five dollars to join a
group to repeal the law, then the law would not produce optimal results. The example
also assumesthat there are no transaction costs, so that no money is expended effecting
the transfer of the book.
112. For discussionof Kaldor-I-Icks efficiency, see DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN
A. STOUT, CASES AND MATERALS ON LAW AND EcONOMIcs 16-20 (1992); POSNER,
supra note 110, at 13-16; Coleman, supra note 110, at 84-132.
113. Some of the criticisms are discussed in the sources referred to supra in note
112. See also Richard S. Markovits, A Constructive Critique of the Traditional
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/2
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interesting to examine whether the regulation of secret warranties is
Kaldor-I-Icks efficient.
Suppose that a particular model of car suffers from a defect and the
manufacturer determines that it will provide a good will adjustment program
to those who complain to dealers. Assume that the repairs will cost the
manufacturer fifty dollars per car. If the manufacturer is rational, it must
believe that its gains in good will from repairing the cars it chooses to include

in the program equal or exceed fifty dollars per car, so that it at least breaks
even on the transaction. The manufacturer probably assumes that its gains in
good will from repairing cars excluded from the program would be less than.
fifty dollars per car, because otherwise a rational manufacturer would include
those cars in the program as well (assuming, for the moment, no transaction
costs). That will often be a reasonable assumption, because some consumers
who do not complain will not suffer from the problem, or may not notice it,
or may not hold it against the manufacturer. But other consumers probably
will encounter the problem and some may even be sufficiently troubled by it
that they will decide not to buy the manufacturer's products again.
Consequently, it is reasonable to assume also that the manufacturer would
experience some gain in good will if it offered free repairs to those not
included in the program, though perhaps not so large a gain per consumer as
with those who are included.
Assume that the manufacturer would average a gain in good will of five
dollars per car of those excluded from the program."' If the manufacturer
decided to extend its program to all purchasers of its cars, it would also face
some expense in notifying them and perhaps incur other transaction costs as
well. Assume these costs average two dollars per consumer. As a result the
net cost to the manufacturer of notifying non-complaining motorists of its
program and then repairing their cars is forty-seven dollars per car. That is
arrived at by adding the fifty dollars in repair costs to the two dollars in notice
costs, and subtracting the five dollars gained in good will.
Now look at the situation from the point of view of the motorist. As a
practical matter, it might cost consumers considerably more than fifty dollars
to obtain the repair from a source other than the manufacturer, given the

Definition and Use of the Concept of "The Effect of a Choice On Allocative
(Economic)Efficiency:" Why the Kaldor-HicksTest, the Coase Theorem and Virtually
All Law-and-Economics Welfare Arguments Are Wrong, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 485.
114. This assumes also that the announcement of an adjustment program will not
cause the seller to lose any good will. As discussed above, announcements of recalls
may cause a loss in good will. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. On the
other hand, it may be that a voluntary adjustment, which is not required for safety or
emission-related reasons, can be presented in a way to avoid any loss to the seller's
good will.
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diagnostic problems and other problems other repairers are likely to
experience, as discussed above, but assume that the repairs are worth only
fifty dollars to consumers. If the net gain to non-complaining motorists is
fifty dollars, and the net loss to the manufacturer is forty-seven dollars, then
requiring manufacturers to provide free repairs is Kaldor-Hicks efficient.
Such a.requirement would produce a net increase in the wealth of society of
three dollars per repair, assuming no other costs. In fact, as long as the
increase in the manufacturer's good will exceeds the cost of notice and other
transaction costs, disclosure of the existence of secret warranties will be
Kaldor-Hicks efficient. If the assumption that repairs are worth no more to
consumers than they cost manufacturers is relaxed, so that the value of the
repairs to consumers reflects the likelihood that they would have to pay more
than the manufacturer pays to accomplish the repairs, it becomes even more
likely that requiring manufacturers to provide free repairs is Kaldor-Hicks

efficient. While that is not a sufficient condition for forced disclosure or
regulation, it does militate in favor of forced disclosure.
In sum, regulation of secret warranties is desirable from the standpoint
of economics. The market cannot reach an optimal allocation of resources
without government intervention. The Article now turns to other policy
arguments concerning good will adjustments.
B. FairnessJustifications
The argument most frequently made by supporters of secret warranty
legislation is that less aggressive consumers are deprived of a benefit afforded
the more aggressive, and this seems unfair. For example, one government
official has commented, "We don't think a prerequisite to getting a defective
part or a failed part repaired in your $15,000 car should be some type of
confrontation with either the seivice manager or a general manager."'1 5 This
implicates one of the traditional themes of consumer law: protecting those
who do not or cannot protect themselves. That idea finds expression in
numerous ways in consumer protection rules: For example, legally-mandated
cooling off periods are designed to afford consumers a chance to reconsider
certain purchases away from high-pressure sellers;" 6 the FTC Act has
historically been used to help the vulnerable;" 7 and the unconscionability

115. Conn.Hearings,supranote 13 (testimony of Timothy West, Director of the
Fraud Division of the Department of Consumer Protection).
116. See generally, DEE PRIDGEN, CONSUMER CREDrr AN Ta LAW § 15.01
(1990).
117. See generally,Elizabeth H. Dole, Cost-Benefit Analysis Versus Protecting
the Vulnerable: The FiYC's SpecialInterestGroups, 9 ANmrUST L. & ECON. REV.
15 (1977). See also Federal Trade Comm'n v. Sterling Drugs, Inc., 317 F.2d 669,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/2
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doctrine is most likely to be brought into play when one of the participants to
an agreement is lacking in bargaining power." 8 Requiring manufacturers
to afford the ignorant the same benefits they provide the more knowledgeable
fits neatly into this tradition.
Secret warranties also lend themselves to other forms of discrimination.
Because dealers and district representatives frequently have the discretion to
decide whether individual consumers will receive free repairs or not under
good will adjustment programs, they can exercise that discretion in favor of
preferred groups. Although no empirical research is publicly available to
show that certain groups are or are not more likely to receive good will
adjustments than others, it does appear that white males receive better
treatment from car dealers than females and African-Americans, at least on
some matters,"" and that the poor pay more, both for used cars and for
Thus, Ian Ayres' recent study of automobile
repairs to those cars.12
dealerships in Chicago found that dealers charged white women markups that

674 (2d Cir. 1963), in which appears the following famous quote reflecting the attitude
toward consumers of those who applied the FTC Act, at least until 1983:
The general public has been defined as 'that vast multitude which includes
the ignorant, and unthinking and the credulous, who, in making purchases,
do not stop to analyze but too often are governed by appearances and
The average purchaser has been variously
general impressions.'
characterized asnot'thinking straight,' subjectto 'impressions,' uneducated,
and grossly misinformed; he is influenced by prejudice and superstition; and
he wishfully believes in miracles, allegedly the result of progress in science
(quoting 1CALLMAN, UNFAjR COMPETION AND TRADEMARKS § 19.2(a)(1), at341-44
(1950)). Though the FTC has purportedly abandoned that standard, in favor of the
"consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances," see FTC Policy Statement on
Deception, contained in Letter from James C. Miller EIl (then-FTC Chair) to Senator
Bob Packwood (Oct. 14, 1983), [hereinafter FTC Policy Statement], the quote does
demonstrate an approach which has animated much FTC action.
118. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449
(D.C. Cir. 1965) ("Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an
absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract
In many cases the
terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party ....
meaningfulness of the choice is negated by a gross inequality of bargaining power.").
119. See Ian Ayres, FairDriving: Gender andRaceDiscriminationin RetailCar
Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817, 827-842 (1991).
120. See McNeil et al., supranote 56, at 709-12. Although this study took into
account sales by private sellers as well as by dealers, the same patterns were found in
both markets; that is to say, dealers charged more for the same cars to the poor and
the poor were obliged to pay more for repairs for the same cars. That retailers charge
the poor more for goods has long been established. See generally,DAVID CAPLOVTZ,
THE POOR PAY MORE: CONSUMER PRACTICES OF LOW-INCOmE FAmmES (1967).
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were forty percent higher than the markups charged white men; that
African-American men were obliged to pay markups twice those of white
men; and that female African-Americans had to pay markups three times
larger than those paid by white males.'
The study also found that consumers were subject to varying kinds of
nonprice discrimination, depending on their race and gender. AfricanAmerican men were less likely to be offered a test-drive,' while AfricanAmerican women were more likely to be asked certain questions than other
potential purchasers.l" Sellers tended to steer customers to salespeople of
the same race and gender as the customer.2
Another study explored what happened when consumers complained to
dealers after having bought used cars which developed problems during the
first three months after the sale. The study found that the seller was more
likely to pay for repair costs when the consumer had a higher income than

when the consumer was poor, even taking into accountproduct characteristics,

such as the age of the car."z
Though the reasons for the different treatment remain unclear, 6 it is
certainly plausible that dealers who accord preferential treatment to white
males in some respects will do so in other respects as well. If good will
adjustments are provided in a racially discriminatory fashion, that alone should
justify legislative and regulatory intervention. 27
Even if sellers do not deliberately discriminate against certain groups, the
method chosen to ration good will adjustments-waiting until a consumer
seeks redress from the seller-is likely to deprive minority groups and those
with lower incomes of the free repairs. Studies show that African-Americans
and those of lower socio-economic status are less likely to perceive problems

121. Ayres, supra note 119, at 819.
122. Ayres, supra note 119, at 834-35.
123. E.g., Are you married? What is your occupation? Ayres, supra note 119,
at 834.
124. Ayers, supra note 119, at 833. Professor Ayres found that sellers did not
treat different groups differently in all respects. Sellers did not steer different
consumers to cars of different cost, for example. Id. at 833-34.

125. See McNeil et al., supranote 56, at 715-17.
126. Professor Ayres speculates that the different treatment is rooted less in
animus towards certain consumers than in dealer estimates as to which group will yield

the most revenue for the dealer, but calls for further study to discover the reasons.
Ayres, supranote 119, at 841-57.
127. It might be that civil rights statutes would bar such discrimination. But that
would require proof that free repairs were offered on a biased fashion, proof that might

be difficult to obtain. It might also be preferable to have a statute applying clearly to
secret warranties.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/2
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with the products they purchase and less likely to voice those problems, once

128
perceived, to the seller.
A final fairness argument turns on the secrecy in secret warranties.
Because so much about secret warranties is kept obscure, policy makers are
unable to obtain enough information to formulate rules. For example, given
the amount of information available to the public, it is impossible to determine
such basic questions as how much secret warranties cost, whether certain
groups obtain a disproportionate share of secret warranties, or even how many
secret warranties have existed. The burden of proof on the issue of whether
or not secret warranties should be regulated ought to rest on those who possess
the relevant information and are keeping it confidential: automobile
manufacturers.
In sum, from the perspective of both economics and simple fairness, and
given the information currently available, it appears desirable to regulate secret
warranties. The article now explores the extent to which existing laws
accomplish this goal.

IV. TEE REGULATORY BACKGROUND OF SECRET WARRANTIES
The key issues of law concerning secret warranties revolve around
manufacturers' obligations to people to whom free repairs are not offered.
May a manufacturer, without violating the law, provide free repairs to some
consumers without notifying others who suffer from the same problem that
they too can obtain help? If so, may the manufacturer deny repair assistance
to some who actively seek it while giving it to others? Must the manufacturer
reimburse consumers who paid for the repairs? The answers are not yet clear.
The leading federal statute governing recalls for automotive safety
problems-the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act 2l--does not

normally apply to secret warranty programs. Indeed, in most of the country,
no law specifically and clearly regulates secret warranties. The Federal Trade
Commission, acting under the Federal Trade Commission Act,130 has in the
past commenced cases against automobile manufacturers operating secret
warranty programs,"' though the FTC's interest in secret warranties has
waned since 1980, as discussed below. Most states, at least arguably, have the

128. See Best & Andreasen, supranote 56, at 707, 723; Ross & Littlefield, supra
note 56, at 203; Warland et al., supranote 56, at 160 (consumers who are upset by
product failures but take no action are less well-off and less educated than those who

take action).
129. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1988).
130. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1988).
131. See In re Ford Motor Co., 96 F.T.C. 362 (1980) (consent order); In re
Chrysler Corp., 96 F.T.C. 134 (1980) (consent order).
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2
power to regulate secret warranties under their existing "Little FTC" Acts,1

though there are no reported cases in which state authorities have sought to do
so."' Only California, Connecticut, Wisconsin, and Virginia have passed
legislation designed to afford their citizens uniform access to goodwill
adjustments.'
In addition, two commentators have suggested that secret
warranties might help make out a claim for breach
of an implied warranty
135
under the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC").
This Article now takes up this regulatory background. It first touches
upon the federal recall statute, then explores the rules which arguably prohibit
secret warranties, and finally turns to warranty claims.
A. FederalAutomobile Safety Legislation
Until 1966, federal law imposed virtually no quality or safety standards
on automobile manufacturers. Any legal obligations to produce safe or
well-made cars came from state product liability law.136 Relatively few cars
were recalled and what recalls there were bore a distinct resemblance to the

132. See infra notes 214-25 and accompanying text.
133. It is impossible to know how many secret warranties have been disclosed as
the result of private negotiations between auto manufacturers and regulatory agencies
or public interest groups. Two settlements, however, have generated some publicity.
One is the result of a case filed against Ford by the Illinois Attorney General. See
Ford Agrees to Disclose Existence of Post-WarrantyRepair ProgramsIn Illinois,
ANTIrUST & ThADE REG. RPTR. (BNA), July 2, 1981, at D-l-2. In addition, the
Center for Auto Safety and the Center for Law in the Public Interest filed a class
action suit against Toyota stemming from a secret warranty program allegedly
instituted by Toyota. According to two reports (one published by CAS and the other
co-authored by a CAS employee), Toyota settled the suit by agreeing to notify past
and present owners and lessees of the 400,000 cars which might suffer from the defect;
repair cars which developed the problem within one year of the settlement; reimburse
owners who had already incurred expenses repairing the problem, including expenses
for substitute transportation; pay up to $835,000 to a Consumer Support and Education
Fund; and pay $250,000 in attorneys' fees. The estimated cost of the settlement is
$100 million. See Polachek & Steinbach, supranote 6, at 3; Center for Auto Safety,
CAS 100 Million Toyota ClassAction Settled, 10 LEMON TImS No. 2 at 1, 2 (1989).
See also Helen Kahn, Toyota Suit Has Boon for Consumer,ATrOmOnvE NEWS, Mar.
13, 1989, at 1 (noting that Toyota denied liability).
134. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-227 (West 1993); VA. CODE ANN. ch. 17.6
§§ 59.1-207.34 to 59.1-207.39 (Michie 1992); CAL. Civ. §§ 1795.90-1795.93 (Deering
1994); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 218.017 (West 1994).
135. SeeROSMARrN, supranote29, at 126-27 (Supp. 1992); SHELDON, supranote
3, at 226. See infra notes 240-59 and accompanying text.
136. See Joan Claybrook & David Bollier, The Hidden Benefits of Regulation:
Disclosingthe Auto Safety Payoff, 3 YALE J. oN REG. 87, 103 (1985).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/2
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secret warranty programs of today: Manufacturers rarely publicized recalls
customers of either the problems or risks which
and were lax about notifying
137
recalls.
the
prompted
Then Congress passed the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act
of 1966.138 That statute focuses on preventing traffic accidents and, when
accidents do occur, reducing deaths and injuries from them.'39 The Act
requires manufacturers to recall automobiles which fail "to conform to
applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards, or contain[ ] a defect which
relates to motor vehicle safety .. .,"140 Manufacturers who learn of defects
which render cars unsafe are obliged to mail notice of the facts to owners and
The National Highway
to cure the problem without charging the owners.'
Traffic Safety Administration can also direct a manufacturer to conduct a
recall. 142

137. See id. at 104 (8.7 million cars were recalled from 1960 through 1966 for
possible safety defects, compared with more than 100 million from 1966 through
1983); Mark Levinson, Footnote, Recalls: Tracing Them Back to the Turn of the
Century,DUNN's REv., Jan. 1979, at 117 ("[T]he so-called 'silent recalls' of the early
part of the century were infrequent, carried out by companies when and how they saw
fit." Levinson cites the Automotive Information Council for the fact that the first
recall involved the 1903 Model K Packard: the manufacturer notified dealers that the
car's drive shaft tended to pop out of its housing.). See also Robert W. Irvin, Making
Good,After Their Fashion,THE NATION, July 24, 1972, at 46 (Pre-1966 recalls "were
often handled informally and haphazardly; sometimes the deficiency was made good
when a car was brought in for service, and the owner was never the wiser.").
138. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1988). Other federal statutes govern the safety of
other products. See, e.g., the Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2083
(1988). For discussion of the effectiveness of the Consumer Product Safety
Commission, see W. Kip Viscusi, Consumer Behavior and the Safety Effects of
ProductSafety Regulation, 28 J.L. & EcoN. 527 (1985).
139. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1988).
140. 15 U.S.C. § 1400 (1988). In determining whether a vehicle contains a
defect, courts have stated a willingness to take cost into account. See United States
v. General Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 420, 436 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
141. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1411, 1413 (1988); 49 C.F.R. § 577.7 (1993).
142. See 15 U.S.C. § 1412 (1988); 49 C.F.R. §§ 501.2, 577.1 to 577.9 (1994).
See generallySklaren, supranote 24, at 470-73; Stephen J. Werber, Automobile Recall
Campaigns: Proposalsfor Legislative andJudicialResponses,56 J. URBAN L. 1083,
1084 (1979). For varying views on NHTSA and its effectiveness, see Claybrook &
Bollier, supra note 136; Asch, supranote 92 (critiquing Claybook & Bollier); Jerry
L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of Motor
Vehicle Safety, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 257 (1987); Schwartz & Adler, supra note 22, at
403-26; Daniel D. Cutler, Note, The Continuing Struggle for Automotive Safety, 15
SETON HALL LEG. J. 453 (1991).
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The Traffic and Vehicle Safety Act does not apply to non-safety-related
defects. Consequently, it does not help motorists who wish to claim the
benefits of secret warranties. On the other hand, it is sometimes difficult to
determine whether a particular defect sufficiently affects safety to mandate a
recall.'43 Conceivably, in a close case in which a manufacturer decided that
a recall was not required, but chose instead to institute a secret warranty
program, the Traffic and Vehicle Safety Act might offer some leverage to
consumers or those arguing on their behalf. However, the argument in such
a situation would not be that the manufacturer had misbehaved by creating a
that it had misbehaved by not ordering a
secret warranty program, but rather
44
statute.
federal
the
under
recall
B. The FederalTrade Commission Act
Strong arguments can be made that secret warranty programs violate the
Federal Trade Commission Act. The Federal Trade Commission was
sufficiently persuaded of this view that it commenced proceedings against two
major automakers, proceedings that ultimately terminated in consent decrees
in 1980.1 Since 1980, the FTC has not acted against secret warranties, 46
143. See Sklaren, supra note 24, at 471 ('Often, the question of whether or not
to recall is quite close, for example, as to whether an alleged defect is 'safety related,'
or as to what is the appropriate repair .... "). CAS has suggested that "manufacturers
have conducted secret warranties for some defects that, prior to 1981, would probably
have been the subject of safety recalls ... ." CENTER FOR AuTo SAFETY, REPORT ON
SECRET WARRANTIES TO THE FTC (1987), reprintedin CENTER FOR AUTO SAFETY,
SECRET AuTo WARRANTIES, item 6 (1992). Cf Warren Brown, Toyota to pay
$250,000 to Settle Complaint,WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 1994, at C3 (Manufacturer and
NHTSA settled NITSA complaint about defective fuel tank. NHTSA representative
reportedly stated that manufacturer changed design in newer models and fixed old
tanks only for customers who complained. CAS charged secret warranty.
Manufacturer claimed it cooperated with N-TSA and did not provide misleading or
incomplete information.).
144. Federal law may also require a manufacturer to recall cars if a substantial
number of the cars violate air pollution prevention regulations. See 42 U.S.C. § 7541
(1988). That obviously is of little aid to a consumer attempting to obtain repairs for
a problem unrelated to emissions.
145. See In re Ford Motor Co., 96 F.T.C. 362 (1980); In re Chrysler Corp., 96
F.T.C. 134 (1980).
146. See Sagolla, supra note 10 (Reagan administration did not initiate secret
warranty cases); JimHenry, N.Y. Seeks End to Secret Warranties,AuTOMOTIVE NEWS,
Dec. 11, 1989, at 15 (quoting New York State Attorney General Robert Abrams that
federal government has not pursued secret warranties); NY Hearings,supra note 2
(testimony of Clarence M. Ditlow, Executive Director, Center for Auto Safety) ("When
the Reagan Administration took control of the FTC in 1981, the Commission dropped
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/2
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because it shares the view, criticized above, that secret warranties may not
injure consumers14 and perhaps also because of its diminished
resources.1 48 That does not mean, however, that the FTC lacks the legal
authority to play a role in the area, if it chooses to do so.
The Federal Trade Commission Act proscribes unfair and deceptive trade
practices. 149 In its two secret warranty cases, the FTC charged that the

its efforts to expose secret warranties.").
147. For relatively recent expressions of the FTC view of secret warranties, see
William MacLeod, director of the FTC's Bureau of Consumer Protection, quoted in
Is Your Car's Warranty a Secret?, supranote 9, at 215 ("There is a real question as
to whether 'secret' warranties help or hurt consumers. If we make adjustment policies
more expensive, then fewer companies will offer them. It won't help consumers if
automakers do away with goodwill adjustments altogether."). See also Karen Riley,
FTC to Get Complaints on Ford's Truck Paint,WASH. TIMES, June 23, 1992, at C1
(quoting Gary Laden, FTC Assistant Director of Marketing) ("If the company is
voluntarily doing something extra than they normally have to do, then what's the
problem? They're just being a nice guy."). Silver, supranote 27, at 73 (FTC Bureau
of Consumer Protection Director William MacLeod reported to say that FTC would
only intervene in a secret warranty case if the FTC believed a manufacturer had
intentionally concealed a serious defect that would have caused a purchaser not to buy
the car if they had known about the defect at the time of the purchase or if the
manufacturer knew of a minor defect that would cause major problems if not repaired,
such as a sudden loss of oil that would damage the engine); Ann J. Woolley, LittleKnown GM Warranty Fixed Some Cars, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 16, 1983, at E6
(reporting that FTC attorney Richard Gateley said secret warranties are not illegal, but
commented "I'm not saying whether it's fair, the law isn't always fair."). Cf
MacLeod Letter, supranote 26, at 2 ("if an automobile manufacturer knows or should
know that the owners of its cars need to engage in unusual maintenance procedures,
or if the manufacturer has information that a significant number of its vehicles have

a hidden defect that will lead to costly, unexpected, premature component failures, it
may be a violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commissionif the manufacturer
fails to disclose that information to affected purchasers"). Earlier FTC officials had
a different view. See FTC ChallengesFordMotors Handling of 'PistonScuffing'
Defect in Autos, ANMrRUST & TRADE REG. RPrR. (BNA), Jan. 19, 1978, atA-10-11.

148. For discussion of the reduction in FTC resources, see The Report of the
American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law Special Committee to Study the
Role ofthe FTC, section IX, reprintedinMARKETINNG AND ADVERTISING REGULATION
THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMIssIoN IN THE 1990s 412, 437-38 (Patrick Murphy &
William L. Wilkie eds., 1990). But see William L. MacLeod, Kirkpatricklt: A Vew
From Inside the Commission,id. at 51-54 (arguing that despite budget cuts, FTC is as
active as in the past in issuing complaints and orders).
149. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1988) ("Unfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce,

are hereby declared unlawful.").

See also 15 U.S.C. § 52(b) (1988) ("The

dissemination or the causing to be disseminated of any false advertisement... shall
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programs at issue were "unfair or deceptive,""' thus permitting the inference
that secret warranties are only unfair, or that they are only deceptive, or even
that they are both unfair and deceptive. It appears that the programs might in
fact violate both prongs of the statute.
There are three main arguments that secret warranties are unfair or
deceptive."' The first approach-and probably the hardest to support-is
that it violates the FTC Act for a manufacturer, as a matter of policy, to
provide free repairs to some consumers without making those repairs available
to others who experience the same problem.
The second theory depends on whether the dealer has made certain
statements to consumers who are denied free repairs. If the dealer tells some
customers, say, that nothing can be done for them when in fact the dealer can,
in its discretion, provide free repairs, then it should be fairly easy to establish
deception. But obviously not every dealer makes such statements.
The third approach depends not so much on the existence of a secret

warranty program, but on the fact that the cars suffer a significant defect. As
discussed below, it is by now fairly well established that the FTC has the
power to order the recall of a defective product, even after the warranty has
expired. Thus, in many situations in which an automaker institutes a good
will adjustment program, the FTC will have the power to order a recall, not
necessarily because of the secret warranty program, but because of the same
defect which triggered the secret warranty program. This Article now reviews
the FTC secret warranty cases, and then explores each of these arguments in
turn.
1. The FTC Secret Warranty Cases
In the first secret warranty case to be resolved, the FTC charged that
certain Chrysler cars were rusting prematurely.152 In the second case, the
53
complaint alleged that some Ford engines suffered from "piston scuffing.'0
Both manufacturers allegedly provided special aid to complaining customers:
Chrysler provided free replacement fenders or paid installation costs, or both,

be an unfair or deceptive act or practice in or affecting commerce ...

.");

15 U.S.C.

§ 55(a)(1) (1988) ('The term 'false advertisement' means an advertisement, other than
labeling, which is misleading in a material respect.").
150. The complaints in the cases charged the respondents with having committed
an "unfair or deceptive act or practice." See ChryslerCorp., 96 F.T.C. at 135; Ford
Motor Co., 96 F.T.C. at 365.
151. See generallyPolacheck & Steinbach, supra note 6, at 3-4.
152. See ChryslerCorp., 96 F.T.C. at 135.
153. FordMotor Co., 96 F.T.C. at 363. "Piston scuffing" means that pistons
were rubbing improperly against cylinder walls.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/2
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while Ford initiated a program to compensate injured buyers."' Still, the
complaints alleged, most affected consumers were unable to take advantage
of the manufacturers' largesse, in Chrysler's case because they did not know
of the program, and in Ford's because either they did not know that
compensation was available, or they were not eligible for compensation
because of model year or mileage limitations on the program, or dealers
simply did not implement the program. The complaints charged that the
failure to disclose the existence of the adjustment programs to owners of the
relevant cars "may cause [them] substantial economic harm" and consequently
was unfair or deceptive.'55 The complaints also claimed that the
manufacturers had violated the FTC Act in other respects,'56 and the
complaint against Ford alleged generally that
Ford's practices had "the
151
public.
the
mislead"
to
tendency
and
capacity
In its settlement, Chrysler denied that it had violated the law, while the
FTC maintained that "ithad reason to believe that the respondent had violated
the said [FTC] Act."15 Chrysler agreed to give notice of its adjustment
program by mail to certain car owners, replace the affected fenders of owners
who contacted Chrysler, and reimburse owners who had paid for the repairs
themselves.

154. After discovering the problem, Ford also modified its engine design.
155. ChryslerCorp.,96 F.T.C. at 135; FordMotorCo., 96 F.T.C. at 365.
156. The Chryslercomplaintalso alleged that Chrysler had known of the defect
for some time and that its failure to disclose to owners of affected cars that the
problem existed had caused these owners "substantial economic harm due to their
inability to avoid or prevent premature rust." This failure to disclose the existence of
the defect was said to be unfair or deceptive. ChryslerCorp., 96 F.T.C. at 135.
Ford's concealment of its adjustment program was also allegedly unfair to
prospective purchasers because they would not have access to facts likely to affect
their purchase decision. Wholly apart from the failure to disclose the existence of the
secret warranty program, the Commission alleged that Ford had committed an unfair
or deceptive practice by not notifying prospective purchasers and owners of Ford
vehicles that its cars suffered from piston scuffmg. Prospective purchasers were again
said to be injured because they were not told of facts which would probably have an
impact on their purchase decision; with respect to those who already owned Fords, the
complaint charged that the failure to disclose "may cause them substantial economic
harm due to inability on their part to avoid or prevent substantial damage to the
engines of their vehicles." FordMotorCo., 96 F.T.C. at 365. The complaint also
took Ford to task for representing, through its advertising, either directly or impliedly,
that its automobiles were durable even though the piston scuffing had impaired the
durability of its cars. Id. at 364.
157. FordMotorCo., 96 F.T.C. at 365.
158. ChryslerCorp.,96 F.T.C. at 136.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995

51

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 2 [1995], Art. 2

MISSOURILAWREVIEW

[Vol. 60

The Fordsettlement agreement also contains a statementnoting that Ford
did not concede that it had violated the law. In contrast with the Chrysler
settlement, the Ford agreement did not report a Commission determination
that it had reason to believe that Ford had violated the FTC Act. That may
not be very significant, however: Not only had the FTC issued the complaint
described above, indicating that it had determined that if the facts were as
alleged, Ford had violated the FTC Act, but also Ford agreed to much more
stringent terms than did Chrysler. In fact, in complying with the settlement,
Ford is reported to have sent notices to more than eleven million consumers
and to have spent millions on free repairs." 9
Under the settlement, Ford agreed to mail owners of affected cars notice
of any good will adjustment programs Ford might institute during the next
eight years. 60 Ford further promised to reimburse owners of cars who had
already paid for repairs for the piston scuffing. The settlement obliged Ford
to insert in its warranty booklets a statement to the effect that it sometimes
pays for repairs under adjustment programs and to maintain a toll-free number
which consumers could call to learn about specific adjustment programs.
Similar notices were to go to those who had bought Ford cars during the two
preceding model years. Advertisements to be placed by Ford in various
publications and displays for dealer showrooms were also to explain the

adjustment programs."

159. Silver, supranote 27, at 73.
160. Under part IV (A) of the consent decree, Ford agreed to notify by mail
affected owners of "adjustment programs." Adjustment programs are defined in part
I (7) as follows:
"Adjustment program" refers to extended policy programs ... under which
respondent undertakes, on a uniform basis and with eligibility defted in
terms of specified time-in-service and/or specified mileage limits and/or

specified other terms beyond those stated in respondent's applicable
warranty or warranties, to pay for all or any part of the cost of repairing,
or to reimburse owners for all or any part of the cost of repairing, any
engine or transmission condition, or any condition other than an engine or
transmission condition that may substantially affect vehicle durability,
reliability or performance, other than service provided under a safety or

emission-related recall campaign. This term does not include ad hoc
adjustments made by respondent on a case-by-case basis and not pursuant
to a general commitment to pay for specified services.

Then-Commissioner Robert Pitofsky concurred in the decision to accept the consent
order, but noted with concern that the agreement did not require direct mail notice to
owners that their cars suffered from problems that were not the subject of good will
adjustment programs. He observed that direct mail notification can be expensive.
161. Ford also agreed to provide copies of its Technical Service Bulletins to

consumers upon request, and many of the notices described in the text were also to
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Normally, settlements provide little support for the legal propositions that

could have been litigated had the cases proceeded to judgment. But FTC
consent orders are somewhatmore authoritative than conventional settlements.
For one thing, courts have a long record of deference to FTC decisions.'62
Consequently, to the extent that the Ford and Chrysler cases reflect
Commission views, they are likely to provide significant guidance as to what
the law is, or at least was, at the time the orders were adopted. In addition,
when the FTC issues a complaint-an act which precedes or coincides with
the filing of the consent order-the FTC has determined that the offending
practice violates federal law.163 The Ford and Chrysler complaints both
alleged that secret warranty programs were unfair or deceptive, and in
Chrysler,the Commission explicitlyreported a determination that it had reason
to believe that Chrysler had violated the FTC Act."M

refer to the existence of the Technical Service Bulletins.
162. See, e.g., Federal Trade Comm'n v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 382 U.S. 46,
48-49 (1965); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385
(1965) ("[T]he Commission's judgment is to be given great weight by reviewing
courts."); Kraft, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 970 F.2d 311, 316-18 (7th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1254 (1993); Simeon Management Corp. v. Federal
Trade Comm'n, 579 F.2d 1137, 1142 (9th Cir. 1978) ("[T]he FTC has accumulated
much expertise. We are not to lightly set aside agency action based on the exercise
of such accumulated expertise merely because, were we trying the matter anew, we
might reach a different result. We are not to set aside the Commission's action unless
it is apparent that it is unsupported by substantial evidence or is arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with the law.") (citations
omitted). See generally Jeff Sovem, Private Actions Under the Deceptive Trade
PracticesActs: Reconsideringthe FTC Act as Rule Model, 52 OIIo ST. L.J. 437, 443
(1991) (explaining why the FTC has taken the lead in shaping the definition of
deception); Developmentsin the Law, DeceptiveAdvertising,80 HARV. L. REV. 1005,
1039 (1967) ("[R]ecent judicial opinions yield the Commissionvery broad discretion
on all of the critical issues."); Candace L. Oxendale, Comment, The FTC and
Deceptive Trade Practices:A ReasonableStandard?,35 EMORY L.J. 683, 685 (1986)
("the appellate courts, mindful of the presumed expertise of the Commissioners in the
field of trade regulation, have applied a very deferential standard of review to FTC
determinations"); Belinda Welti, Note, The Need for a Statutory Definition of
"Deceptive"Advertising,19 NEW ENG. L. REv. 127 (1983) ("Reviewing courts defer
to FTC findings of deceptive advertising."). But cf. Robert Pitofsky, BeyondNader:
ConsumerProtectionand the Regulation ofAdverfising, 90 IIARv. L. RPv. 661, 678
(1977) (former FTC Commissioner criticizes judicial deference to FTC).
163. See SHELDON, supra note 3, at 101-02.
164. This is not to suggest that FTC consent orders are equivalent to binding
judicial precedents, see generally Stephanie W. Kanwit, 1 FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISsIoN § 12.06, at 12-19 (1992) ("The courts and FTC have construed consent
orders as contracts rather than as binding judicial precedent, reasoning that any other
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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The Supreme Court has given special consideration to FrC consent
orders. In Federal Trade Commission v. Mandel Brothers, the Court wrote
that an FTC interpretation of a statute "is entitled to great weight... even
though it was applied in cases settled by consent rather than in litigation."165
However, Mandel is arguably distinguishable: Not only was the statute
involved not the FTC Act, but the interpretation was contemporaneous with
enactment of the statute and had been consistently adhered to in more than
100 cases. Still, a worthless interpretation should not become significant just
because it is repeated in numerous consent decrees and was written shortly
after the statute interpreted was enacted. In any event, the determinations
made by the FTC in the Ford and Chrysler cases should be accorded
respectful consideration in deciding whether secret warranties violate the FTC
Act, even though the FTC has since ignored the issue.
2. Do Secret Warranties, Without More, Violate the FTC Act?
In addition to the FTC determinations in secret warranty litigation, the
standards generally applied by the FTC support the conclusion that secret
warranty programs, without more, violate the FTC Act. Taking unfairness
first, the FTC formerly used three criteria to determine if a practice was
unfair:
(1) Whether the practice, without necessarily having been previously

considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by
statutes, the common law, or otherwise-whether, in other words, it is
within at least the penumbra of some common-law, statutory, or other
established concept of unfaimess;
(2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous;

(3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers ....

166

interpretation would hamper the consent settlement process."), but only that they shed
considerable light on how the FTC Act should be interpreted.

165. 359 U.S. 385 (1959). Id. at 391. See also People ex reliHartigan v. Maclean
Hunter Pub. Corp., 457 N.E.2d 480, 487 n.1 (1983) ("consent orders are not
authoritative as adjudications, but they are not without precedential value").
166. See, e.g., 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8355 (1964). See also Federal Trade Comm'n
v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244-45 n.5 (1972). On unfairness under
the FTC Act generally, see Craswell, supranote 110; Ernest Gellhorn, TradingStamps,
S & H, and the FTC's UnfairnessDoctrine,1983 DuKE L.J. 903; Neil W. Averitt, The
Meaning of "UnfairActs or Practices"in Section 5 of the FederalTrade Commission

Act, 70 GEO. L.J. 225 (1981); David A. Rice, Consumer Unfairness at the FTX:
Misadventuresin Law and Economics, 52 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1, 4 (1983).
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In 1980, the Commission issued a Policy Statement which shifted the focus
of unfairness away from morality and more towards an economics-oriented
approach similar to cost-benefit analysis.167 The Policy Statement stated that
the consumer injury prong was the most important of the three criteria, and
could by itself warrant a finding of unfairness." The Policy Statement also
refined the consumer injury prong, a refinement which was in turn codified
by Congress in 1994. The 1994 statute barred the FTC from outlawing a
practice for reasons of unfairness, "unless the act or practice causes or is likely
to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by
consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to
'
consumers or to competition."169
It is no coincidence that statute parallels
the Policy Statement; the Senate Committee Reports makes clear that the
statute is intended to embrace existing law and preserve the authority of FTC
unfairness precedents.1
Do secret warranties cause consumers substantial injury? The FTC's
complaint in Ford alleged that the failure to disclose the existence of the
17
secret warranty program caused consumers "substantial economic harm.1 1
The Policy Statement also notes that "[i]n most cases a substantial injury
involves monetary harm...,,"72 The FTC has in the past used its unfairness

167. Letter from Michael Pertschuk et al., to Senators Ford and Danforth (Dec.
17, 1980) [hereinafter Pertschuk Letter]. The Policy Statement is discussed in
PRMGEN, supra note 79, at ch.9.
168. The Policy Statement in fact indicates that the Commissionwill not rely on
the unethical or unscrupulousprong as an independent basis for a finding ofunfaimess.
169. Pub. L. No. 103-312 (1994), 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(n) (West Supp. 1995).
170. See S. REP. No. 103-30, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 12-13 (1994), reprinted
in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. (103 Stat.) 1776, 1787-88:
This section is intended to codify . . . the principles of the [Policy
Statement]. Since the FTC's policy statement itself is based on the FTC's
decided cases and rules, this section codifies existing law. The
incorporation of these criteria should enable the FTC to proceed in its
development of the law of unfairness with a firm grounding in the
precedents decided under this authority, and consistent with the approach
of the FTC and the courts in the past. The Committee believes that this
codification is necessary in order to provide the FTC, its staff, regulated
business, and reviewing courts greater guidance on the meaning of
unfairness and to prevent a future FTC from abandoning the principles of
the [Policy Statement].
171. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
172. Pertschuk Letter, supra note 167, at 5. Even small injuries may meet the
standard if many consumers suffer the injury. See also S. REP. No. 103-130, 103d

Cong., 2d Sess. §13 (1994), reprintedin 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. (103 Stat.) 1776, 1788;
In re Orkin Exterminating Co., 108 F.T.C. 263, 362 (1986) ("We are not concerned
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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power, and thus presumably found serious economic injury, when sellers did

not disclose information which would help consumers care properly for their
automobiles and clothing. 73 Notice of good will adjustments seems to fall
into that category as well. It is not an obstacle that the injury caused by secret
warranty programs arguably occurs after purchase of the product:... the
FTC has banned a variety of post-purchase practices. 75
The second part of the test is whether the injury was one that consumers
could not reasonably have avoided. It is difficult to see how consumers who
are unaware of good will adjustment programs could reasonablyhave avoided

the injury caused by the programs.

Consumers who do not know of the

with trivial or merely speculative harms, but an injury may be substantial if it does a
small harm to a large number of people. Over $7.5 million in increased renewal
revenue in an approximately four year period at the unjustified expense of consumers,
is not insubstantial.") (footnotes omitted), aff'd, 849 F.2d 1354, 1366 (1lth Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1041 (1989). See also Averitt, supra note 166, at 246.
173. See, e.g., Trade Regulation Rules, 16 C.F.R. § 423 (1994) (Care Labeling
Rule requires clothing to bear permanent labels on how to care for garment, such as
"cold water wash only"), explained at Care Labeling of Textile Wearing Apparel,
Statement of Basis and Purpose, 36 Fed. Reg. 23,883-23,889 (1971) ("It is unduly
oppressive and unfair to consumers to withhold information essential to the ordinary
use of a product" because many consumers experience "substantial economic loss
because of erroneous assumptions about care of clothes"); 16 C.F.R. § 306 (1994),
explained in Posting of Minimum Octane Numbers of Gasoline Dispensing Pumps,
Statement of Basis and Purpose, 36 Fed. Reg. 23,871, 23,877 (1971) (Rule requiring
posting of standardized octane ratings of gasoline to prevent confused consumers from
buying more expensive gasoline with higher octane than necessary; rule based on both
unfairness and deception power). See generallyPRIDGEN, supra note 79, § 9.05[2].
174. To the extent that consumers pay for secret warranty programs at the time
of purchase and do not receive a benefit for that payment, they have arguably been
injured at the time of payment. Yet it is probably fair to say that an even greater
injury occurs after purchase when the consumer incurs additional expense to correct
a problem, or simply lives with a defect, which would have been corrected had the
consumer known of the good will adjustment program.
175. See, e.g., Orkin Exterminating Co., 108 F.T.C. at 341-42 (exterminating
company contracted for lifetime pest control at particular rate and later sought to raise
rates; practice ruled unfair); In re Spiegel, Inc., 86 F.T.C. 425, 437 (1975) (practice
of mail order company of suing consumer in company's home state rather than
consumer's home state unfair), aff'd in pertinentpart,540 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1976);
In re All-State Indus. Inc., 75 F.T.C. 465, 490 (1969) (practice found unfair when
seller did not disclose to consumers that it routinely assigned consumer credit contracts
to third party, thus immunizing third party from most consumer claims and defenses
and obligating consumer to pay under holder in due course .doctrine, evenwhen seller
did not perform), aff'd, 423 F.2d 423 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 828 (1970).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/2
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availability of free repairs cannot be expected to seek them; they end up either

enduring a defect or paying for its correction.
In re Orkin Manufacturing Co. 176 is instructive. Orkin had entered into

"lifetime" contracts at fixed rates with some of its customers, but sought to
raise its rates some years later when inflation impaired the profitability of the
contracts. Some customers complained. In an effort to preserve the good will
and business of complaining customers, Orkin responded to complaints by
rolling back the price increase if the customer could establish that it had relied
on Orkin's promise that the fee would not change. 11 7 Orkin generally
charged the higher price to customers who did not complain. The FTC found
that non-complaining customers could not reasonablyhave mitigated the injury
they suffered, 78 even though the customers had a writing which indicated
that Orkin had violated their rights.'79 Consumers have no such writing
when secret warranties are involved and thus are even less able to protect
themselves. 8 '

176. 108 F.T.C. 263 (1986), aff'd, 849 F.2d 1354, 1366 (11th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 1041 (1989).
177. Id. at 286-90, 367.
178. Id. at 366-68.
179. The Eleventh Circuit, in affmning, noted that "consumer information is
central to this prong of the unfairness inquiry ... ." Orkin Exterminating Co. v.
Federal Trade Comm'n, 849 F.2d 1354, 1366 (11th Cir. 1988), cert.denied,488 U.S.
1041 (1989).
180. In In re International Harvester, 104 F.T.C. 949 (1984) the Commission
offered some guidance on when it believed the unfairness power should be used to
require disclosure. The Commission wrote:
In most cases it is appropriate to limit mandatory disclosure to those core
aspects of a transactionthatvirtually all consumerswould consider essential
to an informed decision. These are the same basic characteristics discussed
above in connection with common-law merchantability: (1) information
bearing on fitness for intended use ....
Id. at 1062 (footnote omitted).

Probably nearly all consumers who had experienced a problem with their car
would regard it as essential to their decision of whom should repair the problem that
the dealer would provide free repairs. And the availability of free repairs of a defect
at least arguably bears on the fitness of the car for its intended use. In 1981, then-FTC
official (and now-professor) Richard Craswell offered the following synthesis of FTC
unfairness decisions governing non-disclosures:
[T]he Commission's decisions suggest that the failure to disclose
information ... will be unfair if: (1) consumers currently lack the
information in question; (2) consumerswould choose differently if they had
the information, thus facing sellers with a different set of demand curves;
and (3) the benefits of better consumer decisions and improved seller
performance are not outweighed by the costs of supplying the information.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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The third part of the unfairness test is whether the injury is outweighed
by any countervailing benefits. The FrC restated this part of its policy

statement as whether the conduct is harmful "in its net effects." 181 As
discussed above in part III, secret warranties meet that test.
If secret warranties are unfair, are they also deceptive? Secret warranty
programs do not fit in well with traditional deception cases. Generally,
conduct is found deceptive under the FTC Act because a seller has caused or
permitted the consumer to believe that the consumer is getting more than is
in fact provided. Secret warranties present precisely the reverse scenario.
With secret warranties, consumers actually could receive more than the
manufacturer promised, but because they do not know about the available
benefits, they are misled into thinking the benefits are not available and so do
not seek them. Nevertheless, although it is more difficult to show a violation
of the deception prong of the FTC Act than the standards for unfairness, secret
warranties probably violate the deception prong as well.
The standards for deception have also changed in recent years, or at least
the way those standards are expressed has changed. Since 1983, the FTC has
seen conduct as deceptive "if there is a representation, omission or practice
that is likely to mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances,
to the consumer's detriment."'" The misconduct must also be material."
Craswell, supra note 166, at 123. Secret warranties meet those criteria.
181. See InternationalHarvesterCo., 104 F.T.C. at 1061 ("In analyzing an
omission this part of the unfairness analysis requires us to balance against the risks of
injury the costs of notification and the costs of determining what the prevailing
consumer misconceptions actually are."). Cf In re Southwest Sunsites, Inc., 785 F.2d
1431 (9th Cir.) ("There can be no benefit to society from the dissemination of
misrepresentations that induce consumers to continue making payments that they might
very will have terminated if they had not been misinformed."), cert.denied,479 U.S.
828 (1986). See also S. REP. No. 103-130, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. §13 (1994),
reprintedin 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. (103 Stat.) 1776, 1788.
182. FTC Policy Statement on Deception at 5 contained in Letter from James C.
Miller, I1 (then FTC Chair) to Senator Bob Packwood (Oct. 14, 1983). See generally
Southwest Sunsites, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 785 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied,479 U.S. 828 (1986); Carol T. Crawford, UnfairnessandDeception Policy at
the FTC: Clarifying the Commission's Role and Rules, 54 ANTiTRUST L.J. 303
(1985); William W. Jacobs, Consumer Litigation andIts Relationshipto the Federal
Trade Commission's"Unfairness"and"Deception"Standards,16 U. TOL. L. REV. 903
(1985); Jack E. Karns, The FederalTrade Commission'sEvolving Deception Policy,
22 U. RICH. L. REV. 399 (1988); Roger E. Schechter, The Death of the Gullible
Consumer: Towards aMore Sensible Definition of Deception at the FTC, 1989 ILL.

L. RFV. 571; E. Thomas Sullivan & Brian A. Marks, The FTC'sDeceptiveAdvertising
Policy: A Legal and EconomicAnalysis, 64 OR. L. REV. 593 (1986); The FTC and
DeceptiveTradePractices:A ReasonableStandard?35 EMoRY L.J. 683 (1986); Dale

Pollak & Bruce Teichner, Comment, The Federal Trade Commission's Deception
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Little else is required: the FTC need not show that the manufacturerhas made
a false statement;"M or that the manufacturer intended to deceive
anyone; 1 or that anyone was in fact deceived' 86 or injured."s
The FTC secret warranty cases were commenced and settled under the
earlier standard: Acts were considered deceptive in 1980 if they had a
capacity or tendency to deceive the ignorant, unthinking, and credulous
consumer.1" The Fordcomplaint echoed some of this language. It alleged
that Ford's practices had "the capacity and tendency to mislead members of
the consuming public .. ." Nevertheless, whether or not the change in
standards matters in some situations, it probably does not matter in this one:
If secret warranties are objectionable, they should deceive consumers acting
reasonably in the circumstances just the same as consumers who are ignorant,
unthinking and credulous.
Secret warranties are deceptive when considered in juxtaposition to the
written warranty provided car buyers. A consumer who examined her
warranty and saw that the manufacturer is not under a legal obligation to

EnforcementPolicy,35 DEPALUL L. REv. 125 (1985).
183. FTC Policy Statement, supranote 182.
184. Even literally true statementsmay be ruled deceptive. See, e.g., Bockenstette
v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 134 F.2d 369, 371 (10th Cir. 1943) ("Words and sentences
may be literally and technically true and yet be framed in such a setting as to mislead
or deceive."); Removatron Int'l Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCI) 22,619 (1988);

Thompson Medical Co., 104 F.T.C. 648, 788 (1984).
185. See Federal Trade Comm'n v. Sterling Drugs, Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 674 (2d
Cir. 1963) ("proof of intention to deceive is not requisite to a finding of violation of
the statute"); see also Federal Trade Comm'nv. Algoma Lumber, 291 U.S. 67 (1934);
Schulnan, Little F.T.C. Act: The NeglectedAlternative, 9 J. MARSHALL J. OF PRAC.
& PRoc. 351, 361 (1976).

186. See Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 379 F.2d 666, 670
(7th Cir. 1967); Resort Car Rental Sys. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 518 F.2d 962, 964
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975).
187. See Federal Trade Comm'n v. Raladam Corp., 316 U.S. 149, 152 (1942);
Sterling Drugs,Inc., 317 F.2d at 674; Charles of the Ritz Distrib. Corp. v. Federal
Trade Comm'n, 143 F.2d 676, 680 (2d Cir. 1944).
188. See, e.g., SterlingDrug,Inc., 317 F.2d at 674. For discussion of the earlier
standard, see the authorities cited supra note 182.

189. FordMotorCo., 96 F.T.C. at 365. Paragraph 15 of the complaint reads:
The use by respondent of the aforesaid acts and practices has had, and now
has, the capacity and tendency to mislead members of the consuming public
who are purchasing or who have purchased substantial quantities of motor
vehicles equipped with the engines described in Paragraph Five.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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provide free repairs after the warranty expires could reasonably conclude that
asking the manufacturer for such repairs will be fruitless."0
In a sense, the warranty acts as a half-truth because it creates the illusion
that the manufacturer will provide only the services identified in the warranty,

and no more. It is well-established that half-truths can be deceptive under the
FTC Act.'
For example, a baker's truthful advertisement that its bread
contained "only 46 calories per slice" was ruled deceptive because it created
the impression that the bread was a special diet food, when the reality was that
the bread had been sliced more thinly than other breads."9

More recently,

190. To reduce the likelihood of such confusion, the consent decree that the FTC
entered into with Ford required Ford to state in various publications furnished to
buyers of Fords that Ford sometimes pays for repairs after the warranty has expired.
FordMotor Co., 96 F.T.C. at 369. For a theoretical discussion of the type of
inference described in the text, see Richard Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive
Advertising, 65 B.U. L. REv. 658, 670-72 (1985). The FTC's power over deceptive
statements is not limited to express statements but extends also to implications. See,
e.g., In re Litton Indus., 97 F.T.C. 1, 76-77 n.12 (1981) ("It is well-established
principle of advertising law ...that advertisers be held responsible for implied, as
well as express, misrepresentations . . . ."). See also Thompson Medical Co., 104
F.T.C. at 802-03 (ad for Aspercreme which stated that Aspercreme contained "nonaspirin pain reliever" nevertheless held to imply that Aspercreme contained aspirin
when surveys showed significant number of consumers thought it did, apparently
because of product's name); In re Bristol-Myers Co., 102 F.T.C. 21, 320 (1983), aff'd,
738 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1984), cert.denied,469 U.S. 1189 (1985); Aronberg v. Federal
Trade Comm'n, 132 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1942) ("The ultimate impressionupon the
mind of the reader arises from the sum total of not only what is said but also of all
that is reasonably implied."). See generally Ivan L. Preston, The Federal Trade
Commission 'sIdentificationofImplicationsAs ConstitutingDeceptive.Advertising,57
CiNCiNNATI L. REv. 1243 (1989). Some limits exist to the FTC's willingness to infer
representations from statements by merchants. The FTC has written that the
implication must be a reasonable interpretation of the merchant's statement to be
sanctionable. See FTC Policy Regarding Advertising Substantiation, appearing as

Appendix to Thompson Medical Co., 104 F.T.C. at 839-40; In re National Dynamics
Corp., 82 F.T.C. 488, 524 (1973). In some cases, the FrC requires extrinsic evidence,
such as survey evidence, to establishthat a substantialnumber of consumers do in fact,
draw the erroneous inference from the material. See Thompson Medical Co., 104
F.T.C. at 789. It appears that secret warranties should satisfy these tests. Numerous
consumers-indeed probably most consumers-have been misled into thinking that
sellers will not repair their defective products for free once the warranty has expired;
how else to explain the fact that so many consumers pay for repairs when they could
obtain them without charge?
191. See, e.g., InternationalHarvester Co., 104 F.T.C. at 1057 ("it can be
deceptive to tell only half the truth, and to omit the rest").
192. See National Bakers Servs., Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 329 F.2d 365,
367 (7th Cir. 1964).
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a cheese-manufacturer'struthful advertisementthat each slice of its cheese was
made from five ounces of milk or had five ounces of milk was found
deceptive when thirty percent of the calcium in the milk was lost during
processing, in light of the fact that the ads also accurately noted the
importance of calcium in the development of bones."
In addition, secret warranties are arguably deceptive as "pure omissions."
This is a harder argument to sustain than the half-truth argument, in part
because the FTC has retreated from the pure omission doctrine in recentyears.
In the past, the FTC concluded that when a manufacturer does not correct a
consumer's normal, but erroneous, expectations about a product, the
manufacturer can be found to have behaved deceptively. 94 For example,
the FTC determined that many people purchasing funeral services mistakenly
believe that the law requires embalming and, for cremation, caskets. 95
Consequently, the FTC views the failure of funeral directors to correct these
misconceptions as deceptive, even though the funeral directors themselves did
nothing to foster the confusion. 9 '
The FTC's retreat from the pure omission doctrine came in 1984 in the
InternationalHarvester case. 197 In Harvesterthe FTC stated that it "does
not treat pure omissions as deceptive" and that "pure omissions are not
appropriately characterized as deceptive or reached through deception analysis
S..,198
The Commission identified two reasons for this decision. First, it
noted that individual consumers might have preconceptions about many issues,
and "it would be both impractical and very costly to require corrective
information on all such points." 199 Second, the Commission observed that
"pure omissions do not presumptively or generally reflect a deliberate act on

193. See Kraft, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 970 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S.Ct. 1254 (1993).
194. See Statement of Basis and Purpose, Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and
Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg.
8,324, 8,352 (1964) ("The principle crystallizedin [cases] is that Section 5[of the FTC
Act] forbids sellers to exploit the normal expectations of consumers in order to deceive
just as it forbids sellers to create false expectations by affirmative acts."). See
generallyPRiDGEN, supra note 79, § 10.07; Preston, supra note 190, at 1277-81.
195. See Trade Regulation Rule, Funeral Industry Practices, 47 Fed. Reg. 42,260,
42,274-77 (1982).
196. See 16 C.F.R. § 453.3(a)(1)(ii), (b)(2) (1994).

197. 104 F.T.C. 949 (1984). Though the FTC found that Harvester had not
engaged in deception, it concluded that Harvester had violated the unfairness prong of
the FTC Act. At least one observer has expressed skepticism about how much of an
impact Harvesterwillin fact have on pure omissions. See PRIDGEN, supra note 79,
§ 10.07[1] at 10-29 to 10-30.
198. InternationalHarvester,104 F.T.C. at 1059-60.

199. Id. at 1059.
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the part of the seller .... .""' Nevertheless, the FTC noted that a seller
might commit a deceptive practice if the seller remained silent "under
circumstances that constituted an implied but false representation," and that
such an implied representation could be based on "ordinary consumer
expectations as to the irreducible minimum performance standards of a
2 1 By analogy,
particular class of goods.""
the FTC could, if it wished to,
determine that when a seller supplies a written warranty but is silent about
post-warranty repairs, the seller makes an implied, but false, representation
that it will not provide post-warranty repairs, in light of the ordinary consumer
expectation that a seller will perform its repair obligations under the warranty,
and no more.
Failure to disclose the availability of good will adjustments also appears
to satisfy the materiality requirement for deception. The FTC defines
something as material if it is "likely to affect consumers' conduct or decision
with regard to a product." 2 In its 1983 Policy Statement on Deception, the

Commission noted that "[m]aterial information may affect conduct other than

the decision to purchase a product."2" The Statement gave as an example
In re Volkswagen of America, Inc., ' in which the Commission alleged that

providing incorrect instructions for installation of oil filters was material. The
Statement also observed that information concerning durability, performance,
warranties, or quality are likely to be material." 5 If consumers knew about
good will adjustments, they would undoubtedly seek free repairs in greater

200. Id.

201. Id. at 1058. See also In re Figgie Int'l, Inc., 107 F.T.C. 313, 379 (1986).
Cf Thomas J. Holdych, Standardsfor EstablishingDeceptive Conduct Under State
Deceptive Trade Practicesthat Impose PunitivePenalties,73 OR. L. REV. 235, 294
(1994) (arguing that sellers should have obligation to disclose under state deceptive
trade practices statutes "when an information source knows or has reason to know that
disclosure of a fact would correct a mistake about a basic assumptionupon which the
other party is operating in entering into a transaction [or] when an information source
knows or has reason to know that there is a high probability that a buyer is ignorant
of a fact that the buyer subjectively believes is material to the transaction and the
information source can provide information about the fact efficiently and at a lower
cost than the buyer.").
202. International Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. at 1056. See also Southwest
Sunsites, Inc., 105 F.T.C. at 149.
203. FTC Policy Statement, supra note 182, at 16 n.45.
204. 99 F.T.C. 446 (1982). The case terminated in a consent decree in which
Volkswagen agreed, among other things, to mail to owners of affected cars corrected
instructions onhow to install oil filters and to reimburse certain owners whose cars had
suffered oil leaks as a result of improper oil filter installation. Id. at 451-52.
205. FTC Policy Statement, supra note 182, at 18.
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numbers; it thus seems fairly clear that concealing the availability of free
repairs has an impact on consumer behavior and so qualifies as material.
Does all of this prevent a manufacturer from repairing even one
consumer's car after the warranty has expired without falling afoul of the
Federal Trade Commission Act? Not in light of the public interest
requirement. The FTC may bring only proceedings which "would be to the
interest of the public ....
.""o That statutory restraint, together with
budgetary restrictions 7 and concerns about political realities.0 . are likely

206. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1988). See generallyPRIDGEN, supranote 79, at § 8.03;
PETER C. WARD, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISsION: LAW, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
§ 3.03 (1993); JohnD. French, The FederalTrade Commissionandthe PublicInterest,
49 MiNN. L. REv. 539 (1965); Marshall A. Leaffer & Michael H. Lipson, Consumer
Actions Against Unfair or DeceptiveActs or Practices: The Private Uses of Federal
Trade Commission Jurisprudence,48 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 521, 525 n.23 (1980)
(suggestingpublic interest limitations "encourag[e] restraint in case selection"). Courts
generally do not make an independent determination of whether a particular action is
within the public interest. See id.; Slough v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 396 F.2d 870,
872 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,393 U.S. 980 (1968) (determination of public interest "is
essentially one for the Commissionand will only be reversed on a showing of an abuse
of discretion"); Guziak v. Federal Trade Com'n, 361 F.2d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 1966),
cert.denied,385 U.S. 1007 (1967); Federal Trade Comm'nv. Rhodes Pharmacal Co.,
191 F.2d 744, 747 (7th Cir. 1951); Ford Motor Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 120
F.2d 175, 182 (6th Cir.), cert.denied, 314 U.S. 668 (1941).
207. See Sovern, supra note 162, at 442 ("Because the FTC lacks the staff to
pursue many significant improprieties, it is unlikely to expend its scarce resources on
trivial deceptions."); Leaffer & Lipson, supranote205, at 554 ("The FTC must select
cases carefully because of scarce budgetary resources."); William A. Lovet, State
DeceptiveTradePracticeLegislation,46 TUL. L. REV. 724, 729 n.10 (1972) (the FTC
"is modestly staffed [and] far removed from most local communities").
208. On occasion, Congress has curtailed the FTC's power when the legislature
feared the FTC would regulate matters best left untouched. See, e.g., Federal Trade
Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, § 11, 94 Stat. 374, 37879 (1980) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 57a) (withdrawing power to regulate children's
advertising). See also William J. Baer, At the Turning Point: The Commission in
1978 in MARKETimNG AND ADVERTISiNG REGULATION; THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION IN THE 1990s 94, 98 (Patrick E. Murphy & William L Wilkie eds.,
1990):
In brief, Congress, which had remained strongly supportive of the agency
until 1978, began to show increasing hostility towards the Commission's
activist agenda and to consider a broad range of proposals to restrict the
agency's authority. The proposed restrictions included: (1) limiting the
FTC's jurisdiction over unfair, as opposed to deceptive, acts and practices;
(2) terminating the FTC's rule making proceedings involving children's
advertising, used cars, and procedures for private organization
standard-setting; (3) allowing one house of Congress to veto any trade
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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to deter even the most aggressive FTC Commissioners from acting with
respect to good will adjustments, except when the manufacturer actually
institutes a secret warranty program.
3. Do Secret Warranties, Together With Misrepresentations,
Violate the FTC Act?
Even if the FTC were to conclude, contrary to its past views and the
discussion above, that secret warranties do not, in and of themselves, violate
the FTC Act, it is possible that a particular secret warranty program will be
accompanied by conduct that will fall afoul of the statute. If, for example, a
dealer tells a complaining consumer that nothing can be done, when the dealer
has the discretion to fix the car without charging the customer, the dealer has
acted deceptively." 9 It is well established that oral statements can violate
the FTC Act. The classic Holland Furnace case provides a good
example.210 A Holland Furnace representative would reportedly appear at
a consumer's home, claim to work for a governmental agency, and tell the
consumers that their existing furnace was defective, not repairable, and likely
to cause fires. Not surprisingly, such misrepresentations sometimes resulted
in sales. The Court of Appeals upheld the FrC's order banning such conduct.
But relying on accompanying conduct to prevent secret warranties is
unsatisfactory. For one thing, a particular secret warranty program may not
be accompanied by such conduct. In addition, when oral statements are at
issue, proof becomes more difficult. Finally, it is the manufacturer who
initiates secret warranty programs, not the dealer. Yet it is the dealer whose
conduct is considered troublesome under this approach. If the goal is to
eliminate secret warranties, focusing on the associated conduct of the dealer,
rather than the institution of the secret warranty itself, may not be productive.
4. Do Manufacturers Violate the FTC Act by Failing
to Disclose the Existence of the Defects Which
Inspire Secret Warranties?
Whether or not a product is the subject of a secret warranty, if the FTC
concludes that a product is defective it may seek a recall. As one observer

regulation rule that the Commission might promulgate; (4) requiring
dismissal of pending litigation against the cereal industry and the
agricultural cooperatives; and (5) imposing new limits on the FTC's
subpoena authority.
209. See Polachek & Steinbach, supranote 6, at 1, 5.
210. Holland Furnace Co. v. Federal Trade Conm'n, 295 F.2d 302 (7th Cir.

1961).
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commented, the "Commission has developed a sort of FTC common law of
recalls and defect theory."2"' The FTC has reached consent orders with a
number of auto manufacturers requiring the manufacturers to notify customers
of certain defects in their cars, repair the defects, and reimburse owners who
had previously had the repairs made.212 Because secret warranty programs
are commenced only when a defect is present, the FTC could use the existence
of a secret warranty program as a signal that such a recall is needed. Thus,
even if the FTC concludes that secret warranty programs are notper se unfair
or deceptive, it still might act because of the defect which triggered the secret
warranty program.
C. State Deceptive Trade PracticesActs
Because the courts have not recognized a private cause of action for
violation of the FTC Act,213 a decision by the FTC not to regulate secret

211. Recalls, supranote 20, at 773 (remarks of Nancy L. Buc).
212. See In re American Honda Motor Co., 99 F.T.C. 305 (1982) (premature
fender rusting); In re Ford Motor Co., 96 F.T.C. 362 (1980) (piston scuffmg); In re
Chrysler Corp., 96 F.T.C. 134 (1980) (premature rusting); In re Saab-Scania of
America, Inc., 107 F.T.C. 410 (1986) (paint condition). See also In re Volkswagen
of America, Inc., 110 F.T.C. 392 (1988) (respondent agreed to establish arbitration
procedure under aegis of Better Business Bureau to resolve claims by individual
owners of damage caused by excessive oil consumption by certain of respondent's cars
and to advertise existence of program); In re General Motors Corp., 102 F.T.C. 1741
(1983) (respondent agreed to establish arbitration program under aegis of Better
Business Bureau to resolve various claims of defects by individual owners); In re
Chrysler Corp., 99 F.T.C. 347 (1982) (respondent allegedly misrepresented type of oil
filter suitable for cars and agreed to notify owners of problem; separate statement of
CommissionerPertschuk expressed dismaythat Commissiondid not do more to protect
consumers who have suffered damages).
213. See Bott v. Holiday Universal, Inc., 1976-2 Trade Cas. (CCI-I) 60,973
(D.C. Cir. 1976); Holloway v. Bristol-Meyers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 988 (D.C. Cir.
1973); Carlsonv. Coca-Cola Co., 483 F.2d 279, 280 (9th Cir. 1973); cf.Pan American
World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 306 (1963) (dicta: statute based
on FTC Act does not "embrace a remedy for private wrongs but [is] only a means of
vindicating the public interest"). But see Guernsey v. Rich Plan of the Midwest, 408
F. Supp. 582, 588-89 (N.D. Ind. 1976) (private right of action exists when FTC had
previously entered cease and desist order against defendant's parent corporation). See
generally Steven W. Gard, Purpose and Promise Unfulfilled: A Different View of
Private Enforcement Under the FederalTrade Commission Act, 70 Nw. U. L. REV.
274 (1975) (arguing for private cause of action); Alan J. Bentkofsky, Note, Private
JudicialRemediesfor False and MisleadingAdvertising, 25 SYRAcusE L. REv. 747
as Small Claims Tribunal:
(1974) (same); StevenNaclerio, The FederalDistrictCourt
An Argument Against the Holding in Guernseyv. Rich Plan, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 345
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warranties ends the matter, at least insofar as the FTC Act is concerned. But
the states have stepped in to fill the gap. Every state has enacted a statute
which permits a public agency to proceed against manufacturers who engage
in deceptive practices, and nearly all states permit consumers to bring claims
as well.214 Though different states frame the requirements for a successful
claim under these "little FTC" acts differently, most courts rely heavily on
federal interpretations of the FTC Act in interpreting their own legislation;215

(1977) (opposing private claims); Comment, Private Enforcement and Rulemaking
Under the FederalTrade CommissionAct: Expansion of FTC Responsibility,69 Nw.
U. L. REV. 462 (1974) (same). A decision by the FTC not to commence a case is not
subject to judicial review. See Arthur Best, Controlling False Advertising: A
ComparativeStudyofPublicRegulation,IndustrySelf-Policing,andPrivateLitigation,
20 GA. L. REv. 1, 16 (1985) ("The Federal Trade Commission has almost total
independence in deciding to commence cases. Consumers and competition may
request that the FTC begin investigations or prosecutions, but an FTC decisionto reject
these suggestions is not reviewable.") (citations omitted). Cf Heckler v. Chaney, 470
U.S. 821 (1985) (Food and Drug Administration decision not to bring proceeding not
reviewable unless statute so provides).
214. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 8-19-1 to -15 (1993); ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.471
(1986); ARz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-1522 (1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-106
(Michie 1991); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200, 17500 (West 1987); CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1770 (West 1985 & Supp. 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-110b (West 1992);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2513, 2532 (Supp. 1994); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3904
(1991 & Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.204 (West Supp. 1995); GA. CODE
ANN. § 10-1-393, 106-1203 (Harrison 1994); HAw. REv. STAT. § 481A-3 (1985);
IDAHO CODE § 48-603 (Supp. 1994); 121 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1/2 para. 312

(Smith-Hurd 1993); IowA CODE §714.16 (1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-626 (Supp.
1993); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 367.170 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1987); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, § 1212 (West 1980); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 325D.44(1) (West Supp.
1995); MIss. CODE ANN. § 75-24-5 (Supp. 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-103
(1993); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 59-1602 (1993), 87-302 (1994); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 358-A:2 (1984 & Supp. 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-2(c) (Michie Supp. 1994);
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 349, 350 (McKinney 1988); N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 63.12
(McKinney 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-15-02 (1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1345.02 (Anderson 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 646.608 (1993); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
73, § 201-2 (1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-20(b) (Law. Co-Op 1985); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 37-24-6 (1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-104 (Supp. 1994); TEx.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46 (West 1987 & Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 13-11-4 (1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2453 (1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-200
(Michie Supp. 1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.86.020 (West 1989); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 100.20 (West 1988 & Supp. 1989); WYo. STAT. § 40-12-105 (1993).
215. Some "little FTC" acts refer specifically to interpretations of the F.T.C. Act.
See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-104(1) (1993) ("in construing [the deceptive
trade practices act] due consideration and weight shall be given to the interpretations
of the federal trade commission and the federal courts relating to section 5(a)(1) of the
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/2
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indeed, one state even accords FTC consent orders precedential value.216
Accordingly, if, as argued above, secret warranties violate the federal FTC
Act, they most likely fall afoul of the state deceptive trade practices acts as
well.217 The "little FTC" acts of some states do not ban unfair practices, but

Federal Trade Commission Act"); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-101(l) (1992) ("[Tlhe
purpose of this article is to complement the body of federal law govering... unfair,
deceptive and fraudulent acts or practices .... It is the intent of the legislature that,
in construing this article, the courts be guided by the interpretation given by the federal
courts to the various federal statutes dealing with the same of similar matters."). See
also ALA. CODE § 8-19-6 (1993); ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.545 (1986); ARiz. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 44-1522 (1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110b(b) (West 1992);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.204(2) (West Supp. 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-391(b)
(Harrison 1994); HAW. RFV. STAT. § 480-2(b) (Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 48-618
(1977); 212 ILL. CoM. STAT. ANN. 1/2 para. 262 (Smith-Hurd 1993); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 207(1) (West 1989); MD. CODE ANN. [Transportation] § 13-105
(1990); MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 93A, § 2(b) (West 1994); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 358-A:13 (1984); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-4 (Michie 1987); R.I. GEN. LAWs
§ 6-13.1-3 (1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17.46(c)(1) (Law Co-Op); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
9, § 2453 (1993); WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.86.920 (West 1989). Cases according
some weight to interpretations of the F.T.C. Act when construing "little FTC" acts
include In re Scrimpsher, 17 B.R. 999, 1015 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1982) (applying New
York law); Guste v. Demars, 330 So. 2d 123, 125 (La. Ct. App. 1976); People v.
Colorado State Christian College, 346 N.Y.S:2d 482, 487-89 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973);
Marshallv. Miller, 276 S.E.2d 397, 399 (N.C. 1981); Hardy v. Toler, 218 S.E.2d 342,
345 (N.C. 1975); Commonwealth ex rel. Zimmerman v. Nickel, 26 Pa. D. & C. 3d
115, 120 (C.P. Mercer Cty. 1983); Wesware, Inc. v. State, 488 S.W.2d 844, 848 (rex.
Civ. App. 1972). See generallyLeaffer & Lipson, supra note 206, at 532 ("[S]tate
courts applying these statutes increasingly have adopted the standards of 'unfairness'
and 'deception' thathave been developed and used by the F.T.C., and approved by the
federal courts."); SHELDON, supranote 3, at 99 (many "courts show great deference
to F.T.C. decisions"); Jack E. Karns, State Regulation of Deceptive Trade Practices
Under "Little F.T.C.Acts:" Should FederalStandardsControl? 94 DICK. L. REv. 373
(1990). But see Russel J. Boehner, Note, Consumer Protection Statutes and the
Common Law: Is the Imposition ofDouble or Treble DamageAwards "Unfair"to the
Businessman? 15 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1157, 1177-78 (1981) ("The significant
differences betweenthe state statutes and their federal counterpart greatly diminislithe
value of F.T.C. decisions as a guide on the state level.").
216. See State v O'Neill Investigations, Inc., 609 P.2d 520, 529 (Alaska 1980)
("adjudications which are resolved by consent decree constitute an administrative
interpretation of the Federal Trade Commission Act which have clear precedential
value"). See also Idaho Consumer Protection Regulations, Reg. 3,4,2 ("It is an unfair
or deceptive act or practice for any seller to engage in trade or commerce if in so
doing the seller or the seller's goods or services fail to comply with: ... Any Federal
Trade CommissionConsent Decree in which the seller is a party to the decree .... ").
217. See SHELDON, supranote 3, at 226 ("a strong argument can be made that the
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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only deceptive trade practices.21 In such states, obviously, those arguing
that secret warranties violate state law are limited to arguments of deception.
But even in those states the FTC consent decrees may be useful because the

FrC complaints indicate that the secret warranty programs at issue in those
cases were "unfair or deceptive."
Connecticut and Virginia have provided by statute that secret warranty
plans violate their "little FTC" acts.219 It is by now fairly well-established
that in fashioning the law, courts can look to statutes enacted in other
jurisdictions as persuasive authority. Thus, in Trammel v. United States,22 °
the Supreme Court looked to the privilege rules of the states, as enacted in
statutes, to conclude that the privilege against adverse spousal testimony
should no longer be recognized in the federal courts under the Federal Rules
of Evidence. 1 Consequently, courts may, in addition to relying on FTC
precedents, employ the Connecticut and Virginia enactments in interpreting
their own state statutes. To be sure, courts cannot ignore the normal rules of
statutory interpretation that the text of the statute and its legislative history are
of paramount importance, but where statutes are as open-ended as deceptive
trade practices acts often are, and are intended to apply to a variety of
transactions to prevent consumer frauds, it makes sense to construe them in
light of the interpretations of other states.
Though no cases have been reported involving challenges to secret
warranties under "little FTC" acts, there are a number of analogous cases. The
troublesome aspect of secret warranties, it will be recalled, is that a merchant
does not disclose to consumers an available benefit. In several cases, courts
have found such conduct deceptive. In Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v.
Martin Surgical Supply Co.,2 2 an insurer was held to have violated the
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act when the insurer,
knowing that Martin had been sued, did not disclose to Martin that Martin was
covered for the lawsuit under an insurance policy that the insurer had sold to
another. Because Martin had not known of the coverage, it had retained its
own attorney to defend in the litigation. Similarly, another court ruled that
Pennsylvania's "little FTC" act requires landlords to notify tenants of certain

practice of secretwarranties is a UDAP violation"). RoSMAR1N, supranote 29, at 115.
218. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1995).
219. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 42-227(h) (West Supp. 1994); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 59.1-207.38 (Michie 1991).
220. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
221. See also Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970) (The
Court relied on federal and state wrongful death statutes to create new claim in
wrongful death). See generallyHARRY W. JONES

TEm MATERIALs 594-736 (1980).
222. 689 S.W.2d 263 (rex. Ct. App. 1985).

ET AL., LEGAL METHOD CASES AND

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/2

68

Sovern: Sovern: Good Will Adjustment Games

1995]

SECRET WARRANTY REGULATION

tenant rights if the failure to provide notice might mislead or confuse the
consumer.2' In still another case, a plaintiff was held to state a cause of
action under Oregon's Unlawful Trade Practices Act when the plaintiff had
alleged that the defendant had sold her a car without disclosing that the
defendanthad previously advertised it-and later advertised it again-for $800
less than the plaintiff had paid.224 Finally, another case ruled that a lender's
practice of encouraging customers to refinance existing loans without
disclosing to them that taking out a 225new loan would be even more
advantageous violated a "little FTC" act.
D. State Secret Warranty Statutes
California, Connecticut, Virginia, and Wisconsin all have similar statutes
governing good will adjustments. 226 The statutes require manufacturers to
notify owners of eligible autos of the existence of any good will adjustment
program and of the terms of the program. The notice must be sent by mail
within ninety days of the adoption of the adjustment program.22
Manufacturers must also reimburse those who have previously obtained the
repairs on their own.2 s If a consumer seeks a repair which is covered by
an adjustment program from a dealer, the dealermust disclose to the consumer
that the adjustment program exists.229 Except in Connecticut, manufacturers
are also required to inform dealers of the adjustment programs.' ° When
consumers purchase a new car, manufacturers or dealers must tell them, as a

223. Commonwealthv. Monumental Properties, Inc., 329 A.2d 812, 829-30 (Pa.
1974) (court remanded for further proceedings under the standard it articulated).
224. Sanders v. Francis, 561 P.2d 1003 (Or. 1977).
225. In re Milbourne, 108 B.R. 522,537-39 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) (applying
Pennsylvania law).
226. See CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1795.90-1795.93 (West Supp. 1995); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 42-227 (West 1992 & Supp. 1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-207.34 to
59.1-207.39 (Michie 1991); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 218.01(7) (West 1994).
227. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1795.92(a) (West Supp. 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 42-227(c) (West 1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-207.35 (Miohie 1991); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 218.01(7)(2) (West 1994).
228. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1795.92(d) (West Supp. 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 42-227(f)(g) (West 1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-207.37 (Michie 1991); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 218.01(7)(3) (West 1994).
229. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1795.91(b) (West Supp. 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 42-227(e) (West 1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-207.36 (Michie 1991); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 218.01(7)(2)(b) (West 1994).
230. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1795.92(c) (West Supp. 1995); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 59.1-207.35 (Mvichie 1991); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 218.017(2) (West 1994).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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general matter,
that the manufacturer sometimes offers good will adjustment
1

programs.23
The statutes define adjustment programs to exclude ad hoc adjustments
made on a case-by-case basis.1 2 Adjustment programs are also limited to
conditions "that may substantially affect vehicle durability, reliability or
performance .. ..
Violation of the Wisconsin statute is punishable by
an award of double damages and attorney's fees, while infringers of the
Connecticut and Virginia statutes are subject to the remedies of the state "little
FTC" acts. 4 The California statute does not contain an enforcement
mechanism, an omission which has already drawn criticism. 5

E. Warranty Statutes
Consumer warranties are governed by an amalgam of state and federal
law. The traditional rules, based largely on the common law, are found in the
UCC. Under the UCC, sellers may make express warranties" 5 and, unless
disclaimed, implied warranties. 7 The federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty

231. CAL. Crv. CODE § 1795.91(a) (West Supp. 1995); CONN. GPN. STAT.
§ 42-227(d) (West 1992); VA. CODE ANqN. § 59.1-207.36 (Michie 1991) (not limited
to new car purchasers); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 218.017(2) (West 1994).
232. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1795.90(d) (West Supp. 1995); CoNN. GEN. STAT.
§ 42-227(a)(4) (West 1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-207.34 (Michie 1991); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 218.017(1)(a) (West 1994).
233. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1795.90(d) (West Supp. 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 42-227(a)(4) (West 1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-207.34 (Michie 1991); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 218.017(1)(a) (West 1994).
234. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-227(g) (West 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-207.38
(Michie 1991); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 218.017(4) (West 1994).
235. See Ralph Vartabedian, OwnersNot In On Secret Warranties,L.A. TIMEs,
Apr. 22, 1994, at E6; Center for Auto Safety, California'sWeakSecret WarrantyLaw,
14 LEMON TIMEs No. 1 & 2, at 1 (1994). As originally introduced, the California bill
provided that violations of the bill would constitute an unfair or deceptive trade
practice; injured consumers could recover treble damages plus attorney's fees; and the
Attorney General could seek enforcement of the provisions. See Cal. S. Bill No. 486,
§ 1797.92 (Feb. 25, 1993). During the legislative process, Toyota Motor Sales, USA
apparently objected to these enforcement provisions. See Report of the Senate Com.
on Judiciary on SB 486, at 6-7 (1993-94 Regular Session) ("Toyota believes that the
enforcement of warranty adjustment law should be left to public and private litigants
via the state's unfair competition act."). The provision was dropped during the
legislative process.
236. See U.C.C. § 2-313 (1990).
237. See U.C.C. § 2-314 (1990) (implied warranty of merchantability); id.
§ 2-315 (implied warranty of particular purpose); and id. § 2-316 (disclaimer of
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/2
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provides that sellers of consumer products who provide written

warranties may not disclaim the implied warranties, though they may limit the
"duration" of the implied warranties "to the duration of a written warranty of
reasonable duration" provided the limitation is conscionable. 9 Because
many, if not most, manufacturers of consumer goods wish to make a written
warranty, they also make implied warranties for at least some period, under
the lash of Magnuson-Moss, and, of course, some manufacturers who do not
provide written warranties still make implied warranties.
Two commentators, Yvonne W. Rosmarin and Jonathan Sheldon, both
writing in publications of the National Consumer Law Center, have urged that
the existence of a secret warranty program supports a claim for breach of the
implied warranty of merchintability.24 If the product is found to be
defective before the implied warranty has expired, the consumer should not
need the secret warranty program to establish an entitlement to free repairs:
The consumer has a right to repairs under the warranty during the warranty
period upon the showing of a defect. If, on the other hand, the warranty has
expired, the consumer will not ordinarily be entitled to free repairs. Ms.
Rosmarin has suggested, however, that the existence of a secret warranty
program implies a "widespread pattern of defects," making a limit to the

warranties).
238. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1988). On the Magnuson-MossAct generally, see,
in addition to the authorities cited below, Michael B. Bixby, JudicialInterpretationof
the Magnuson-Moss WarrantyAct, 22 AM. Bus. L.J. 125 (1984); Barkley Clark &
Michael J. Davis, Beefing Up Product Warranties: A New Dimension in Consumer
Protection, 23 KAN. L. REV. 567 (1975); Paul A. Lester, The Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act: The Courts Begin to Talk, 16 U.C.C.L.J. 119 (1983); Michael A.
Schmitt & Susan D. Kovac, Magnuson-Moss vs. State Protective Consumer
Legislation: the Validity of a StricterState Standardof WarrantyProtection,30 ARK.
L. RFv. 21 (1976); Christopher Smith, The Magnuson-Moss WarrantyAct: Turning
the Tables on CaveatEmptor, 13 CAL. W. L. REv. 391 (1977); Ronald L. Lipinski,
Note, ConsumerProduct Warranties-TheFT.C. Steps In, 9 J. MARSHALL J. PRAC.
& PROc. 887 (1976).
239. Section 108(b), (c) of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Act of 1980, 15 U.S.C. § 2308 (1988) provides:
(b)... implied warranties may be limited in duration to the duration of a
written warranty of reasonable duration, if such limitation is conscionable
and is set forth in clear and unmistakable language and prominently
displayed on the face of the warranty.
(c) A disclaimer, modification, or limitation made in violation of this
section shall be ineffective for purposes of this title and State law.
240. See RosMARw, supranote 29, at 126-27; SHELDON, supranote 3, at 226.
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duration of the implied warranties unconscionable and thus invalid under the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.24
The circumstances under which a limit to the duration of an implied
warranty is unconscionable under the Magnuson-Moss Act are unclear.
Indeed, even the concept of the duration of an implied warranty is so vague
as to have been accorded a variety of different meanings.242 Neither the
legislative history 4 nor the FTC regulations244 shed much light on the
problem.
Only three reported cases explore the Magnuson-Moss conscionability
limitation. All three involve automobiles. Two of the cases seem to focus
primarily on the length of the warranty actually provided. In one, Hahn v.
FordMotor Co.,24 the court upheld a twelve-month, 12,000 mile warranty

241. ROSMARIN, supra note 29, at 127.
242. For varying judicial interpretations, see Max E. Klinger, The Concept of
Warranty Duration: A Tangled Web, 89 DIcK. L. REV. 935, 936, 966 (1985)

(concluding that Magnuson-Moss duration language refers to time for discovery of
breaches of the implied warranties, as opposed to, say, length of time in which
consumer can sue for breach). See also CURTIS R. REITz, CONSUMER PRODUCT
WARRANTES UNDER FEDERAL AND STATE LAWs 82 (2d ed. 1987) (some language
of Magnuson-Moss is "most perplexing"); Kathleen F. Brickey, The Magnuson-Moss
Act-An Analysis of the Efficacy of Federal Warranty Regulation as a Consumer
Protection Tool, 18 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 73, 101-09 (1978); David B. Saxe &
David I. Blejwas, The FederalWarrantyAct: ProgressandPitfalls, 22 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REv. 1, 20-21 (1976). Implied warranties are not normally thought of as having
a duration. Rather, if a product is defective at the instant in which it is transferred to

the buyer, the warranty has been breached, even though the defect may not become
apparent until some later date. Professor Reitz discusses some possible interpretations

of the language of the statute in his treatise. Rurrz, supra at 82-95.
243. For example, the relevant section of the House Committee Report merely
paraphrases the statute. See H. REP. No. 1107, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1974)
reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7702, 7722; See also S. CONF.REP. 1408, 93rd Cong.
2d Sess. 3 (1974) reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7755, 7757-58. One key member
of Congress commented "[firankly, I have trouble with the whole section. I don't
know precisely what it attempts to have done, and I am one of the authors of the bill,
frankly." Consumer Warranty Protection: Hearingson H.R. 6313, HR. 6314, H.R.
261, H.R. 4809, H.R. 5037, H.R. 10673 (and similarand identicalbills) Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce & Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate & Foreign

Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 187 (1971) (remark of Rep. Eckhardt).

The

legislative history on the meaning of duration of an implied warranty is discussed in
Klinger, supra note 242, at 951-53.

244. 16 C.F.R. §701.4(a)(7) (1994) requires only thatwarrantors state limitations
on the duration of implied warranties, together with a text that some states may not
allow such limitations, so that the limitation may not apply to the particular consumer.
245. 434 N.E.2d 943 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). SeegenerallyBixby, supranote238,
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limitation against challenge under Magnuson-Moss without much discussion
of the meaning of the Magnuson-Moss conscionability limit. The warranties
in the second case, Bush v. American Motors Sales Corp.,46 also were
limited to twelve months or 12,000 miles. On a motion to dismiss, the court
ruled the limitation conscionable as a matter of law. The Bush court did not
explain its decision beyond citing three other cases which it said had found
similar warranties to be reasonable and conscionable. None of the cases cited
by the court in Bush as support for the proposition that the warranty passed
muster under Magnuson-Moss refers to the Magnuson-Moss Act. Although
all three of the cases cited in Bush involved twelve-month warranties, in only
one did a party challenge a warranty on the ground that it was not reasonable
and conscionable, and that challenge was made under the UCC.247 Nothing
in the other two cases indicates that the litigants had argued that a warranty
was unconscionable; indeed, the word unconscionable is not even mentioned
in the decisions. Rather, both opinions seem to take as a given that a warranty
does not extend beyond its terms.24
Carlson v. GeneralMotors Corp.,249 took a different approach. Some
of the warranties at issue in Carlson were limited to two years or 24,000 miles
while others lasted three years or 50,000 miles. Defects in the engines of

many of the cars allegedly surfaced only after the warranties had expired. The
district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss, ruling as a matter of law
that the limitations were reasonable and conscionable."' The court of

at 144-45.
246. 575 F. Supp. 1581 (D. Colo. 1984).
247. Broe v. Oneonta Sales Co., 420 N.Y.S.2d 436,437-38 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).
Broe is also discussed infra, note 262.
248. See Hendersonv. General Motors Corp., 262 S.E.2d 238, 239 (Ga. Ct. App.
1979) ("The evidence on summary judgment shows without contradiction that
warranties had expired prior to the sale of the car to appellant. Thus, even if the

warranties were transferable to appellant, recovery will not lie under an implied
warranty theory."); Christopherv. Larson Ford Sales, Inc., 557 P.2d 1009, 1013 (Utah
1976) ("[Tlhe important point is that the warranty was limited to 12 months or 12,000
miles, whichever occurred first. The indisputable fact and the insuperable obstacle to
defendant's recovery against Condor, is that it had purchased the vehicle two years

previously.").
249. 883 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1989).
250. From the wording of the statute, quoted supranote239, it appears that the
duration of the implied warranties may be limited to the length of a written warranty,
if the duration of the written warranty is reasonable and the limitation of the implied
warranties is conscionable and meets other requirements of clarity and
conspicuousness. Thus, it appears that whether the impliedwarranties (as opposed to
the written warranty) are of reasonable duration should not be an issue, at least under
the plain meaning of the statute.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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appeals reversed, holding that the question of conscionability could not be
decided on the pleadings, but required a more developed record.
The Carlson court regarded as irrelevant decisions finding shorter
warranties to be conscionable, since, the court noted, "each case necessarily
turns on variable evidence of the 'commercial setting' in which challenged
disclaimers were imposed." 1 The court then explored ways in which the
warranty limit could have been unconscionable. 2 The complaint had
alleged that because the defendant had more bargaining power than the
plaintiff and there was not significant competition over warranties in the
automotive industry, the plaintiff had no choice but to accept the defendant's
warrantyterms. The plaintiff also alleged that the defendant had known of the
defect in its engines but did not warn consumers of the likelihood of engine
failure. The court of appeals ruled that those allegations, if proven, could
establish that the limits to the defendant's warranties were unconscionable.
Neither the Bush approach nor the Carlson approach is particularly
helpful to those challenging secret warranties. Car warranties are, if anything,
longer today than they were when the Bush court held a warranty of one year
or more conscionable as a matter of law. According to one recent report, no
auto warranty
is shorter than two years while most are three years or
3
longer.2
251. Carlson,883 F.2d at 293 n.8.
252. The Carlson court seemed to assume that conscionability as used in the
Magnuson-Moss Act has the same meaning as it does in the Uniform Commercial
Code ("UCC"). See also Klinger, supranote 242, at 966. Section 2-302(1) (1990) of
the UCC provides:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may
refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the

contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the
application of an unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable

result.
Id.
Given that at the time the Magnuson-MossAct was enacted, portions of the UCC
had been enacted in every state in the country, and that § 2-302 and the
unconscionability doctrine had spawned a large amount of discussion in cases,

scholarly articles, treatises, and law schools, Congress must have known that the word
it was using had a meaning, albeit a disputed meaning, in commercial law, the field
Congress was regulating. It thus seems plausible that Congress intended the word
conscionability to bring with it the baggage it had adquired since being incorporated

into the UCC.
253. See GILLIS, supra note 36, at 95-96. According to Gillis, only Porsche,

Suzuki Soft Tops, and Volkswagen provided basic warranties as short as two years.
The longest basic warranty was five years, provided by Chrysler on certain of its

models. Powertrain warranties and corrosion warranties tended to run even longer.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/2

74

1995]

Sovern: Sovern: Good Will Adjustment Games
SECRET WARRANTY REGULAThON

While the Carlson approach offers greater flexibility, it too has
significant drawbacks for someone trying to argue that an automobile
durational limitation is unconscionable. It is probably no longer fair to say
that auto manufacturers do not compete on the basis of warranty. There is
some variation in length of warranties, and at least one manufacturer,
Chrysler, has run an extensive campaign to publicize the terms of its
warranty. 4 It may be that courts will be receptive to the argument that
many consumers are inattentive to car warranties, and so even when
manufacturers provide varying degrees of warrantyprotection, consumers will
not adequately protect themselves, but other courts surely will not see that as
suggesting unconscionability 5 In addition, one apparently key allegation
in Carlson was that the defendant knew at the time it sold the cars of the
likelihood of catastrophic engine failures." 6 Many, perhaps most, secret
warranty programs involve defects about which the manufacturer did not know
at the time it sold the cars. 7
Consequently, those challenging durational limitations on the theory that
the existence of a secret warranty program renders the limit unconscionable
may have difficulty fitting their cases within any of the relevant precedents.
That difficulty may not prove insurmountable-it may be that courts will, on
reflection, choose a third approach to the problem-but it does not bode well
for the success of such challenges.
Even if a court finds that a durational limit is unconscionable, that still
will help only a limited class of consumers. At most, given the statute of
limitations on implied warranty claims, such a decision would extend the
period in which one could sue on the implied warranties to four years from

254. Indeed, intruth auto manufacturers competed on the basis of warranty at the
time Carlson was decided. See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 103, at 667 ("The
[auto] industry... began to compete extensively on warranty coverage in the 1960's,
and continues to compete in this area today."); see also Clark & Davis, supranote238,

at 568.
255. See supra note 105.
256. Carlson,883 F.2d at 294. The court wrote:

Perhaps, most significantly, plaintiffs also alleged that GM knew of inherent
defects in its diesel engines-but failed to warn its customers of the
consequential likelihood of "catastrophic failures." .. . The claim is, of
course, that GM imposed its durational limitations on the operation of
implied warranties in the course of bargaining tainted by the "concealment
of relevant facts", that, ipso facto, plaintiffs had no "meaningful choice"
when they accepted the limitations; and that the disclaimers themselves

were therefore unconscionable as a matter of law ....
Id.
257. But see Ford Motor Co., 96 F.T.C. at 365 (complaint alleges that
manufacturer knew of defects at time of sale). See supra note 156.
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the date tender of the good is made;" as some automobiles are already
warranted for four years or more, and most are warranted for at least three
years," even when a court is persuaded by the argument it will not help in
many cases.
F Miscellaneous Cases
Bennett v. Matt Gay Chevrolet Oldsmobile, Inc.,26 mentioned secret
warranties. After plaintiffs complained of steering problems, the manufacturer
and dealer made repairs. It was not clear whether those repairs were made
under the warranty or after the warranty expired, as a good will adjustment.
In addition, after the warranty ran, the manufacturer and dealer installed a new
power steering unit. The dealer had purchased the unit from an independent
parts supplier; unbeknownst to the manufacturer, the unit contained parts
which were not designed to fit the model year of plaintiff's car. One of the
plaintiffs lost control of the car and was injured in the ensuing accident. The
court denied the manufacturer's motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs'
negligence and breach of warranty counts, noting that the manufacturer had
known that the original steering mechanism was defective and that the
manufacturer had provided a secret warranty to correct the defect. The court
concluded its opinion by stating that "an issue remains for the jury to
determine if [the manufacturer] was negligent or breached its warranty to
plaintiffs and if so, whether the installation of the replacementpart in question
was foreseeable and thus whether.., negligence or breach [of warranty] by
[the manufacturer] was the proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries. 261
It is hard to know what significance to attribute to Bennett. Most likely,
the court used the existence of a secret warranty program only as an
acknowledgement by the manufacturer that a part was defective.
Alternatively, Bennett may speak to the liability of a manufacturer who
negligently repairs a car even when the manufacturer is under no duty to make
the repair.
But Bennett is also susceptible ,to a broader, if less plausible,
interpretation. The case could be read to imply a rule that manufacturers who
provide secret warranties are liable to those who are injured if the part covered
by the secret warranty proves defective. That rule would be justifiable on
policy grounds, for many of the same reasons discussed in Part III above,

258. See U.C.C. § 2-725 (1990) which provides that the statute of limitations for
breach of a contract for sale is four years after the cause of action has accrued and that
a breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made.
259. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.

2"60. 408 S.E.2d 111 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991).
261. Id. at 115.
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though it is harder to support as an extension of traditional product liability
common law. Certainly the notion that a warranty extends for a longer period
than its terms provide seems peculiar, absent unconscionability or a similar
rationale. Negligence (in failing to provide notice or properly made repairs
without charge to consumers, who later suffer personal injury from the defect,
when the manufacturer knows of the defect and is providing free repairs to
others) seems a more defensible argument, though it would be impracticable
for individual secret warranty plaintiffs to prove negligence in most cases,
given the expense of doing so. Even under this broader interpretation, Bennett
could be limited to cases in which the manufacturer unsuccessfully attempts
to correct the problem before the warranty expires. Such an interpretation will
not provide much assistance to consumers seeking the aid of secret warranties
after a warranty has expired.262

262. Two other reported cases have discussed secret warranties but did little to
advance the state of the law of that subject. In Broe v. Oneonta Sales Co., 420
N.Y.S.2d 436 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978), plaintiff sued an auto manufacturer for breach of
warranty after the warranty had expired. Plaintiff supported his claim by filing with

the court a newspaper clipping that stated that some manufacturers provided secret
warranties. The court, noting that "there is nothing to indicate that any secret
warranties existed here or, if so, the nature and extent of them, or more important, that
plaintiff knew and relied upon them and is entitled to the benefit of them," granted
summary judgment to the defendant. Id. at 437-438. The court thus implied that a
consumer could sue on a secret warranty only if the consumer knew of and relied on
the secret warranty. As that reliance, to be material, would have to come at the time
of purchase, and as even manufacturers typically do not know that they will offer a
secret warranty with a new car at the time of purchase, the effect of such a rule would
be to deny consumers an action on secret warranties. The court probably did not fully
understand the nature of secret warranties.
An unpublished opinion, K & B Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Polen, No. 9-151, 1983
WL 6221 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 8, 1983), also explored good will adjustments. The
manufacturer offered to pay for part of an out-of-warranty repair on the consumer's
car. When the consumer refused to pay for the remainder of the work, the dealership
which had repaired the car sued the consumer, and the consumer sued the
manufacturer. The trial court held that the manufacturer's offer to pay for part of the
work extended the warranty as to that repair, obliging the manufacturer to assume its
full cost. On appeal, that portion of the decision was reversed. The appellate court
ruled that the manufacturer's offer to pay part of the repair bill did not create any
obligation to pay for the rest. Nothing in the opinion suggests that the offer to pay
was part of a larger program directed at the defect in question; that is to say, it does
not appear from the decision that the offer to pay was part of a secret warranty
program. As the opinion is technically unpublished, its precedential value may be
limited.
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V. How SHOULD SECRET WARRANTlES BE REGULATED?

Part III of this Article argues that secret warranties should be regulated.
Part IV demonstrates that while secret warranties seem to violate existing,
vaguely-worded, rules governing consumer transactions, those rules have not,
with rare exceptions, been used to prohibit secret warranty programs. This
section explores what, if anything, should be done to further the regulation of
secret warranties.
One possible choice-to do nothing-seems unsatisfactory. The existing
statutes have not been effective in preventing car manufacturers from
operating secret warranty programs. In 1992, for example, the Center for
Auto Safety claimed to have discovered a new secret warranty involving a
defect allegedly affecting more than four million vehicles and costing more
than one billion dollars to correct.263 Of course, it cannot be determined
how many secret warranty programs remain undiscovered. In addition, it is
desirable to have clear and specific rules regulating secret warranties so that
consumers and manufacturers alike can readily identify their rights and
obligations, and then conform their conduct to the requirements of law at as
low a cost as possible.
A variety of issues involving secret warranty regulation will now be
considered in turn. Among them: Are secret warranties best regulated at the
state or federal level? Under what circumstances should a manufacturer's
adjustment program be regulated, or, to put it another way, how many cars
must a manufacturer repair for free before it can properly be said that it has
instituted a secret warranty? What type of notice should a manufacturer have
to give to consumers that free repairs are available? When a manufacturer
institutes a good will adjustment program, should it be obliged to reimburse
customers who have previously obtained the repairs on their own?
A. Should the Federal Government or the States
Regulate Secret Warranties?
Assuming that regulation is desirable, one critical issue is what level of
government ought to be involved. Though the federal governmentspecifically, the FTC-blazed the trail on secret warranties, more recently the
states have led the way, as has happened in a variety of areas in consumer

263. See Center for Auto Safety, Annual Report, 13 LEMON TIMEs, No. 4 at 1,
2 (1993) ("1992 saw CAS uncover one of the biggest secret warranties in
history-peeling paint on over 4 million 1985-92 Ford F-series pickups that Ford
officials estimated could cost $1 billion to repair. For owners that complained loudly,
Ford had authorized free repainting at a cost of $1,000 per truck.").
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protection.2" For several reasons, national regulation seems preferable to
state regulation. First, to the extent that state laws differ, they may increase
the expense of complying with the applicable rules. For example, if state A
requires that a company give notice by advertising and state B by direct mail,
the company may, in order to meet the requirements of state A, incur
unneeded expense by advertising in publications which are distributed in both
states. At least one industry representative has expressed concern about the
burden of complying with the secret warranty rules of different
administrative
265
states.
A second problem with leaving secret warranty regulation to the states is
that if some states enact secret warranty legislation while others do not-as
has already happened-some car buyers will continue to bear the costs of free
repairs for other car buyers. Assume that manufacturers comply with secret
warranty legislation, and that, as argued above, the expense of secret warranty
programs is ultimately borne in large measure by car buyers in the form of
increased purchase prices. 16 If some states require auto makers to notify
their citizens of the possibility of free repairs, the citizens of those states will
probably obtain more free repairs than those who live elsewhere.267 But the
residents of all states will share equally in the cost of the repairs, at least in
the short run. Consequently, car buyers in some states will end up subsidizing

264. See supra notes 152-61 and accompanying text. See also REPORT OF THE
A.B.A. SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ROLE OF
reprinted in MARKETING AND ADVERTISING
REGULATION; TE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISsION IN TB E1990s 412,421 (1990) ("The
THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMIssION,

state attorneys general have responded to the perceived slackening of FTC enforcement
with vigorous advertising programs of their own.").
265. See Conn. Hearings,supra note 13 (testimony of Alice Cantwell, Ford

Motor Co. Regional Manager of Governmental Relations) (opposing state regulation
because Ford notification is nationwide and reporting to state officials would create
additional administrative burdens).

266. See supranotes 74-76 and accompanying text.
267. One externality of secret warranty legislation is that it helps consumers in
other states obtain the free repairs as well. Once a manufacturer notifies the residents
of one state of the possibility of obtaining free repairs, some citizens of other states
will hear of the good will adjustments throughword of mouth or media coverage. The
likelihood, however, is that fewer people outside the enacting state will learn of the

good will adjustment than those inside the state, and so the problem of some car
buyers subsidizing the repairs of others will continue.
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repairs received in disproportionate numbers by car buyers in other states.268
That seems undesirable." 9

The states are in fact locked in a game similar to the Prisoner's Dilemma
with each other on secret warranties.1 0 Because the citizens of states
enacting secret warranty legislation reap nearly all of the benefits of the statute
while bearing only a small portion of the increase in costs, states have an
economic reason to pass such statutes, just as each prisoner has an incentive
to cooperate so as to receive a lesser sentence while imposing a greater one
on the other prisoner. Every time a state passes a secret warranty statute, it
increases the cost of providing good will adjustments. At some point,
however, when enough states have enacted secret warranty statutes, the cost
of offering secret warranties increases enough to have a greater impact on the
manufacturer's decision as to whether to offer a secret warranty at all.
Conceivably, in some instances, the greater cost will be enough to cause the
manufacturer not to offer a good will adjustment that it otherwise would have.
Just as each prisoner is better off if he is the only prisoner to confess, each

268. Cf Rice, supranote74, at 2 ("Significant state-to-state differences in laws
governing product quality and performance claims do exist... [and] the conditions
produce a market systemtransfer of a subsidy from consumers in less protective states
to purchasers in more protective jurisdictions."). In addition, as Professor Rice has
also pointed out, "the cost burden borne by residents of less protective states will
increase as more jurisdictions enact protective laws." Id. at 49.
269. Conceivably, car manufacturers could respond to secret warranty legislation
by adding a surcharge to the cost of cars sold in the enacting state, to recover the cost
of complying with the statute. At least one commentator has argued that a variety of
factors militate against adjustments in prices to reflect the different costs of different
rules enacted by different states. See Rice, supra note 74, at 5-8. In addition, such
a surcharge, in the short run, also shifts the cost of repairs from the car owners who
receive the repairs-who bought some years ago-to other car buyers-who buy today
and in the future. In the longer run that problem should take care of itself, as
manufacturers include the costs of secret warranties under the new legislation in the
purchase price of cars.
270. In that classic game, two accomplices, call them A and B, are arrested in the
commission of a crime. The prosecutor tells A that if A testifies against B, while B
remains silent, A will go free, while B is sentenced to fifteen years. Another
prosecutor makes an identical offer to B in a different room. Each is told that if
neither A nor B cooperates, both will get two years, but if both cooperate, each will
be sentenced to five years. Both prisoners would be better off if neither cooperated,
but each has an incentive to cooperate to protect himself from the other. The logical
move for each prisoner is to make a deal with the authorities, unless A and B are able
to agree with each other-and trust each other-that neither will cooperate. For
discussion of the prisoner's dilemma, see, e.g., BARNEs & STOUT, supranote 112, at
33-34; CHARiS J. GOETZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND ECONOMICS 8-19
(1984).
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state is better off if other states do not enact secret warranty legislation so that
manufacturers never reach the point at which the cost of complying with
legislation renders it uneconomic to institute free repair
secret warranty
271
programs.
These problems can be avoided if either Congress or the FTC intervene.
Congress, however, seems unlikely to act with respectto secret warranties any
time soon. Though Congress has enacted a variety of statutes governing
automobiles,272 it has not yet turned its attention to secret warranties, and
may never do so.
The FTC seems a more likely candidate for action at the federal level.
To be sure, the FTC has during the last decade eschewed a role in secret
warranty regulation, and its officials have expressed the view that secret
warranties should not be regulated.2 3 But the change in presidential
administrations might bring a similar change in the outlook of the FTC, and
the FTC has intervened in secret warranties before.
The FTC could act with respect to secret warranties in a variety of ways.
It could, as it did in 1980, litigate, either seeking cease and desist orders
through administrative adjudications, perhaps again with the goal of reaching
settlement agreements with auto manufacturers, or it could file in federal court
for injunctive relief. 4 The FTC could promulgate a trade regulation rule
enforceable through civil penalties and consumer redress actions. 5

271. The discussion assumes that consumers in states lacking secret warranty
legislation receive fewer free repairs than do those in stateswhich do have legislation.
This is likely to be so, even if the media publicizes the fact of a secret warranty in
news accounts, since the media probably would not provide as widespread notice as
would a direct mail campaign, for example.
272. See, e.g., National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1381-1431 (1988); Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1982, repealedbyPub. L. No. 103-272, § 7(b), 108 Stat. 1379 (1994).

273. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
274. See 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (1988). See generally 1 KAmvrr, supranote 164, at
ch. 10.
275. See 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1)(B) (1988). See generally1 KAMVr, supranote

164, at ch. 6. In 1994, Congress restricted the FTC's power to promulgate trade
regulation rules to circumstances in which the unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
question "are prevalent." Such acts or practices are considered prevalent only if the
Conumissionhas previously issued cease and desist orders regarding them, or if "other
information available to the Commission indicates a widespread pattern of unfair or
deceptive acts or practices." Pub. L. No. 103-312, § 5, amending 15 U.S.C. § 57a(b).
This prevalence requirement should not pose a problem with secret warranties, given
the past consent decrees and the frequent reports of secretwarranties in the media and
by consumer groups.
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Alternatively, the FTC could issue an industry guidep 6 or an advisory

opinion."

The FTC could also pursue some combination of these activities.

Interestingly, the Fordsecret warranty consent order providbd for what would
happen if the FTC issued a trade regulation rule or a guide involving the
subject of the consent order, implying that the FTC considered the possibility
of a secret warranty regulation or guide. 8 The relative merits of these
different ways of proceeding-which have been discussed extensively
elsewhere 2 9 -is beyond the scope of this Article. It is enough to note that
the FTC has a number of options in choosing how to proceed, if it elects to
do so.
B. How Should Secret WarrantiesBe Defined?
The definition of a secret warranty is critical because only when a
manufacturer satisfies that definition will the statute be triggered. For
example, suppose a manufacturer chooses to pay for repairs to a system which
has failed in a single car after the warranty has expired. Assume that no other
reports of failures of that system have been received. No one proposes to
require a manufacturer who repairs one car to notify all other purchasers of
its cars of the availability of free repairs. Consequently, any definition of
good will adjustments should exclude such single repairs. On the other hand,
if the manufacturer frequently assumes the cost of repairs to other cars which
have suffered the same system failure, at some point the manufacturer will
have made so many repairs that it can fairly be said that the manufacturer has
adopted a good will adjustment policy. Any definition should embrace such
a situation.
This point-that the definition should focus on the number of repairs
provided by the manufacturer-was overlooked by the drafters of the four
secret warranty statutes and the Ford consent decree, which all define
adjustment programs similarly. Connecticut's statute, for example, provides
that an adjustment program is "any program or policy that expands or extends
the consumer's warranty beyond its stated limit or under which a manufacturer
offers to pay for all or any part of the cost of repairing, or to reimburse
consumers for all or any part of the cost of repairing, any condition that may
substantially affect vehicle durability, reliability or performance ..

276. See 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1)(A) (1988).
277. 16 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1994).
278. FordMotorCo., 96 F.T.C. at 375.
279. See, e.g., Report of the A.B.A., supranote264, at 426-32; 1 KANWrr, supra
note 164, § 6.02.
280. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-227(a)(4) (West 1993). See also CAL. Civ. CODE
§ 1795.90(d) (West Supp. 1995); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 218.017(1)(a) (West 1994).
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The definitions also exclude repairs made under a safety or emission-related
and "adjustments made by a manufacturer on a case by case
recall campaign,
28
basis."
A problem has arisen under the Connecticut definition. The Center for
Auto Safety has charged that one manufacturer has attempted to evade the
Connecticut statute by erroneously characterizing its repairs as performed on
a case-by-case basis. 2' The manufacturer's position seems to be that the
statute applies only if the manufacturer automatically provides free repairs to
all complaining consumers, and that it does not apply to the situation in which
the manufacturer evaluates each claim separately, granting some and denying
others. The statute could also be interpreted as being triggered by a decision
to provide -repairs to some, unstated number of consumers who meet certain
criteria, even though free repairs are denied to other consumers who do not
meet those criteria. Though this latter interpretation seems more defensible

Virginia's statute is similar except that it fails to make explicit that the law does not
apply to repairs made under written warranties. Rather, it requires adjustment
programs to be "extended policy programs," which is presumably intended to refer to
extensions of express warranties. See VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-207.34 (Michie 1991).
The Fordconsent order definition is quoted supra in note 160.

281. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1795.90(d) (West Supp. 1995); CoNN. GEN. STAT.
§ 42-227 (West 1992 & Supp. 1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-207.34 (Michie 1991);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 218.017(1)(a) (West 1994).
282. See, e.g, World News This Week, AuToWEEK, Feb. 3, 1992, at 3 (CAS
charges that Honda is attempting to evade Connecticut's secret warranty law by
labeling repair as "goodwill adjustment" in dealer bulletins.); Anthony Giorgianni, A

Whispered Promise to Pay? Honda Accused of Violating State Law on Secret
Warranties,HARTFOPfDCOURANT, Jan. 16, 1992, atA16 (CAS charges Honda notified
dealers it would pay certain repair costs but did not tell Connecticut car owners in
violation of Connecticut law; Honda asserts it is not required to notify car owners

because repairs are made on case-by-case basis. CAS claims that repairs are being
provided free to all who request them. HONDA Sept. 21, 1991 bulletin to service

managers quoted as saying "Any repair performed after warranty expiration may be
eligible for goodwill consideration by the District Sales Manager."); Giorgianni, supra
note 19, at E3 ("Automakers can circumvent the [Connecticut] law, however, by
issuing 'good-will adjustments' instead of warranty extensions. In good-will
adjustments, the manufacturers notify dealers they will pay to correct defects and

related damage, but on a case-by-case basis,with the final decisionusually resting with
the dealer or the manufacturer's zone representative. Connecticut's hidden warranty
disclosure law does not require automakers to notify vehicle owners about good-will

adjustments. But critics, including the CAS, say such notification should be required
because manufacturers often don't apply such adjustments case by case but give them

to everyone who complains.").
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as a matter of statutory interpretation, and certainly as a matter of policy, the
manufacturer's interpretation is not beyond the pale.2"
A preferable definition, and one that would avoid the problem with the
Connecticut statute, would have a trigger based on the number of repairs or
percentage of cars sold receiving free or reduced cost repairs provided by the
manufacturer. When the manufacturer exceeded the threshold of, say, the
lower of 200 free or reduced cost repairs of the same defect, or free or
reduced cost repairs of the same defect provided to ten percent of the cars of
a particular year and model, the manufacturer would be required to comply
with the statute. The figures 200 and ten percent are completely arbitrary.
The goal is to select numbers which imply that so many cars suffer from this
problem that it would be productive for societyto require the manufacturer to
notify all or many owners of such cars of the availability of free repairs; 200
and ten percent may or may not be those numbers. Obviously, little point
would be served in requiring manufacturers to incur expenses notifying
consumers that they can obtain free repairs for a condition from which their
car does not suffer.'
A final point related to the definition of a good will adjustment concerns
the value of the repairs. It may be that a manufacturer would choose to
institute a hidden warranty program for an extremely inexpensive repair. For
example, the manufacturer might, as a matter of course, always replace a
missing screw if the repairer noticed its absence, even if a consumer who
might have brought the car in for an unrelated repair had not noticed the
absence of the screw. The manufacturer should not be required to comply

283. The manufacturer's interpretation would reduce the statute to one that
provided that when a manufacturer decided to repair the cars of all who complain
about a specific defect, the manufacturer must also notify those who do not complain.
That would make the statute considerably less significant: a manufacturer could avoid
complying with it simply by electing to make repairs on a case by case basis.
284. See Conn. Hearings,supranote 13 (statement of Automobile Importers of
America, Inc.):
One major difficulty is the determination of what characteristics of
vehicles merit a wide-ranging offer of assistance. For a problem that
manifests itself inless than one percent of avehicle class or a characteristic
that one in 10,000 owners may observe, complying with extensive notice
and repair obligation [sic] would be a waste of time and money.
Another difficulty is defining how many instances of assistance
constitute an "adjustment program." If a manufacturer repairs five cars on
an ad hoc basis, does an "adjustment program" exist?
See also Werber, supra note 23, at 1085 ("Ford was once required to recall 200,000
trucks to find a single vehicle with a wheel related safety defect."); Bob Tamarkin,
Recalls-The Costs Soar, FORBES, July 10, 1978, at 79 ("Not every recalled car is
defective. The defect rate on recalls has generally ranged from 20% to 35%.").
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/2
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with notice requirements as to such repairs. Consequently, any secret
warranty statute should have a minimum threshold for the value to the
customer of the repairs before the statute is triggered. 5

C. What Type of Notice Should Be Required?
Once a decision is made to regulate secret warranties, notice is probably
the thorniest issue. It has great potential for increasing the cost of providing
adjustments to the point where manufacturers choose not to offer adjustment
programs. Better quality notice increases the cost of adjustment programs two
ways. First, it is itself more expensive. And second, because better quality
notice results in more affected consumers learning of the availability of free
repairs, it increases the number of consumers who may seek repairs. On the
other hand, notice is obviously critical to helping consumers obtain free
repairs.

1. Notice at the Time of Purchase
The four secret warranty statutes require a variety of notices. When a
consumer purchases a car, the statutes require the manufacturer to notify the
consumer that the manufacturer sometimes offers post-warranty adjustment
programs.8 6 The Ford consent order contained a similar requirement. 2"

285. Because the focus of this article has been on automobiles, it has not been
necessary to consider whether the product which is the subject of the secret warranty
should also have a minimum price before the manufacturer should be required to
notify consumers of the availability of free repairs. But some products other than cars
have been the subject of secret warranties, see supra note 12, and so legislation could
conceivably be drafted which would be applicable to goods other than cars. If so, the
statute should specify that it does not apply unless the good sells for more than some
minimum amount large enough to justify the cost of providing notice.
286. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 1795.91(a) (West Supp. 1995) (dealer provides
notice; not limited to new car purchasers); CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 42-227(d) (1993); VA.
CODE ANN. § 59.1-207.36 (Michie 1991) (not limited to new car purchasers); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 218.017(2) (West 1994). Toyota, for example, places the following
notice to purchasers in the glove compartment at the time of purchase:
To further demonstrate our commitment to your satisfaction with your
Toyota car or truck, there may be times when Toyota will establish a
special policy adjustment for your particular vehicle model which will pay
for all or part of the repair cost beyond normal warranty coverage. If you
should experience a problem or concerns, either within or outside of the
warranty period, please follow these procedures in sequence listed for the
fastest possible response. STEP 1: CONTACT THE DEALERSHIP
CUSTOMER RELATIONS MANAGER, STEP 2: CALL THE TOYOTA
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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Ironically, though such a notice requirement seems prudent, and was in
fact used above to support the argument that secret warranties can be
deceptive, this type of notice may not be of much help to consumers, unless
steps are taken to increase the likelihood that consumers will read and
remember the information. Many car buyers probably do not read through all
the documentation they receive when they purchase a new car.2" Even
those who read the documents when they first receive the car might be less
attentive to matters which are not likely to be useful for years, especially in
light of the information overload effect-consumers who buy a new car
receive a great deal of printed matter and many do not give full attention to
some of it.2" 9 Finally, some consumers who read and attend to the legend
surely forget about it over time. This is, after all, a provision that is not
helpful until the warranty expires three or more years later.
Nevertheless, it is possible to make this type of notice more helpful. If
it were to appear on the cover of the warranty booklet, for example, in a
conspicuous typeface or color, consumers would be more likely to notice it,

CUSTOMER ASSISTANCE CENTER (1-800-331-4431).
NY Hearings,supranote 2 (testimony of Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.).
287. See FordMotor Co., 96 F.T.C. at 269. Ford also agreed to maintain a
toll-free number for consumers to call to obtain information on adjustment programs,
to urge dealers to post information on adjustments in their showrooms and service
areas, and to advertise the existence of adjustment programs in various publications,
including the "Ford Times."
288. For example, one study determined that some warranties go unread by some
consumers because the warranties are too long, too technical, or too legal. See
ARTHUR YOUNG & Co., supranote 18, at 60. See also Ellen M. Moore & F. Kelly
Shuptrine, Warranties: ContinuedReadability ProblemsAfter the 1975 MagnusonMoss Warranty Act, 27 J. CoNsuMkR AFFAiRs 23, 31-32 (1993) (average auto
warranty requires post-graduate reading level). Another study found that 91.5% of the
responding consumers agreed that "customers are not likely to check a product's
guarantee very well until after the product has been bought and some problem arises."
Wilkes & Wilcox, supranote 64, at 39. Consumers who see at the beginning of the
warranty that it has expired are thus likely never to make it to the statement about
post-warranty coverage unless the statement is prominent. In a dramatic illustration
of how consumers don't read notices, a bank that was required by law to provide a
particular notice to its customers, included with the notice a statement that it would
pay $10 to any customer who mailed in to the bank his or her name and address on
a piece of paper bearing the word, "regulation." No one did so. See ALAN SCHWARTZ
& ROBERT E. ScoTr, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTiONS: PRINCIPLES AND PoLicIES 1142
(2d ed. 1991).
289. Cf Whitford, supranote 105, at 152-53 (consumers who had been provided
oral explanation of warranty at time of purchase did not perform significantly better
when quizzed later on warranty than those who were not given oral explanation). For
discussion of information overload, see supranotes 102-03 and accompanying text.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/2
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read it, and even recall it. If it is thought desirable to provide such a notice,
and it does appear useful, steps should be taken to increase the likelihood that
consumers will in fact receive the information in a usable way.29 At a
minimum, that reduces the problem of deception.
2. Notice at the Time a Secret Warranty Program is Adopted
The four secret warranty statutes all require manufacturers who institute
a good will adjustment program so notify owners of eligible automobiles by
first class mail within ninety days of adoption of the program.29' Under the
Fordconsent order, Ford agreed to provide mail notice of any new good will
adjustment programs it started.'
Mail notice is probably one of the best ways of reaching affected
consumers.2 But it can be very expensive, so expensive that it provides

290. There is always a danger, in highlighting one disclosure, of obscuring others.
Cf. Howard Beales et al., The Efficient Regulation of ConsumerInformation,24 J.L.

& ECON. 491, 534 (1981) ("the information disclosed will act as a signal which
channels competition away from some other, more important product attribute");
Henry Weinstock, Comment, Consumer Warranty Law in California Under the
Commercial Code and the Song-Beverly and Magnuson-Moss Warranty Acts, 26

U.C.L.A. L. REv. 583, 593 (1979) ("We may pity the consumer who is forced to
receive voluminous documents all of whose terms are in large colorful print, bold-face
type, and capital letters."). Nevertheless, it is difficult to think of some critical
information that would be overlooked if this were printed on the cover of the warranty
booklet. It is, however, undeniable, that there is an inconsistency between wanting
consumers to know of secret warranties, so they can take advantage of them, and not
wanting consumers to know of secret warranties so as to avoid distracting consumers
from other product characteristics.
291. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1795.92(a) (West Supp. 1995); CoNN. GEN. STAT.
§ 42-227(c) (West 1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-207.35 (Michie 1991); Wis. STAr.
ANN. § 218.017(2) (West 1994).
292. FordMotorCo., 96 F.T.C. at 373.
293. Arequirement that sellers give notice by mail requires manufacturers to have
access to the names and addresses of their customers, but apparently manufacturers do
retain that information concerning the initial purchasers of their cars. See Conn.
Hearings,supra note 13 (testimony of Alice Cantwell, Ford Motor Co., Regional

Manager of Governmental Relations) (Ford maintains records of first owners of cars;
speaking of notifications of recalls of cars still under warranty, she stated "because
now of the wonderful computer world and the identification system, consumers are
notified very easily"); George E. Hoffer et al., When RecallsMatter: FactorsAffecting
Owner Response to Automotive Recalls, 28 J. CONSUMER AFFAms 96, 100 (1994)
("Before initiating a recall campaign, the manufacturer obtains from each state's motor

vehicle registration files a list of currentregistered owners of the recalled vehicles.")
(emphasis in original).
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a significant disincentive to institute an adjustment program.294 One
manufacturer sometimes forgoes mail notice, and makes do by telling its
dealers of the program, making service bulletins available to public, and
sometimes issuing a press release. 5 Similarly, in one case involving not
secret warranties, but alleged defects in a car, the FTC and a manufacturer
negotiated a settlement under which the manufacturer agreed to advertise the
availability of an arbitration program and to give direct mail notice only to
whose names were supplied to the manufacturer by State Attorneys
consumers
296
General.
Another approach which might be less expensive would be to specify that
manufacturers must provide actual notice to some proportion of their affected
customers-say seventy-five percent-within a specified period of time and
leave to the manufacturers the question of how to attain that result. As
manufacturers probably have more experience, through their marketing efforts,
at communicating commercialinformation than government, manufacturers are
more likely to come up with the cheapest way to provide notice than
government.2'
In some cases, manufacturers might prefer to use mail
298
notice, especially when relatively few had purchased the affected

cars.

294. Cf Beales et al., supra note 290, at 522 ("information should not be
generated beyond the point at which its marginal benefits equal its marginal costs");
Ayres & Miller, supranote 78, at 1076 ("Requiring ... disclosure when the costs of
communicating are higher than the value of the information to consumers would force
retailers to provide a service whose value is less than its cost.").
295. Conn. Hearings,supra note 13 (Letter from R.J. Bugno, General Motors
General Director of Service Operations (Jan. 30, 1990)). General Motors also
announces the availability of its service bulletins in its owners' manuals, as well as in

People Magazine and Reader's Digest, and prints in its warranty books the telephone
number to call to obtain information.
296. GeneralMotorsCorp., 102 F.T.C. at 1759, 1762 (consent order).
297. See Beales et al., supra note 290, at 522-23:
There is usually an advantage in designing disclosure remedies that leave
as large a role as possible to normal market forces, to restrict the market as
little as possible. The goal should be not to specify the exact information
to be disclosed and the exact manner in which it will be disclosed but to
give sellers the proper incentives to make these decisions on their own.
This reduces the consequences of a bad decision by the government since
it avoids forcing sellers to disclose information in an ineffective manner or
to disclose information which, because of a change in circumstances, is no
longer desired by consumers. It also increases the effectiveness of the
remedy by harnessing sellers' own incentives to develop the most effective
ways of informing consumers. Thus, innovation should be encouraged by
leaving sellers latitude to experiment.
298. Whenmail notice is the manufacturer's choice, the manufacturer should be
required to provide that notice to all affected consumers, not just to 75%. In addition,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/2
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In other cases, where the cost of mail notice would be prohibitive, some
combination of advertising and notice in dealer's showrooms and service
centers might be more efficient, especially since word of mouth and news
coverage might carry the news to some consumers who did not see the
advertising.
One notice issue revolves around independent repair shops. A consumer
experiencing a problem with her car before receiving notice that the problem
is covered by an adjustment program, will often bring her car to an
independent mechanic.299 Repair shops have a disincentive to tell consumers

about secret warranties.

A mechanic who tells the consumer that the

manufacturer would repair the problem for free loses business. Some
mechanics might tell the consumer anyway, out of innate honesty or a belief
that they will retain the customer's good will over the long run, but many will
not.3" 0 Consequently, at the point at which the consumer most needs to
know about the secret warranty-when the defect surfaces and the consumer
is about to authorize a mechanic to perform the work-the consumer is
dealing with someone who will not want to tell him about the existence of
secret warranties.
One way to deal with this problem is to oblige manufacturers to maintain
toll-free numbers which consumers can call to learn about good will
adjustments.0 ' Although the four secret warranty statutes do not provide
for 800 numbers, Ford agreed to provide information about adjustment
programs on toll-free lines under its FTC consent order. 0 2 But toll-free
telephone numbers are not a complete solution either. How likely is it that
consumers will remember to call when they have a problem with their car?
A better solution is to require independent mechanics to post in a conspicuous
location somewhere on their premises a notice that manufacturers do
sometimes provide free after-warranty repairs and a suggestion that the
consumer call the manufacturer's 800 number to inquire whether the particular
condition is the subject of an adjustment. Mechanics will surely not greet this

manufacturers who mailother documents to consumers during the relevant period, such
as promotional material, should be obliged to include notice of the good will
adjustment in the envelope as well. Some manufacturers even publish proprietary
magazines, such as Chevy Outdoors.

299. The four state statutes all require that notice be provided within ninety days
of the institution of the program, see supranote 227 and accompanying text, but the
defect surely manifests in some cars during that period.
300. See ESKELDSON, supra note 83, at 68.
301. See Polachek & Steinbach, supranote 6, at 7; Center for Auto Safety, CAS
RecommendationsforState Secret WarrantyLegislation, 11 LEMON TIMES No. 3, at
4 (1990).
302. See FordMotorCo., 96 F.T.C. at 371-72.
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recommendation with enthusiasm, but it offers the greatest opportunity for
providing consumers with notice at the moment when that notice would be
most useful. 33
An example of how these notice requirements fit together might be
helpful. Suppose a defect occurs in a small proportion of a particular model
of a car, say one percent," 4 and the defect is one that no owner of a car
would allow to go uncorrected. In such a case, a manufacturer that wrote to
all the owners of the model would incur a large expense to provide
information of use to very few consumers. The manufacturer, facing such an
expense for such a small return in good will, might choose instead to forego
the good will of the one percent of its customers, perhaps trusting that some
will continue to buy its products anyway and some would have exited
anyway" 5 If consumers could obtain notice of a good will adjustment
through calling the toll-free number after seeing the reminder in repair shops,
that, together with some advertising, might be enough to reach the bulk of the
affected consumers, and still not discourage the manufacturer from offering
the good will adjustments.

303. Even this may not be a complete success. As one observer has commented:
One drawback to the installation of a toll-free hot line is that consumers
would need to call the number every time they bring the car into the shop.
Since, in most instances, consumers do not know what is wrong with the
car when they bring it into the repair shop, a call to the toll-free line would
have to be made after the repair has been completed.
Conn. Hearings,supranote 13 (statement of Clarine Nardi Riddle, Attorney General
of the State of Connecticut). But since consumers could describe the symptoms of the
problem to the manufacturer over the telephone, very often a good guess could be
made as to whether the problem is covered under a good will adjustment program or
not.
304. Cf Nager, supranote 65, at 306 n.30 ("In some recall campaigns as few as
one percent of the vehicles involved may actually have a safety-related defect, the
remainder being recalled only to locate defective vehicles. For instance, Chrysler
recalled 1.3 million Dodge Aspens and Plymouth Volares to locate 13,000 that were
defective . . . . All models or years of a given vehicle may be recalled due to
similarity in design or production even though only a small number actually need
repair or modification.").
305. See N.. Hearings,supra note 2 (testimony of Automobile Importers of
America, Inc.) ("One crucial problem in dealing with this issue is the determination
of what characteristics of vehicles merit a wide-ranging offer of assistance. For a
problem that manifests itself in less than one percent of a vehicle class or a
characteristic that one in 10,000 owners may observe, complying with a requirement
for notice and an offer to repair all vehicles would be a waste of time and money.
Legislation requiring notice to all vehicle owners, if any owners were offered an
adjustment, would in these circumstances probably mean that no one would be offered

anything ....

).
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When a consumer seeks repairs for a condition which is the subject of a
good will adjustment program, the state secret warranty statutes also require
dealers to notify the consumer of the - existence of the program." 6
Concomitantly, California, Virginia, and Wisconsin require manufacturers
promptly to notify dealers of good will adjustment programs." ° Both
requirements make sense.
D. Should ManufacturersHave to Reimburse Those Who Have
Already Paidfor Repairs?
All four state statutes require manufacturers who provide good will
adjustments to reimburse consumers who have already paid for repairs,
"consistent with the terms and conditions of the program."3
The Ford
consent order contained a similar reimbursement provision,0 9 while Chrysler
pledged to reimburse owners "for the actual or the usual and customary
charges in the owner's trade area, whichever is lower" in its agreement.310
Indeed, the arguments for not permitting manufacturers to conceal the
existence of adjustment programs militate in favor of reimbursement as well.
But reimbursement poses special problems.
Reimbursement risks much greater exposure for manufacturers. When
manufacturers adopt a good will adjustment program, they can determine how
much they will contribute to repairs. Because they can specify the
replacement parts, if any are needed, and can shorten the diagnostic process
by providing information to dealers, they can reduce costs. But manufacturers
cannot control the cost of repairs already made. In addition, because those
repairs were presumably made without the benefit of the manufacturer's
diagnostic information, they may be considerably more expensive than the
repairs the dealer would have provided. Finally, an offer to reimburse
consumers for previously-made repairs creates some possibility for fraud. For
example, consumers could collude with repairers to submit inflated bills to
manufacturers. This greater exposure, the full extent of which is difficult to

306. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 1795.91(b) (West Supp. 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 42-227(e) (West 1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-207.36(B) (Michie 1991); WIs.
STAT. ANN. § 218.017(2) (West 1994).
307. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 1795.92(c) (West Supp. 1995); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 59.1-207.36(B) (Michie 1991); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 218.017(2) (West 1994).
308. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 1795.92(d) (West Supp. 1995); CoNN. GEN. STAT.
§ 42-227(f (West 1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-207.37 (Michie 1991); WIs. STAT.
ANN. § 218.017(3) (West 1994).
309. FordMotorCo., 96 F.T.C. at 374 (reimbursement to be "adjusted to fit the
circumstances, terms and conditions of the particular program in question").

310. ChryslerCorp., 96 F.T.C. at 139.
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predict, might discourage manufacturers from offering good will adjustment
programs.
One way to cure this problem is to limit the amount the manufacturer
must pay. For example, the manufacturer could reimburse consumers only
what it has already decided to pay its dealers for providing the same repair.
This might be what is meant by the language in the statutes that
reimbursement shall be "consistent with the terms and conditions of the [good
will adjustment] program."3"'
But such a limitation has costs of its own. It may not fully cover the
costs incurred by consumers who obtained the repairs before the adjustment
program was initiated. Because other consumers are able to obtain the repairs
for free, consumers who paid for their own repairs are not put on an equal
footing, and that seems troublesome.
In addition, when manufacturers must reimburse consumers at a higher
rate than they provide their own dealers, they have an incentive to move
quickly to create a good will adjustment program. The longer the
manufacturer waits to start an adjustment program, the larger the number of
customers who will be due reimbursement at a greater rate than the
manufacturer provides its dealers, and so the cost to the manufacturer
increases when the manufacturer finally inaugurates a program. Itis desirable
to provide manufacturers an incentive to start good will adjustment programs
as early as possible.
One compromise solution might be to provide for reimbursement at a rate
no greater than ten percent higher than the amount the manufacturer pays
dealers for performing the repairs. That comes closer to compensating those
who paid for the repairs and provides some encouragement to manufacturers
to move swiftly to institute good will adjustment programs, but still limits the
manufacturer's exposure.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that from the standpoint of economics, as well as
simple fairness, secret warranties should be regulated. But existing regulation
has not been effective. Consequently, new regulatory initiatives are needed.
Although most new efforts with respect to secret warranties have occurred at
the state level, federal intervention, either through legislation or FTC action,
would be preferable. Any regulation should contain provisions providing for
notification of affected owners, availability of repairs to all affected owners,
and limited reimbursement of those who have already paid for repairs.

311. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 1795.92(d) (West Supp. 1995); CoNN. GEN. STAT.
§ 42-227(f (West 1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-207.37 (Michie 1991); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 218.017(3) (West 1994).
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